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Preface 
The CEVIS project (Comparative Evaluations of Innovative Solutions in European 
Fisheries Management) has been funded by the EU Six Framework programme. CE-
VIS is a multi-disciplinary project in which 14 European research institutes within 
biology, economics and social science have been cooperating.  
 
Although results from the work are published in books and journal articles it is impor-
tant that the underlying model development, data, and data applications are docu-
mented and accessible This report comprises detailed information of the work carried 
out in work package four of the CEVIS project. This package investigated the eco-
nomic efficiency of four cases in an innovation evaluation framework (IEF). In chap-
ter one of this report the objectives of CEVIS, the evaluation framework and the se-
lected cases in work package four are introduced starting from the project description 
of CEVIS. Chapter two comprises a review of and a reflection on economic indica-
tors. Chapter three to six deals with the four cases of management regimes in term of 
specification of the problem and hypothesis, the method applied to address the prob-
lem and the results.  
 
The work in work package four has been headed by Ayoe Hoff, the Danish Institute 
of Food and Resource Economics (FOI). The cooperating partners are the Dutch Insti-
tute of Agricultural Economics (LEI) and the AZTI Foundation, the Basque Country, 
Spain. FOI has, in particular, been working together with the Danish Institute for 
Fisheries Research, now DTU Aqua, while LEI has cooperated with the Dutch Insti-
tute for Fisheries Research, IMARES. AZTI covers both economic and biological ex-
pertise. 
 
All chapters in the report have been subjected to extensive discussions in the whole 
group. Hans Frost (FOI) has mainly been responsible for chapter two. Erik Buisman 
and Jeffrey P. Powell (LEI) have been mainly responsible for chapter three. Jesper L. 
Andersen and Ayoe Hoff (FOI) have been main responsible for chapter four, and 
Arantza Murillas (AZTI) has been the main responsible for chapter five. Finally, 
Ayoe Hoff has been the main person responsible for chapter six. Elsebeth Vidø (FOI) 
has carried out the final editing. 
 
Director General Henrik Zobbe 
Institute of Food and Resource Economics 
Copenhagen, February 2009 
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Summary 
The work in the CEVIS project was organised into eight work packages. In this report 
the effect of innovative fisheries management is tested on economic efficiency. The 
task, of which the results are presented in this report, is to compare and evaluate fish-
eries management regimes in terms of economic efficiency. Economic efficiency can 
be conceptually defined and evaluated in various ways, but the objective was to re-
view, both theoretically and empirically, how economic efficiency of fisheries can be 
estimated and summarised as an indicator of performance and related to an innovative 
evaluation framework (IEF) as developed in one of the other work packages of the 
CEVIS project, aiming at assessing the likely economic efficiency outcome of various 
management options for a range of case study fisheries.  
 
In CEVIS, in general, the term “indicators” is used broadly to include measurements 
and observations of the inputs, key processes and outcomes of management. The sub-
stance of the IEF will be a set of indicators as well as the procedures for measuring 
them. Chapter two of this report is not solely a literature review but also an analysis 
that reflects on the issue economic efficiency when used as an indicator. The aim is to 
identify the information that will be used to assess the economic performance of the 
selected cases. The use of indicators requires at least four steps: 1) criteria used for 
assessment of economic efficiency; 2) identification and specification of indicators; 3) 
reference points; and 4) interpretation and assessment of outcome and decisions (e.g. 
the traffic light system). 
 
For the whole CEVIS project a number of cases have been selected. Four specific 
cases have been subjected to analyses in this report: 1) For the North Sea, manage-
ment systems with respect to recovery programmes for flatfish have been investi-
gated. The management systems are TAC/quota controls, and effort controls; 2) In the 
Baltic Sea case, various extensions of marine reserves have been investigated; 3) For 
the Western shelf, the case has centered on participatory governance with respect to 
improving stock assessments due to better information about discards and unreported 
landings provided by the industry and finally; 4) the transferable effort system in 
terms of sea days of the Faroe Islands has received attention.  
 
The selected indicator for evaluation of economic efficiency is net present value 
(NPV). For the innovative management schemes evaluated in the four cases the main 
results are as follows: 
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For the North Sea flatfish recovery programme, a TAC/quota scenario, a minimum 
effort scenario and a maximum effort scenario have been assessed. For the 
TAC/quota scenario, the sole quota is assumed to be driving the fishing effort of the 
fleet. For the minimum effort scenario, the most restrictive quota of sole and plaice is 
used to determine the allowed effort, and for the maximum effort scenario the least 
binding quota of the two is used to determine the effort. It is assumed that fishermen 
behave differently under the TAC/quota and the effort management schemes, mean-
ing that under TAC management the trip with the lowest profit per quota unit is 
dropped first. Under an effort management system it is the trip with sea days showing 
the lowest profit that are dropped first. The NPV over 40 years is € 484 millions for 
the TAC scenario, € 671 millions for the minimum effort scenario and € 328 millions 
for the maximum effort scenario. Thus, over the whole simulation period, the mini-
mum effort scenario performs better than the TAC scenario followed by the maxi-
mum effort scenario.  
 
For the Baltic Sea, the economic consequences of marine protected areas have been 
assessed. Three scenarios have been investigated by maximising the fleets‟ profits 
over 10 years. The optimisation is done under a range of restrictions including maxi-
mum and minimum number of days at sea per vessel and expected quotas. In the base 
status-quo scenario, the total net present profit for the Danish fleet is DKK 6,331 mil-
lions (€ 850 millions). In scenario 1 with extended closures around the Bornholm and 
the Gotland Deep and scenario 2 with further extension of the closed area around the 
Bornholm Deep, the values are DKK 3,640 millions (€ 489 millions) and DKK 3,689 
millions (€ 495 millions) respectively. As such, the scenario evaluations indicate that 
extending the marine protected areas in the Baltic Sea will decrease the economic ef-
ficiency of the Danish fishing fleet.  
 
For the Western shelf, the effect of management through participatory governance has 
been assessed. It is assumed that the participatory governance will improve the qual-
ity of the input data to the assessment in terms of reduced bias and uncertainty. This 
improvement will, principally, be reflected in the reduction of the unreported landings 
and inclusion of discard data. Five scenarios have been investigated: The base case, 
two TAC and two effort scenarios for which discards and unreported landing are ob-
served with the implication of improved stock assessment and improved management. 
The result is that over a 40 year period the TAC scenario with full observation of dis-
cards and unreported landings performs best. Effort management where there is no 
underreporting performs almost as good as the TAC scenario with full observation. 
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For the Faroese effort case, six scenarios have been evaluated. The species considered 
are cod, hake and saithe. The applied model is, in general, similar to the one applied 
to the North Sea case in the sense that the minimum and the maximum effort to catch 
each of the three species are computed and used in the projections of future catches 
and effort. For two of the min/max effort scenarios, a restriction on the change in ef-
fort at 10% has been used and for two other a 20% restriction on change has been 
used. The fifth scenario evaluates the situation where neither the minimum nor the 
maximum effort is used, but the effort that maximises net present value (NPV). Fi-
nally, a TAC scenario is evaluated in which the TAC is allowed to change within a 
limit of 15% from year to year. The result is that the two latter scenarios, the NPV 
and the TAC scenarios are showing the best economic performance. The worst scena-
rios are the ones applying maximum effort.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Structure of CEVIS  
The work in CEVIS was organised into eight work packages and five steps as shown 
in figure 1.1. The effect of innovative fisheries management is tested on economic ef-
ficiency, which is the focus of this report. The work of work package four is linked to 
the biological models used in work package 5 as those form part of the necessary 
foundation for evaluating economic efficiency. 
 
Figure 1.1. CEVIS work packages 
 
Areas of Innovation
New Zealand
Maritime Canada
Alaska
Iceland
IEF Test Case Studies
North Sea Baltic Sea
Western Shelf
Faroe Islands
WP 1. Coordination
2A. First
Draft of IEF
Defining the
Innovations
2B. Revision
of IEF
Evaluating
Applicability
to Europe
WP2.
Development of
Innovation
Evaluation
Framework
2C. Final
IEF
Step 1
Months 1-3
Step 2
Months 4-16
Step Four
Months 18-30
Step Five
Months 30-36
WP3. Examining
Examples of
Innovative
Approaches to
Fisheries
Management
3, Interviews Producing Indicators
of impacts of innovation and Best
Practices
WP4-7.  Assessing
Potentials for
Innovative
Approaches  in Test
Cases
= partnership meeting
= steering committee meeting
= advisory committee meeting
WP 8:Evaluations
of Potentials for
Innovation in the
EUWP 8: Potential
EU Applications
Literature
review on
management
innovations.
Cross-Case Disciplinary Work Packages
4. Economic Efficiency
5. Biological Robustness
6. Social Acceptance
7. Costs of Management
Identify Sources and
Collating Data  for Step Four
Cases
WP 4-7
Step 3
Month 17
 
 
 
Source: The CEVIS work programme, Annex 1, description of work 
1.2. Objectives 
Starting from the project description there are a very large number of possible fishe-
ries management systems that differ with respect to the fishery outcomes they gener-
ate. The task, of which the results are presented in this report, is to compare and eva-
luate fisheries management regimes in terms of economic efficiency. Economic effi-
ciency can be conceptually defined and evaluated in various ways. The main objec-
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tive of this work package four is thus to review both theoretically and empirically 
how the economic efficiency of fisheries can be estimated and summarised using in-
dicators of performance related to the IEF developed in work package 2 aiming at as-
sessing the likely economic efficiency outcome of various management options for a 
range of case study fisheries. 
1.3. Innovative Evaluation Framework 
The CEVIS project description states that an evaluation of any aspect of management, 
be it a policy, a specific measure or an institution, consists of comparing its perfor-
mance with its objectives. An important organizing concept for the multi-disciplinary 
work in CEVIS is the identification of performance indicators that can be used to eva-
luate the impact of the innovations to be examined on the performance of the regime. 
Because this is a multi-disciplinary project, in CEVIS in general the term “indicators” 
is used broadly to include measurements and observations of the inputs, key processes 
and outcomes of management.  
 
The substance of the IEF, therefore, will be a set of indicators as well as the proce-
dures for measuring them. The indicators of the inputs, key processes and measures of 
performance will include both quantitative, precisely measurable variables and qualit-
ative (categorical) variables that are important to success to the relevant objectives. A 
critical tension the project seeks to hold is between A) the “adaptive management” 
indicators, processes and measures of performance that management regimes use to 
evaluate their own performance; and B) the “comparative” indicators, processes and 
measures of performance that allow for comparison between management systems. 
The work presented in this report is based on the development of indicators that are 
practical, measurable and acceptable comparative indicators.  
1.4. Selected cases 
For the whole CEVIS project a number of cases have been selected as shown in table 
1.1. The cases shown in the table cover various more specific management systems, 
some of which have been chosen for investigation in work package four. Focus has 
been placed on the four areas marked with bold.  
 
For the North Sea, management systems recovery programmes for flatfish have been 
investigated. The management systems are TAC/quota controls and effort controls. In 
the Baltic Sea case various extensions of marine reserves have been investigated. A 
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new very extensive model have been developed in cooperation with another EU 
funded Sixth Framework project named PROTECT aiming particularly at investiga-
tion of marine protected areas. This work has also been reported to PROTECT. For 
the Western shelf case the investigations have centered on participatory governance 
with respect to improving stock assessments due to better information about discards 
and unreported landing provided by the industry. 
 
Table 1.1. The IEF test case studies and their main foci 
     
 North Sea  Baltic Sea Western Shelf Faroe Islands 
     
Participatory Gover-
nance 
The North Sea RAC 
Dutch Biesheuvel 
system 
 The South  
Western RAC 
 
Rights-based regimes British Producer  
Organizations with 
Fish Quota  
Allocations  
  Transferable effort 
quotas 
Effort Control The flatfish recovery 
plan comprising 
TAC and effort 
management 
Rotating Marine Pro-
tected Areas to  
protect juvenile cod 
 Marine protected 
areas 
Decision Rules  Harvest control rules 
tying specific cod  
biomass reference 
points to specific  
fishing mortality rates 
Adaptive  
management  
of anchovy 
 
 
Source: The CEVIS work programme, Annex 1, description of work 
 
Finally, the transferable effort system in terms of sea days of the Faroe Islands has 
received attention. The system applied on the Faroe Islands is rather unique in the 
sense that no fish quotas are used. The system with transferable sea days is supple-
mented with a number of closed areas the effect of which has not been subjected to 
investigation in our case. 
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2. Economic indicators, review and selection  
2.1. Introduction and concepts 
This chapter is not solely a literature review but also an analysis that reflects on the 
issue economic efficiency defined by the use of indicators. The aim is to identify the 
information that will be used to assess the economic performance of the selected cas-
es. The use of indicators requires at least four steps: 
 
1. Criteria used for assessment of economic efficiency 
2. Identification and specification of indicators 
3. Reference points 
 
Interpretation and assessment of outcome and decisions (e.g. the traffic light system) 
Often there is some confusion about the concepts economic efficiency and economic 
indicators. While the economic efficiency concept is, theoretically, well established, 
see for example Cohen and Cyert (1965), the use of indicators is a convenient analyti-
cal tool to structure information but not a theoretical concept in itself. Theory is 
linked to item 1 above because for example optimal factor allocation or comparison 
between two options are, in theory, obtained in specifically defined ways and the 
measurement of the outcome requires certain indicators and certain criteria for as-
sessment. Before an assessment is performed categorization of the problem consi-
dered is helpful. It may be fruitful to compare fleet segments while it may not neces-
sarily be fruitful to compare salmon fishery with salmon farming. The criteria used 
for assessment should be founded on economic theory about economic efficiency. 
However, criteria could also be “soft” in the sense that they are based on value judg-
ments for example employment or investment rates. A long list of such criteria can be 
found in the literature and often the criteria are adapted to the case (categorization) 
that is under consideration. 
 
The concept economic efficiency is clearly defined in the neo-classical micro eco-
nomic theory, and is further explained in section 2.2. In theory a fishery is „economi-
cally efficient‟ if the resource rent is maximized. Other economic indicators are not 
providing information about economic efficiency as such but only about the state or 
the development of the system from an economical point of view. These indicators 
could be either socio-economic (macro economic) or business economic indicators. It 
is not always easy to distinguish between the macro economics, micro economics, so-
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cio-economics and business (private) economics. Another problem is what concerns 
society and what concerns agents in terms of consumers and producers (companies). 
However, the concept economic efficiency originates from micro economics, and 
from this origin has implications for socio-economics and business economics. 
 
This literature review is based on peer reviewed articles (white literature) and grey 
literature. Most of the information, however, is to be found in the grey literature. 
2.2. Pareto optimality 
From an economic perspective, a fishing fleet is said to be economically efficient, or 
more correctly, Pareto efficient, if it is impossible to reallocate goods and production 
factors between agents involved in the fishery in such a way that somebody is made 
better off without making somebody else worse off (Varian 1999). This is defined as 
the Pareto condition. The Kaldor-Hicks condition says that if gains by one agent, 
groups of agents, etc., are sufficiently high to compensate the losses of another agent, 
groups of agents etc., then the solution is an improvement in economic efficiency. 
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion does not require that compensation is actually paid, which 
means that a more efficient outcome can leave some people worse off. In practice, it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to implement changes that result in Pareto improvement, 
whereas, it is much easier to identify solutions which can result in outcomes that will 
satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criterion for improvement in efficiency. 
 
Often heard phrases when dealing with fisheries, are: „One vessel is more economi-
cally efficient than another‟, or „the vessel has become more economically efficient‟. 
These are not wrong from a linguistic perspective, but such phrases conflict with the 
definition of economic efficiency stated above as they describe states of the system 
that, given the heavily exploited nature of European fisheries, will be economically 
inefficient in most cases, even though some agents may have increased their individ-
ual economic performance. 
 
In principle, a fishery is Pareto efficient if the resource rent is maximized. The re-
source rent is the amount left over after all costs have been deducted from the land-
ings value given there are no external effects outside the fishery such as ecosystem 
effects, and is a key variable with respect to assessing the conditions for economic ef-
ficiency of a fishery, see Andersen (1983), Gordon (1954) Hardin 1968 and Scott 
(1955). The costs include both direct exploitation costs and so-called opportunity 
costs, i.e., how much could have been earned if the capital and labour had been used 
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in the best alternative to fishing. At vessel level, landings values and costs can be ex-
tracted from recorded statistics. For the whole industry, the exploitation costs will de-
pend on both the total fishing effort and the level of exploited stocks, as one vessel‟s 
catches will decrease the stocks in the future and hence increase the fishing costs. 
This external effect is not accounted for in the costs and earnings statistics. As such, 
economic efficiency cannot be assessed by solely using available economic data, but 
must be estimated using bio-economic models that include information about the 
costs and earnings of fishing vessels as well as the size of the fish stocks. In such 
models, the spawning stock biomass should optimally be considered a capital input in 
the same way as vessel capital, and return (remuneration) on the fish stocks should be 
included in a similar manner. The return or rent of fish stocks can be viewed as com-
pensation to society for the common property of the fish stock, and this should be 
added to the effort costs. 
 
The value of the resource rent will, as such, depend on the level of effort used, as well 
as the state of the fish stocks. The latter is implicitly a function of the former and, as 
such, some effort level will exist for which the resource rent is maximised for a given 
fishery. When only one stock is exploited, the maximum resource rent of the fishing 
fleet will coincide with the maximum economic yield of the stock (Gordon 1954), i.e. 
with the optimal sustainable exploitation level seen from the fishermen‟s point of 
view. Most fisheries, however, do not exhibit this ideal one-stock situation, as several 
stocks and fleets usually compose a fishery. That makes it difficult or impossible to 
arrive at the optimal solution in which the resource rent is maximized at the same 
time as the maximum economic yield is reached for all stocks. In this case, the re-
source rent is still the total catch value minus all costs, but the maximisation of this is 
likely to coincide with over-exploitation of some species and under-exploitation of 
others. 
 
However, achieving economic efficiency in fisheries, as defined above, is in many 
cases not possible as most fisheries are subject to embodied externalities. Externalities 
are any external effects caused by individual fishermen, but not included in their ac-
counting system or behaviour (Seijo et al. 1998). In fisheries, externalities are most 
often negative, i.e., the actions of one fisherman cause the rest of the fishery to be 
worse off. Three types of negative externalities can be identified for most fisheries, 
stock, crowding, and technological externalities. The stock externality refers to the 
fact that a fish stock is reduced every time a fisherman harvests it, thus increasing 
harvest costs for subsequent fishermen. Crowding externalities occurs when vessel 
aggregation on fishing grounds increases the marginal harvest costs. Technological 
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externalities occur when fishing gear technologies change the population dynamics of 
fish stocks, e.g., through targeting certain age-groups, or through bycatch. From 
above, it should be clear that in most practical situations a fisherman increases his 
own welfare at the expense of the welfare of other fishermen because of one or more 
of the above mentioned externalities. Thus, his welfare actually increases the eco-
nomic inefficiency of the entire fishery unless he is able to compensate other fisher-
men, which is generally not the case in fisheries subject to overfishing and/or open 
access. Thus, it seems more correct to monitor economic development of fishing 
fleets using economic performance measures, including measures of resource rent.  
2.3. Data Envelopment Analyses (DEA) 
Efficiency measurement begins with Farrell (1957) who defined total economic effi-
ciency concept based on the combination of the following two components: a techni-
cal efficiency (the capacity to obtain maximal output given a set of inputs), and an al-
locative efficiency (the capacity to use inputs in optimal proportions given their 
prices). Felthoven (2002) and Pascoe and Herrero (2004) use DEA framework to es-
timate efficiency in fisheries; and a whole issue of Marine Resource Economics ed-
ited by Vestergaard (2005) has been devoted to capacity efficiency issues using DEA. 
Farrel showed a simple example with two firms which use two inputs (x1 and x2) to 
produce a single output (y), within Constant Return to Scale (CRS). In the following, 
figure 2.1. S´S is a unit isoquant and firms operating on S´S are fully efficient. A firm 
operating in P is inefficient as it employs higher inputs to generate the same output, as 
the firms on the isoquant. The technical efficiency of the firm is measured by the ratio 
0Q/0P; while the allocative efficiency is measured by the ratio 0R/0Q. The product of 
both measures represents the economic efficiency which is measured by the ratio 
0R/0P. 
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Figure 2.1. Efficiency measures: technical and allocative efficiency 
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Following Farrell´s idea, a DEA-model, which is a mathematical programming 
model, estimates the efficient isoquant from sample data by means of a non-
parametric piece by piece linear convex isoquant. The application of DEA model to 
fisheries is used to estimate efficiency measure; however, one of the main restrictions 
of characterizing efficiency through DEA framework is that it provides an efficiency 
measure in relative terms given that estimates efficiencies related to the most efficient 
isoquant. The DEA framework provides an efficiency measure by comparing each in-
dividual production unit - a vessel - against all other units. In this sense, the efficiency 
of each vessel is obtained by comparing its output and input use ratio with the “best 
use or practice”. The so-called best use is related to the one that assures the highest 
output/input ratio. This relative efficiency measure could not satisfy the so-called 
Pareto economic efficiency. 
2.4. Fisheries economics and economic efficiency  
Because of the externalities in fisheries it is necessary to distinguish between the in-
dividual fisherman‟s efficiency and the efficiency of the industry (society). The indi-
vidual fisherman may become more efficient from his own viewpoint if he can in-
crease his profit. There is reason to believe that each fisherman is efficient in the 
sense that his use of production factors (fishing effort) is determined by the intersec-
tion between his marginal costs (exclusive externalities) and the price he will get for 
the fish. But exactly because of externalities the whole industry is inefficient. This 
problem is well known from the fisheries economics literature and dealt with in figure 
2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 shows the so called Gordon-Schaefer model (Gordon 1954) with some 
added information that is explained below. The Gordon-Schaefer model is constituted 
by the gross revenue curve and the total cost curve for the entire fishing industry. In 
its simplest form the entire industry is composed by one species harvested by one 
fleet composed of homogeneous vessels. The gross revenue curve is the (biological) 
Schaefer yield curve of a fish stock multiplied with the price of the fish normalized to 
1. The total cost curve is composed by all the homogeneous vessels‟ costs. If the ves-
sels are non homogeneous some vessels would earn higher profits than others (infra 
marginal producer rent). 
 
It is shown in the literature that because of the externalities discussed above “equilib-
rium” of the fishery is determined by the intersection between the gross revenue and 
the total costs (at point a in figure 2.2). This is often called the open access equilib-
rium because this is how the fishery will adjust if no restrictions are imposed. At this 
point each single vessel is “efficient” from the fisherman‟s point of view because its 
own marginal cost is equal to the price of the fish. This cannot be seen from figure 
2.2, but it is important to notice that even though the earnings of the total industry in 
point a equals 0, the individual vessels can actually earn a high profit, the level of 
which is determined by its opportunity costs i.e. what the capital (and labour) could 
earn elsewhere. However, the entire fishery is economically inefficient. 
 
If the fishery is restricted for example by restricting the number of vessels or the 
amount of catch (quota) the entire fishery can earn more money in the long-run. If ca-
pacity is restricted to 30 compared to 100 (the open access equilibrium) in figure 2.2, 
the distance between gross revenue and total cost for the whole fishery (the distance 
between points b and c in the figure) is maximized. The distance between gross reve-
nue and costs is defined as the resource rent although it includes consumer and pro-
ducer rent.  
 
In principle the fishery is Pareto efficient if the resource rent is maximized assuming 
no externalities outside the fishery for example through ecosystem effects. Therefore 
the resource rent is a key variable with respect to economic efficiency for the whole 
fishery. 
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Figure 2.2. Socio-economic efficiency including the concepts of resource rent, 
overcapacity, and remuneration of the biomass 
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Economic efficiency determined by the resource rent cannot be extracted from statis-
tics but has to be calculated by use of bio-economic models that include information 
about the fish stocks and the fishing vessels. On vessel level the profit can be ex-
tracted from the recorded statistics, but the vessels‟ contribution to the resource rent 
of the whole industry also has to be calculated by taking the net profit of the vessels 
after deduction of all costs and then subtract the opportunity profit. The fish stock is 
embodied in this measure. Therefore, the calculation of the maximum resource rent 
requires explicit information about the fish stock and its capacity to produce yield. 
 
Thus, economic efficiency for a whole fishery cannot be determined without knowl-
edge about the yield of the fish stock. This requires biological information based on 
fish stock assessment that produces information about the development of the stocks. 
The information about the spawning stock biomass is published by, among others, the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). This information makes 
it possible to calculate the development of stock biomasses and the yield as a function 
of fishing mortality. Assuming that fishing mortality is a linear function of fishing ef-
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fort the stock biomass development as a function of effort is shown in figure 2.2 as 
decreasing from the left to the right.  
 
If the spawning stock biomass is considered a capital input in the same way as vessel 
capital, the biomass capital could be remunerated in a parallel way. The fish stock 
remuneration could be viewed as a payment to society for the common property of the 
fish stock and this remuneration could be added as a cost to the effort costs. If the re-
muneration is a constant percentage of the stock value, the remuneration will differ 
with stock size. For example in point A in figure 2.2 it is low relative to the remunera-
tion in point B.  
 
If, on the other hand, the percentage is determined according to the yield of the stock 
(landings) in proportion to the stock, the percentage should be high in point A and 
lower in point B. The yield in proportion to the (low) biomass in point A in is 25% 
while the yield in point B is 8%. If the opportunity cost of capital is for example 8% 
the stock should be increased to the corresponding level. The calculated remuneration 
of the stock could be subtracted from the total profit recorded for the fishery in ques-
tion, and this efficiency measures would provide some information about state of the 
fishery.  
 
In many cases only point estimates of the fish stocks are available. In these cases it is 
still possible to calculate the remuneration to the stock, although not with the same 
degree of precision as if the stock development is known. 
 
Most fisheries are, however, not representatives of the ideal one-stock one-fleet situa-
tion described above. Usually several stocks and fleets compose a fishery. That makes 
it impossible to arrive at an optimal solution in which the resource rent is maximized 
and reference points such as Maximum Economic Yield (MEY at point c in figure 
2.2) or the biological reference point Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY, at the peak 
point of the gross revenue curve in figure 2.2) are reached.  
 
The more common situation where a fishing fleet is exploiting several stocks at the 
same time is shown in figure 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 2.3 shows the yield curve (landings 
curve) of different stocks as a function of sea days. The yield curves are calculated by 
use of a Gompertz
1
 function (Conrad and Clark, 1994) and the associated number of 
                                                 
1 Benjamin Gompertz (March 5, 1779 - July 14, 1865, London, England) was a self educated 
mathematician. 
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sea days as a function of the landings of the different species is calculated by use of 
the EIAA model (SEC 2004). It is assumed that the fleet is not able to exploit the spe-
cies sequentially (one by one), but exploits the stocks in a fixed relationship. 
 
Figure 2.3. Landing of different species as a function of effort (sea days) 
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It is noted from figure 2.3 that the peak points (MSY) of the yield (landings) curves 
cannot be obtained for all the species at the same time. If the yield (landing) curves 
are multiplied with the fish prices and aggregated and the costs of producing sea days 
are taken into account one arrives at the picture shown in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. Gross revenue, total variable costs and profit for a fleet segment ex-
ploiting several species 
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Aiming at maximizing the resource rent the figure shows that the optimal number of 
sea days for this segment is around 6000 days. Figure 2.4 can be compared with fig-
ure 2.2. They show the same features but the underlying assumption are different in 
particular with respect to the level the various species are exploited. Some are ex-
ploited above and some below their biological reference points MSY.  
 
Finally, with reference to conventional economic theory individual fishermen maxi-
mize their profit when the marginal costs are equal to the price of the fish. This means 
that it is possible for (some of) the individual fishermen to earn high profits even in 
cases where the resource rent is dissipated. These profits are recorded in cost and 
earnings statistics but it is not possible without knowledge about the opportunity costs 
to determine the extent to which this profit includes resource rent. 
 
The most appropriate criteria to assess economic efficiency are discussed below but 
before that a review of indicators and where they are used is carried out.  
2.5. Indicator systems 
Indicators systems are often addressed in relation to sustainable, precautionary and 
responsible fisheries (FAO 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2005). 
 
CEVIS    FOI    27 
Therefore, the indicator systems are developed to cover several dimensions. The indi-
cator systems described in this section are not fisheries specific, but developed to ad-
dress a range of issues within four dimensions:  
 
1. Ecological 
2. Social 
3. Economic 
4. Institutions/governance systems.  
 
Economic indicators are thus part of a broader system, which is described by different 
indicator systems that in a sense are variations of a theme. 
 
The approach of FAO and OECD generally includes more than only economic indica-
tors as these bodies focus on sustainability of fisheries primarily from a biological and 
economic point of view, but with increasing focus on social an institutional aspects. 
FAO, in particular, has put emphasize on biological indicators in the Code of Conduct 
for a responsible fishery (FAO 1995a) that originates from the UN conference in 1992 
(the Rio declaration. Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, 1992). 
 
A framework developed by FAO to address issues about sustainable fisheries is the 
Sustainable Development Reference System (SDRS). With respect to fisheries the re-
lationship between conventional fisheries management schemes and the SDRS system 
is presented in table 2.1. For a fishery system comprising markets, fish resources, 
fishing fleet and fishermen an objective about sustainable fisheries may be set up. A 
management plan would need to include several steps to pursue the objective. In the 
SDRS indicators are defined to host information about monitoring the development 
towards this objective. Reference points are needed for assessment, and interpretation 
is required to arrive at decisions and implementation. Hence information is structured 
in a clear way to make interpretation and decision making easier. 
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Table 2.1. The relationship between conventional management plans and SDRS 
   
Fishery  Fisheries management plans SDRS 
   
 Objectives  
Markets, Resources Monitoring Indicators 
 Assessment Reference points 
Fleets, People Decision Interpretation 
 Implementation  
 
FAO (1999)  
 
For management purposes indicator systems produce information for different sorts of 
analytical assessment frameworks. 
 
One approach widely used for example by the OECD, FAO, and the European Envi-
ronmental Agency (EEA) on the four dimensions is the Drivers, Pressures, State, Im-
pact and Responses (DPSIR) framework. The DPSIR framework was developed by 
the OECD in the 1980s to structure information and is useful because it identifies 
cause and effect relationships, allowing for the separation of issues through the differ-
ent DPSIR categories defined:  
 
1. Driving forces are the underlying causes that lead to environmental pressures 
2. Pressures affect the state of the environment 
3. State refers to the state of the environment in terms of quality of natural re-
sources 
4. Impact refers to the effect that a pressure has on the state of a natural re-
source and on user groups 
5. Response relates to the social response via policies, laws, programmes and 
research 
 
The PSR (Pressure, State, Response) framework was developed in the 1970s
2
, and 
subsequently adopted by the OECD‟s State of the Environment (SOE) group. The 
European Commission‟s indicator development follows this framework. Some or-
ganizations prefer variants of the PSR model; for example, the UN Commission for 
Sustainable Development (UNCSD) bases its indicator set on the Driving force-State-
Response model (DSR or DPRS), which allows for a better inclusion of non-
environmental variables, (Jesinghaus 1999), see Figure 2.5.  
 
                                                 
2 by the Canadian statistician Anthony Friend 
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In broad terms, the PSR framework aims to identify the pressure on the environment 
from human and economic activities, which lead to changes in the state or environ-
mental conditions that prevail as a result of that pressure, and may provoke responses 
by society to change the pressures and the state of the environment.  
 
Figure 2.5. Indicator systems 
 
 
Source: FAO (1999) 
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According to the pressure-state-response (PSR) framework that has been developed 
and used extensively within OECD, see for example OECD (2000), the indicators can 
be classified as shown in table 2.2. For the three dimensions the table shows what the 
cause of the pressure is. The next column shows how the state of the system could be 
measured and, finally, what actions could be taken to alleviate the pressure.  
 
Table 2.2. PRS system applied to three dimensions 
    
Dimensions Pressure State Response 
    
Ecosystem (resource  
and environment) 
- Total catch 
- fish consumption 
 
Stocks status TAC and quotas 
 
Social - Fishing effort 
- Number of vessels 
- Growth rate of 
number of fishers 
Number of fishers 
 
 
Economic - Subsidies 
- Excess fishing capacity 
- Profitability 
- Profitability 
- Sector employment 
Economic incentives & 
Disincentives (e.g. subs- 
dies, taxes, buy-back) 
 
Le Gallic (2002) 
 
 
The information systems DPSIR etc. require information about: 1. Criteria; 2. Indica-
tors; and 3. Reference points. The following section addresses this area with examples 
from the economic dimension. 
 
An example the DPSIR framework applied the Basque trawlers operating in the North 
East Atlantic is shown in figure 2.6; it is easily extrapolated to other fisheries. This 
example comes from ELME project.
3
 The figure provides a summary of the cause and 
effect relationships using States, Pressures and Driving Forces indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 European Lifestyles and Marine Ecosystems, by EU (EC/DG Research: Contract GOCE-CT-2003-
505576) 
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Figure 2.6. DPSIR model applied to trawlers in North East Atlantic. 
 
2.6. Economic indicators 
2.6.1. Definition and use of indicators 
An indicator has been defined as: “a variable, pointer, or index related to a criterion. 
Its fluctuation reveals variations in key elements of sustainability in the ecosystem, 
the fishery resource or the sector and social and economic well-being. The position 
and trend of an indicator in relation to reference points indicate the present state and 
dynamics of the system. Indicators provide a bridge between objectives and actions” 
(Accadia and Spagnolo 2006). 
 
OECD defines indicators as: Indicators are data or combination of data collected and 
processed for a clearly defined analytical or policy purpose (Le Gallic 2002). The 
OECD applies economic indicators in the annual reports Review of Fisheries in 
OECD countries  
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Table 2.3. Examples of economic criteria and indicators 
    
Criteria Example of Indicator Structure Reference Point 
    
Harvest landings 
by-catch 
by species; age groups 
by area 
by fishery sub-sector 
 MSY 
 historical level 
 policy target level 
Harvest capacity GT (decked vessels) 
no. of boats (undecked  
vessels) 
total effort  
by fleet type 
by fishery segment 
age composition of vessels 
fishing mortality/species 
capacity or effort of 
MSY 
policy target level 
Harvest value (in con-
stant prices) 
total deflated value 
(landed price) 
by species groups 
by sub-sector & fishery 
selected historical 
level 
Subsidies 
 
tax rebates 
grants 
by sub-sector 
by fleets/fishery 
 
historical level 
zero level 
target level 
Contribution to GDP fisheries GDP 
national GDP 
by species groups historical level 
Exports export/harvest value by species groups 
by fishery segment 
historical level 
 
Investments market or replacement 
value 
depreciation 
fleet age composition 
by fleet type 
by fishery 
 
historical level 
Employment total employment sub-sector 
fleet/fishery 
historical level  
realistic policy target 
Net returns (profit + rent) net re-
turn/investment 
value of entitlements 
by sub-sector 
by fishery 
historical level  
MEY 
Effort (mainly at fishery 
level) 
 
no of vessels;  
Fishing time 
amount of gear used 
employment 
by fishery segment 
in physical or monetary 
terms 
 
 
 
FAO (1999) 
 
 
Examples of economic indicators etc. can be found in FAO (1999), as shown in table 
2.3. The criteria (or the name of the indicator) show the specific criterion that is 
enlightened by the indicator. The indicator and the structure columns show the type of 
information that could be produced to enlighten the criteria. Finally, the reference 
point column shows reference points that could and should be defined to be able to 
interpret and assess the system. These reference points can show both a state and a 
development. The concepts maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and the maximum 
economic yield (MEY) are suitable as reference points as they are set up independent 
of time. These are points to pursue. For indicators showing developments for example 
in employment, the annual development of the indicator could be compared to a sta-
tionary reference point, produced by using an average number over a number of years 
(historical level).  
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As regard the EU fisheries specifically, the data collection regulation (DCR) from 
2001 (Council reg. 1543/2000 and Commission reg. 1639/2001)
4
 includes a number 
of economic indicators as shown in table 2.4 and 2.5 but no reference points. These 
indicators are similar to the indicators used in the annual economic report about the 
economic performance of selected European fleet segments (AER) and the associated 
EIAA-model. The regulation 1543/2000 is currently under revision, and prior to this 
an extensive work has taken place. Some of the proposals about economic indicators 
have been prepared in the “Paris workshop” and these are included in table 2.4 as 
well. The differences are rather in the name than in the contents of the variable with 
the aim to clarify the type of information that the name refer to. The complete list of 
indicators in DCR and the AER/EIAA is included in the appendix 8.2. 
 
The DCR operates with a minimum programme (MP) and an extended programme 
(EP), and table 2.4 shows the MP. The extended programme prescribes that the in-
formation should be collected on geographical levels that are disaggregated with re-
spect to where the fish is caught.  
 
Table 2.4. Economic variables and indicators used in the EIAA compared to the 
EC data regulation and the revisions proposed by the Paris workshop 
   
 Review of economic indicators (Paris workshop) 
   
Cost and earnings input to the EIAA  
from the AER 
Indicator required by EC  
(Com. reg.1639/2001)  
Proposed revised heading by the 
workshop 
Gross revenue/value of landings income – turnover gross revenue (of which gross 
value of landings) 
Fuel costs fuel costs  
Vessel costs repair and maintenance  
Crew share crew (incl. Social costs)  
Other running costs other running costs other costs 
Depreciation fixed costs capital costs 
Interest n.a. under the minimum  
program 
 
Invested capital investment (asset) the value of capital 
Prices/species prices/species  
 
Source: Commission Regulation (EC) no 1639/2001, appendix XVII (section j) and Report of the workshop 
‘Economic Indicators’ Paris 10-14 May 2004, IFREMER. 
 
 
The extended programme‟s fleet categorization is shown in appendix 8.3 with respect 
to the type of information.  
 
                                                 
4 A revision of the DCR has been prepared in 2008 
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With the aim of narrowing the scope for economic efficiency indicators, the following 
is based on the AER/EIAA approach. 
 
The first best socio-economic indicator is the resource rent in a steady state or over a 
number of years discounted to net present value. However, this indicator requires a 
model to be calculated and extensive data input in terms of economic and biological 
information which is not available on a wider scale. Hence for practical purposes this 
indicator is often in-operational. 
 
The second best indicators on a socio-economic level are indicators as described in 
the FAO and OECD work. They are operational but not founded on economic effi-
ciency theory. 
 
At the business economic efficiency level, profit and the return on capital (ROC) are 
the first best indicators. However, it requires not only estimates of profit but also of 
the invested amount of capital, and in many fisheries (fleets) it is difficult or impossi-
ble to get reliable information about vessels capital. This is also the case in many 
other branches – not only in fisheries. In these cases the return on revenue (or sale) 
ROS, often named operating profit margin, is used as indicator. On a socioeconomic 
level contribution to the gross domestic product (GDP) or the value added are consid-
ered first best indicators. The value added indicator is an approximation to GDP as 
the value added is easily estimated as crew wages plus remuneration of vessel capital 
plus profit (including remuneration of owners). 
 
Table 2.5. Other economic indicators 
  
AER/EIAA Indicator required by EC 1639/2001 
  
Employment on board (FTE)  Employment Full time/part time/FTE 
Effort (sea days) Effort relevant unit accounting for technology and time 
Invested capital (€)  Invested capital 
Fleet - number of vessels  Fleet – number of vessel 
 
Fleet - total GT  Fleet - total GT  
Fleet - total kW  Fleet - total kW  
 Fleet in age 
 Fleet according to gear used 
 
 
The economic indicators used in the Concerted Action EAEF (Economic Assessment 
of European Fisheries) apply to both the data collection of the AER and to the EIAA 
model. Emphasis has been put on a few well defined indicators that have been divided 
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into indicators of known concepts from vessels accounts and indicators of interest 
from a socio-economic point of view as shown in table 2.6 concerning the AER and 
the EIAA. Difficulties as to how to assess investments have caused that an indicator 
such as „return on capital‟ have been avoided. Result from EIAA calculations are ba-
sically presented by use of the same indicators as in the AER.  
 
Table 2.6. Economic indicators used in the EAEF 
  
Annual Economic Report EIAA 
  
Value of landings  value of landings 
Gross value added  crew share 
Gross cash flow  gross cash flow 
Net profit  net profit 
 gross value added 
 operational profit margin (%) 
 classification (words) 
 
 
From a socio-economic point of view remuneration of capital and labour is of interest. 
The gross value added expresses the added value that the segment contributes with to 
the national economy. This includes: salaries, profits, opportunity cost of capital and 
depreciations. It can be obtained by deducting the fixed (except interest and deprecia-
tion) and variable costs (except the labour costs) from the total landing value. 
 
Another interesting indicator is the value added per kg of fish, which consists of di-
viding the Gross Added Value by the total kg of fish landed. This indicator offers a 
view of the economic importance of the landings in volume terms. Both indicators are 
complementary, and in need of each other, for a robust analysis. 
2.6.2. Long-term indicators and discount rates 
Production surplus models such as the Gordon-Schaefer model predicts a long run 
bio-economic equilibrium where catch per unit of effort (CPUE) equals the ratio of 
the cost per unit effort a to the price per unit harvest p, i.e. CPUE = a/p. Time series 
for catch and effort, as well as for effort costs and fish prices, are important sources of 
information that may be used in cases where fisheries independent stock assessment is 
not undertaken. CPUE time series should be used with great care as indicators of 
stock changes due to the unknown stock-output elasticity and efficiency changes, see 
SEC (2006) for further information. 
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 In the short term (i.e. next year), constant assumptions can be made about the struc-
ture of a given fleet and that fleet‟s activity. The longer term is indicated by either a 
static equilibrium solution or a dynamic solution. In the former, as used to indicate a 
“recovered state” in the EIAA model
5
, no information can be given as to the length of 
time it would take to achieve that state, or even if that state can be achieved (espe-
cially given assumptions about a constant fleet). Hence, an indication of profitability 
of a fleet at a snapshot in time (i.e. “now”) for any potential future scenario carries 
obvious misinterpretations. In the dynamic solution, a path (typically by year) to some 
future situation is given. This can account for changes in activity (i.e. changes in ef-
fort allocation by gear/species/area) and can take account of changes in fleet structure. 
These will clearly be dependent on the management options modelled and assump-
tions made. However, in the dynamic case, economic indicators over time can be pre-
sented that allow the assessment of the full effects of management measures on fleets 
to be ascertained. With respect to the biology, time to recovery given scenarios for 
alternative fishing mortalities (or time to some other target) can be provided (e.g. 
North Sea cod recovery evaluations). These can indicate the probability of recovery at 
each time step and as such the uncertainty associated with recovery.  
 
In the dynamic case, typical indicators such as gross revenue, intermediate consump-
tion, gross cash flow and net profit can be used, as a yearly path is evident. In addi-
tion, a comparison of net present values (NPV) is possible in the dynamic case. In 
comparing the present values of alternative management strategies in order to achieve 
a policy objective (e.g. a recovery program or MSY for stocks), it is common to dis-
count net benefits that will accrue in the future compared to net benefits that can be 
achieved at present. Discounting is included because investment in fisheries must 
compete with other investment opportunities with a positive rate of return. A second 
argument is the assumption that future generations are better off because of increase 
in productivity. This needs to be addressed by the social planner. Typically, a cost–
benefit analysis will discount streams of net benefits and compute the NPV as a single 
number. The theory is that standard discounting is meant to ensure that the present 
value of net benefit calculations provides a meaningful indication of whether the effi-
ciency criterion is satisfied or not. If NPV of two alternatives is equal but is made up 
of two different streams of annual benefits, secondary reference point could be ap-
plied complimentary. For example is stability to prefer to variability. 
 
                                                 
5 The “recovered state” in the EIAA model indicates the quotas of each individual stock where they 
have reached an equilibrium level at which they can be fished at Fpa (i.e. the fishing mortality at 
which levels of recruitment give a 95% probability of avoiding stock collapse).  
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There are many arguments for and against discounting future benefits and costs; espe-
cially controversial is the choice of the discount rate (as the outcomes are highly sen-
sitive to the rate). The discount rates for people are normally very high which means 
above 20%, see Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) and Hillis and Whelan (1992) 
while the socio-economic discount rates are much lower, for example below 6% be-
fore tax. HM Treasury (2003) proposes a discount rate at 3.5% 
 
When evaluating policies, the market interest rate can be used as the discount rate but 
do not really reflect all long-term effects. High discount rates favour myopic policies 
that continue to exaggerate unsustainable resources whereas discount rates that are 
too low can fail to capture the efficiency argument because other opportunities to in-
vest the capital are more profitable. Sensitivity of the outcomes of a range of discount 
rates (e.g. 2-7%) can be undertaken in order to illustrate the possibilities. The alterna-
tive management strategy that achieves the highest NPV (with constraints for other 
criteria – such as sustainability) is as such the “best” choice. 
2.7. Reference points  
2.7.1. Operating profit margin intervals 
The „Operating profit margin‟ and „Classification‟ indicators are based on operating 
profit margin defined as net profit in proportion to gross revenue, see table 2.7. The 
indicator is well known from business economics and is often used instead of „return 
on capital‟ which is defined as gross revenue minus variable costs in proportion to in-
vested capital. The reference points for these indicators are the intervals in which they 
lie. 
 
Table 2.7. Reference points used in EIAA 
    
Classification --------------------- Operating profit margin --------------------- 
    
Profitable 5% and more  
Stable -5% and up to 5% 
Unprofitable -5% and below  
 
 
In the EIAA reports the classification is elaborated in the presentation of projected 
results. The operating profit margins of the base line years and the projected year are 
compared to show the impact of the proposed quotas for the projected year. The in-
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terval from minus 5% to 5% indicates that the fishing activity would continue in the 
short, medium and long run even if the fixed costs (interest and depreciation) cannot 
be covered (negative net profit). In the long run these costs must be covered and the 
economic performance is deemed unprofitable if the operating profit margin is minus 
5% and below. The criteria of 5% are arbitrarily fixed. 
 
Further to highlight the economic repercussions in the short run an „impact indicator‟ 
has been defined. 
 „Impact‟ = Impact of the TAC in YEAR+1 on operating profit margin com-
pared to current YEAR  
 „Worsened‟ = Segment was making losses, losses now greater 
 „Improved‟ = Segment was making losses, losses now smaller 
 „Lower‟ = Segment was making profits, profits now lower 
 „Higher‟ = Segment was making profits, profits now higher 
 „ – „ = No significant change. 
2.7.2. Break-even as reference point 
The break-even concept shows the required landings value needed to cover fixed cost, 
given the contribution to the margin per unit landings value. The break-even landings 
value is then the value that breaks even between contribution margin and fixed cost 
entailing zero net profit. The break-even landings value in proportion to the realised 
landings value is an indicator of overcapacity or undercapacity respectively in busi-
ness terms. In an overcapacity situation the fixed costs are too high to be covered by 
the contribution margin from the landings, and indicate that capacity ought to be re-
duced and vice versa. 
 
The extended list of indicators in the EIAA includes estimates of the „break-even‟ 
value of landings, partly to show the required value of landings to break even i.e. cov-
er fixed costs, and partly to estimate „overcapacity‟ by use of the „break-even‟ infor-
mation in combination with the actual or projected value of landings.  
 
The definition of break-even is: Break-even revenue = current fixed costs / (current 
cash flow/current revenue). 
 
When the break-even revenue and the actual revenue is compared an indication of the 
change of the fixed costs in order to comply with break-even is obtained. Assuming 
that fixed costs are a proxy for capacity an indication of over and under capacity is 
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provided. The result does not indicate whether a required change in fixed cost actually 
is possible, only that it is necessary. 
 
The applied definition of overcapacity is: Over-capacity = 1- (revenue / break-even 
revenue) 
 
A potentially informative use of the break-even indicator would be to estimate, for 
each fleet segment, the catch required to break even assuming the status quo catch 
composition for each segment. The break-even catches for each stock could be 
summed over fleet segments giving an indication of the degree of imbalance between 
the fishing capacity at break-even and resource availability. 
2.7.3. Economic sustainability reference points 
The economic sustainability depends on the capability of the sector to attract money. 
To guarantee the investment of financial resources in the long term, it is necessary to 
protect the fishery investment profitability. So, the economic sustainability could be 
measured by comparing the profitability of the fishery investments in vessel capital 
and fish stocks on one hand and in alternative sectors on the other. 
 
The possibility to invest in more profitable economic sectors, or with the same profit-
ability with less risk, determines a reduction in the investments in the fishery and 
compromises its sustainability in the long term. 
 
A feasible indicator to measure the economic performance of a fleet segment could be 
the ROI (Return on Investment). The ROI indicates the percentage ratio of net profit 
plus the opportunity cost in relation to the investment.  
 
In order to effectively interpret the information obtained through the indicator, some 
reference points (RP) must be applied. These points can refer to either a sub-optimal 
(in-efficient) or an optimal (efficient) situation. The former identifies a limit which is 
necessary to avoid, while the latter represents a target to be pursued.  
 
The indicator suggested to measure the economic sustainability is calculated by com-
paring the investment profitability rate (ROI) for a specific fleet segment within a 
specific geographical area with the theoretical risk free rate, for example the long-
term treasury bonds rate.  
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The difference between these two rates allows for an evaluation of the profitability of 
an investment in the fishery with regards to a risk free investment. When the ROI 
value is lower than (or very close to) the long-term treasury bonds rate, i. e. when the 
economic sustainability indicator is negative or very close to zero, it is not profitable 
to invest in the fishery and the financial resources will be directed to public bonds or 
to more profitable alternative investments.  
 
In case of limited information on invested capital it is possible to use other more eas-
ily available information‟s from vessel owner statements to create an indicator for 
economic sustainability. The development of own capital (equity) reflects the stability 
of a company. It is not possible to stay in business in the long run with decreasing 
own capital over many years. Additionally, a large amount of external capital com-
pared to a low amount of own capital means higher risks of bankruptcies in case of 
lower catch possibilities than expected.  
2.8. Remuneration of spawning stock biomass (SSB) 
Remuneration of the biomass (resource rent), e.g. the spawning stock biomass (SSB), 
is parallel to remuneration of man made capital. While little information about stock 
biomass is available, information about SSB (older age groups) could be extracted 
from the ACFM reports produced by the Advisory Committee of Fisheries Manage-
ment of ICES and be allocated to specific fleet segments according to the share of 
their landings relative to total EU landings.  
 
The value of the spawning stock biomass (VSSB) could be determined by use of fish 
prices or the net profit (resource rent) if this information is available. Reference points 
could be based on VSSBcurrent or VSSBprecautionary, cf. figure 2.2, points A and B, re-
spectively. In well-managed fisheries the resource rent b – c reflects the remuneration 
of the biomass of a single species. In fisheries characterised by overcapacity e.g. the 
intersection between gross revenue and costs at point a, the resource rent is dissi-
pated. Ideally, the resource rent should be estimated and included as an opportunity 
cost of fishing, but such an exercise is data demanding.  
 
An alternative is to use the current VSSB and the precautionary VSSB in combina-
tion. Using the VSSB indicators in combination produces a reference point. For a well  
managed fleet segment or stock the  1
aryprecaution
current
VSSB
VSSB
, while the 1
aryprecaution
current
VSSB
VSSB
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in a fishery that is not managed in an optimal way. The indicator and the reference 
point are basically of ecological nature. The relevance with respect to economics is 
connected with the valuation of the stocks. 
 
The EIAA model is prepared for possible estimates of remuneration of the fish stocks 
i.e. includes measure for resource rent. The value share VSSB of the fish stocks allo-
cated to each fleet segment is calculated in proportion to the segment‟s quota share of 
the total TAC. The issue requires further development and is not presented as part of 
the EIAA results in published reports for example SEC (2004) 1710. 
2.9. Aggregation 
There are two different aspects on the level of aggregation used for economic indica-
tors: the levels at which economic indicators are used within the models and the level 
at which the results are presented.  
 
In an economic perspective the ideal indicator is the resource rent, which means that 
only one indicator and reference point is required for presentation. The underlying 
model, however, requires and produces a large number of indicators.  
 
The level needed for the use of economic indicators in the models depends on the 
type of model used. In the EIAA model for example, totals per fleet segment are used 
to predict the effects of TACs on the economic performance of fleets. In dynamic 
simulation models working on fisherman‟s level a fisherman‟s behaviour is modelled 
by means of comparison of economic indicators of different fishing strategies.  
 
Since all of the economic models are used for management purposes, the output indi-
cators should fit the data needs for managers. In case of stable fleets, total economic 
indicators will be sufficiently indicative for developments in the economic perform-
ance, but in case of changing fleet structure, other levels of aggregation (per vessel, 
per kW, per GT) might be more indicative for the actual developments. 
2.10. Interpretation 
Once indicators are produced and reference points decided the performance of the 
system can be interpreted. A widely used method that does not refer to fisheries is the 
traffic light system. The system works with green, yellow and red colours. The system 
has for example been applied to FAO‟s Geographical Sub Areas 17 and 18 (GSA 17, 
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18) in the Mediterranean, see Accadia and Spagnolo (2004), and the following tables 
2.8 and 2.9 show the results.  
 
The list of indicators is comprehensive and reference points in terms of absolute or 
relative numbers have to be determined in advance. Apart from that, the relative de-
velopment over time of the indicators can in itself be used as reference points. The 
development of fuel prices, for example, can be viewed in this way. Increasing fuel 
prices will then be marked with read while decreasing and sufficiently low (in a his-
toric perspective) fuel prices will be marked with green. 
 
Compared to the first best indicators mentioned above the advantage of using a large 
number of indicators is that it is pinpointed where in the systems problems occur.  
 
Table 2.8. Traffic light method applied to economic indicators for FAO-GSA-17 
         
INDICATORS 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
         
Economic performance (ROI - 
Risk_free_rate) (%) 
3.57 1.74 0.89 8.80 10.10 8.87 12.09 14.24 
                  
Added Value/Revenue 0.67 0.66 0.63 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.63 
Gross Operative Margin/Revenue 0.30 0.23 0.20 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 
ROS (Return on Sale) 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.26 
ROI (Return on Investment) (%) 10.33 6.66 5.60 14.39 15.27 13.82 16.37 18.52 
Revenue/Invested Capital (%) 44.75 41.71 41.27 56.51 65.11 58.12 66.95 71.21 
Net Profit per vessel (000 €) 60.79 38.82 27.19 82.79 68.94 62.69 63.94 71.61 
                 
Landings per vessel (ton) 
340.2
6 
306.9
9 
296.3
7 
358.0
9 
310.8
6 
287.0
9 
276.3
4 
283.3
8 
Landings per GRT (ton) 4.49 4.31 4.16 4.95 5.59 5.15 5.73 5.88 
Landings per day (ton) 2.02 1.83 1.97 2.05 1.67 1.60 1.75 1.84 
CPUE (kg) 27.55 26.22 28.62 29.09 31.21 29.91 35.16 38.48 
Revenue per vessel (000 €) 
291.3
8 
268.8
4 
239.8
6 
337.8
7 
302.8
2 
274.3
0 
267.7
3 
280.9
0 
Revenue per GRT (000 €) 3.85 3.77 3.37 4.67 5.44 4.92 5.55 5.83 
Revenue per day (000 €) 1.73 1.60 1.59 1.94 1.63 1.53 1.69 1.83 
RPUE (€) 23.59 22.96 23.17 27.45 30.40 28.58 34.06 38.15 
                 
Average price (€/kg) 0.91 0.95 0.89 1.06 1.13 1.14 1.18 1.24 
Fuel cost per vessel (000 €) 37.63 35.87 38.08 47.71 44.76 40.40 39.69 43.92 
Fuel cost per day (000 €) 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.29 
Maintenance cost per vessel (000 €) 11.92 11.26 9.18 11.78 11.48 10.72 10.76 14.14 
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Table 2.9. Traffic light method applied to social indicators for FAO-GSA-17 
         
INDICATORS 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
         
Social sustainability (Salary –  
Minimum salary) (000 €) 3.70 4.77 3.78 8.20 8.08 4.66 4.82 2.84 
Employed persons (num.) 1178 1109 997 837 762 744 876 915 
Landings per crew (ton) 46.81 42.37 43.40 54.34 51.82 45.90 47.00 47.07 
Revenue per crew (€) 40.08 37.11 35.13 51.27 50.48 43.86 45.54 46.66 
Crew/GRT  0.096 0.102 0.096 0.091 0.108 0.112 0.122 0.125 
Salary per crew (000 €) 14.89 15.96 14.97 19.39 19.27 16.00 16.15 14.80 
2.11. Conclusion 
The following list is organised according to the items required by an indicator system. 
First the criteria are listed. The criterion is the name of the type of information that is 
wanted. Secondly, the indicators are listed, and these describe the exact type of in-
formation that is needed to describe the criteria. Thirdly, the reference points describe 
what type of information the indicators are compared with. Fourthly, the interpreta-
tion includes decision rules to reject or approve hypothesis. 
 
The information should be provided on fleet segment level according to the levels 
specified in the DCR (see appendix 8.3). This means that level one is vessel length, 
level two is fishing techniques etc. 
2.11.1. Criteria (name) 
1. Economic efficiency 
2. Harvest 
3. Fish prices 
4.  Gross cash flow (profit margin) 
5.  Net profit 
6.  Contribution to GDP (gross value added) 
7.  Employment 
8.  Effort 
9.  Fleet capacity 
2.11.2. Indicators 
o Economic indicators all measured in €: 
 Value of landings  
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 Variable costs e.g. fuel, provision, repair  
 Crew share e.g. payment to the crew including skipper 
 Gross cash flow (value of landings minus variable costs and minus 
 crew share) 
 Fixed costs (interest payments and depreciation, insurance, admini-
 stration etc.) 
 Net result e.g. value of landings minus all costs 
 Gross value added (socio-economic indicator) e.g. remuneration of la-
 bour and capital (contribution to gross domestic product). 
o Other economic indicators 
 Landings of fish by species (tonnes) 
 Employment on board measured in persons or full time employment 
 Effort measured in sea days or kW-days 
 Invested capital measured in €  
 Fleet capacity measured in number of vessels, GT and kW 
2.11.3. Reference points 
1. Maximum economic yield (MEY). This equals maximizing of the resource 
rent. It is calculated from the short run profit margin (gross cash flow) or the 
long run net profit. The MEY is an optimal “steady state” situation for a fish-
ery from an economic point of view. 
2. Net present value (NPV). The method takes all future in- and outgoing pay-
ments and discounts those to a certain point in time usually the present year. 
It is expressed in absolute values or as a percentage. 
3. Return on investment (ROI). It is calculated taking the change in gross cash 
flow in proportion to the investment. It applies NPV and is expressed as a 
percentage.  
4. Return on capital (ROC). Gross cash flow in proportion to the total invested 
capital in vessels. It is expressed as a percentage. 
5. Operating profit margin (OPM). This is calculated taking gross cash flow in 
proportion to gross revenue. It is expressed as a percentage. 
6. Break even revenue (BER). This is calculated taking the gross cash flow in 
proportion to the gross revenue and divide the fixed costs with this coeffi-
cient. 
7. Overcapacity by use of MEY is calculated taking difference between the cur-
rent number of vessels and the calculated number of vessels at MEY in pro-
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portion to the current number of vessels. If possible GT and kW could be ap-
plied. 
8. Overcapacity by use of BER. It is calculated taking the proportion between 
the current gross revenue and the calculated BER and subtract that coefficient 
from 1. 
9. Other reference points for example for the development in harvest or the em-
ployment are calculated by taking the average value of these indicators for a 
pre-defined historical period. 
2.11.4. Interpretation 
The first seven reference point combines information about output and input in a fish-
ery and requires calculations. The reference points under item eight are dealing with 
indicators separately and are therefore less data demanding. On the other hand these 
reference points are also more difficult to interpret as the interpretation is not based 
on economic theory but on political goals. 
 
The choice of reference points depends on the problem that is addressed and the 
availability of data. The best but also the most data demanding reference point is the 
MEY. The closer the fishery gets to MEY the more efficient it is with respect to usage 
of production factors.  
 
The NPV is convenient once two or more scenarios are compared. The one with the 
highest NPV is usually the one that should be favoured on the expense of the other(s). 
It is useful for comparison of different management regimes. 
 
The ROI reference point is useful to investigate changes in the fishery caused by 
changes in investment for example in vessels and fishing gear. The ROC and the 
OPM are relevant to assess changes in management. The ROC is more data demand-
ing than OPM. OPM has been used for a number of years by the STECF in the as-
sessment of economic repercussions of the quota management.  
 
The interpretation of ROI, ROC, and OPM requires decision rules. Usually these cal-
culated for the fishery is compared to the same type for other sectors or to agreed 
conventional figures. The ROC and the OPM further have the advantage that they 
could be produced over time and therefore also historical reference points of these 
could be used in the interpretation. 
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The easiest overcapacity reference point in terms of data and calculation is the BER-
based reference point. It requires calculation but is less data demanding than the re-
source rent indicator. 
 
As regards the reference point under item 9 they are less data demanding and requires 
little processing. They appear directly from the indicators. A convenient way to inter-
pret these indicators is to use the traffic light system. Once the reference points are 
calculated by taking the average of a certain period the colours can be determined, 
and a picture can be produced. 
 
Finally it should be mentioned that having produced the entire assessment of the 
whole system the DPSIR system could be applied. 
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3. Economic Efficiency in the North Sea Beam Trawl Fleet 
3.1. Introduction  
This case study concerns economic efficiency in the flatfish beam trawl fishery in the 
North Sea. The study will test the following hypothesis: Effort based management is, 
on average, more economically efficient than resource based management. In order to 
test this hypothesis, the IMARES/LEI simulation model presented in section 3.3 will 
be used.  
 
The main target species for the beam trawl fishery are sole and plaice. In section 3.2 
the state of North Sea plaice and sole stocks will be discussed. In section 3.3 the main 
features of the management system will be presented. In section 3.4 the development 
of the Dutch beam trawl fleet is discussed, while section 3.5 presents the economic 
performance of the fleet over the past few years. Section 3.6 discusses the simulation 
model and the scenarios considered. Simulation results are presented in section 3.7. 
3.2. State of the stocks
6
 
3.2.1. Plaice 
The flatfish stocks in the North Sea are heavily exploited and the ICES advice for 
2007 was to reduce catches of North Sea plaice in order to rebuild the stock to safe 
levels. The plaice stock has been below the biologically recommended level for a 
number of years and recruitment has generally been low. ICES classifies the North 
Sea plaice stock as being at risk of reduced reproductive capacity and as being har-
vested unsustainably. SSB was estimated to be at around 193 000 tonnes in 2005 and 
at a similar level (194 000 tonnes) in 2006. The spawning stock biomass (SSB) is 
therefore below the precautionary level Bpa at 230 000 tonnes, but above the minimum 
biomass (Blim) at 160 000 tonnes, below which recruitment is expected to be „im-
paired‟ or the stock dynamics are unknown. Fishing mortality in 2005 was estimated 
at 0.52 which is below the precautionary level of fishing mortality (Fpa at 0.60) and 
recruitment since 2003 has been below the time-series average.  
                                                 
6 This section has been based of ICES advice from October 2006:  Report of the ICES Advisory 
Committee on Fishery Management, Advisory Committee on the Marine Environment and Advi-
sory Committee on Ecosystems, 2006.   
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Table 3.1. Plaice in sub-area IV (North Sea) 
 Recruitment SSB Catch Landings Discards Ftot 
 age 1 (thousands) tonnes tonnes tonnes tonnes (2-6) 
       
1990 1035975 378509 228218 156240 71978 0.58 
1995 1158562 186469 120215 98356 21859 0.66 
2000 1301974 228710 135002 81148 53854 0.53 
2001 763592 276865 182750 81963 100787 0.71 
2002 1929171 243394 180652 70217 110435 0.76 
2003 488754 246132 181302 66502 114800 0.80 
2004 880836 182637 116551 61436 55115 0.54 
2005 579514 193408 104080 55700 48380 0.52 
2006 704238 194051     
 
Source: ICES (2006) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. North Sea plaice, spawning stock biomass (SSB), landings and dis-
cards 
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Source: ICES (2006) 
3.2.2. Sole 
The stock of sole in the North Sea is also considered to be over exploited and ICES 
has advised a reduction in both fishing mortality and catches in 2007. Based on the 
most recent estimates of SSB and fishing mortality, ICES classifies the stock as being 
at risk of reduced reproductive capacity and at risk of being harvested unsustainably. 
SSB in 2006 was estimated at 30,000 tonnes which is below Bpa (35,000 tonnes), and 
fishing mortality in 2005 (0.45) was above the precautionary level (0.4). Recruitment 
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in recent years has been very low but the 2006 year class appears to be above average. 
Discards of sole are not generally considered to be a problem for physical reasons, 
seeing that they are smaller than plaice, and that sole is the primary target species.  
 
Table 3.2. Sole in sub-area IV (North Sea) 
     
Year Recruitment SSB Landings Mean F 
 Age 1 (thousands) tonnes Tonnes Ages 2-6 
     
1990 177673 89462 35120 0.46 
1995 96090 58780 30467 0.53 
2000 124495 39187 22641 0.61 
2001 66740 30424 19944 0.58 
2002 198090 31094 16945 0.58 
2003 90852 25863 17920 0.58 
2004 49375 40155 17147 0.36 
2005 45173 38011 16355 0.45 
2006 96733 30077   
 
Source: ICES (2006) 
 
 
Figure 3.2. North Sea sole, spawning stock biomass (SSB) and landings 
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Source: ICES (2006) 
3.2.3. Stock - recruitment relation 
The pattern of recruitment for both sole and plaice shows little evidence for any ob-
servable stock-recruitment relationship as long as biomass is above certain minimum 
levels. For plaice, ICES has defined a minimum biomass (Blim) of 160,000 tonnes. Be-
low this value recruitment is expected to be „impaired‟ or the stock dynamics are un-
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known. Blim for sole has been estimated at 25,000 tonnes. Given the precautionary 
principle, the unpredictability of the recruitment relationship emphasizes the impor-
tance of following a cautious fishing policy.  
 
Figure 3.3. Plaice and sole stock recruitment as a function of spawning stock 
biomass (SSB) 
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3.3. Management regime  
3.3.1. Introduction 
The Dutch beam trawl fishery is managed through a combination of output regula-
tions (quota) and input regulations (capacity and effort management).  
3.3.2. Output management 
3.3.2.1. ITQs and co-management
7
 
Since 1975, because of severe overfishing, the European system of TAC's has been 
expanded to more than 20 species. In order to allocate the national quota, an ITQ sys-
tem has been gradually introduced in the Netherlands. When the IQ system was intro-
duced in 1976, flatfish quotas officially were only transferable together with a vessel. 
Soon, however, it proved possible to circumvent this rule by using legal constructions 
and an informal ITQ system evolved. In 1985, quotas became officially transferable 
without a vessel; ITQ‟s can be bought, sold or rented. The allocation of quotas in a 
period is based on quotas received in the previous period, for instance, if a fisher re-
ceived 5% of a quota in the previous period, and the total quota is reduced by half in 
the new period, then the fisher in the new period receives a quota of 2.5% of the pre-
vious years quota.  
 
In the early nineties, problems of non-compliance and bad relations between the na-
tional government and the fisheries sector led to the introduction of a set of diverse 
management tools, developing into a co-management system which was implemented 
in 1993. The key ideas of the new management scheme (Biesheuvel system) were:  
 
 sharing of responsibilities between government and fishing industry and,  
 cooperation between fishermen.  
 
In the co-management system, responsibilities in the management of individual quo-
tas have been devolved to groups of fishermen. These co-management groups are 
formally independent legal persons. All group members have to be member of the 
same producer organization (PO). In practice, the management functions of PO's and 
groups are often carried out by the same staff of people. 
                                                 
7 This section has been based on Buisman en Hoefnagel (2007) 
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Group membership is not compulsory. To induce fishermen to enter a group, fishers 
were offered more favourable treatment than non-group fishers. This led to high par-
ticipation in the groups.  
 
The group management board is responsible for management of the pooled quota. 
The board is entitled to impose penalties/fines and other sanctions, including the clos-
ing of fishing activities for the group or a group member. Fines have to be applied in 
such a way that in the end the transgressor is never favoured by the transgression. The 
government remains responsible for controlling the national quota and tasks pertain-
ing to CFP (Hoefnagel and Smit, 1996). 
3.3.3. Input management 
3.3.3.1. Capacity management  
Capacity licensing
8
 was introduced in the Netherlands in 1985
9
 in order to limit the 
total engine power of the fleet. On a licence the engine power of a vessel is registered. 
According to the Fish Licensing Order, only fishing vessels in possession of a fishing 
license are allowed to fish for species subject to a quota. The licensing scheme was as-
sociated with the EU Multi-annual Guidance Programme. No new capacity licenses 
have been issued since 1985.  
 
When the licensing system was introduced in 1985, fishermen could get a license for 
their existing engine capacity and for engine capacity for vessels under construction. 
However, the provision in the scheme for vessels under construction resulted in addi-
tional new capacity. By the end of 1988, the engine capacity of the fleet had expanded 
by 14% compared with the position before licensing. The total number of licenses in 
Dutch fisheries is now circa 754. 
 
In 1987, measures
10 
were taken to restrict the constantly increasing engine power of 
individual fishing vessels in the beam trawl-fleet. The maximum engine capacity of 
new vessels was specified at 2000 HP. At the time of establishment of the measure 
some 80 beam trawlers exceeding 2000 HP were already in operation or were on or-
der. These existing and ordered vessels were allowed to operate. But in the case of the 
transfer of (or part of) these licenses to another vessel, the engine power exceeding 
2000 HP cannot be transferred. Also, when a beam trawler becomes 20 years old, en-
                                                 
8 This paragraph has been based on (Buisman en Hoefnagel 2007) 
9 Beschikking Visserijlicentie (27 December 1984, Stcrt. 253). 
10 Beschikking visserijlicentie (modification 23 September 1987, Stcrt. 184). 
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gine power needs to decrease to 2000 HP. Currently, only a few vessels are operating 
with more than 2000 HP. 
 
3.3.3.2. Transferable licences 
In the Dutch system, licences are allocated to persons or holdings and not to vessels. 
As previously stated, the licences are transferable. In practice, licences have been 
transferred in various ways including being sold with or separately from a vessel. It is 
also possible to combine the licences of two or more old vessels into one vessel with 
higher HP. Vessel owners can keep their licence if their vessel is sold or brought un-
der the flag of another Member State. This means that exports of vessels and quota 
hopping do not necessarily reduce the (potential) Dutch fleet. In case of decommis-
sioning of a vessel, the licence is cancelled. However, the fisherman is in principle 
free to buy another licence and remain active in the fishery. 
 
3.3.3.3. Other measures 
Other significant capacity limiting measures include requirements in relation to the 
fishing gear, i.e. the maximum beam length of beam trawlers (12 metres outside the 
12 miles zone and 4.5 meters within the 12 miles zone) is considered to be an effec-
tive measure to limit the overcapacity of the fleet fishing for flatfish.  
 
3.3.3.4. Effort 
The introduction of a national days-at-sea system in 1987 was an important develop-
ment in the Dutch management regime.
11
 The system was intended to restrict fishing 
effort by limiting the amount of days that fishing vessels can spend at sea. According 
to this regulation, days at sea were calculated on the basis of the size of the allocated 
quotas. The maximum amount of days at sea was further subdivided into three months 
periods. 
 
The national system of days at sea has now been replaced by the limitations laid down 
in the present EU cod recovery plan. The effort limitations for 2007 are specified in 
Council Regulation (EC) No 41/2007, Annex IIa. Days at sea are allocated to fishing 
vessels on the basis of the fishing area and the type of gear (table 3.3). The total num-
ber of days at sea per vessel depends on the types of gear used and on the fishing ar-
eas.  
 
 
                                                 
11.Zeedagenregeling 1987 (Stcrt 1987;32, 1988, 253.) 
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Table 3.3. Number of days at sea between 1-2- 2007 and 31-01-2008 
    
Gear and mesh size Skagerrak/Kattegat  II, IVa, IVb, IVc VIId 
    
Trawls: ≥16 – <32 mm 228 228 228 
Trawls: ≥70 – <90 mm n.a.. 204 221 
Trawls: ≥ 90 – <100 95 209 209 
Trawls: ≥100 – <120 mm 95 95 95 
Trawls: ≥ 120 mm 96 96 96 
Beam trawl: ≥ 80 – <90 mm  132 132 Unlimited 
Beam trawl: ≥ 90–<100 mm 143 143 Unlimited 
Beam trawl: ≥ 100 – <120 mm 143 143 Unlimited 
Beam trawl: ≥ 120 mm 143 143 Unlimited 
Gillnets: <110 mm 140 140 140 
Gillnets: ≥110 – <150 mm 140 140 140 
Gillnets: ≥150 – <220 mm 130 130 130 
Gillnets: ≥ 220 mm 140 140 140 
Trammelnets 140 140 140 
Longlines 173 173 173 
 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 41/2007, Annex IIa. 
 
 
Under this EU system, days at sea can still be transferred, but only within the same 
category (gear and fishing area). Days at sea can be transferred as HP-days, for in-
stance, 1 day at sea for a vessel of 1500 HP equals 5 days at sea for a vessel of 300 
HP. 
3.4. Vessels and catches 
3.4.1. Fleet segments 
The Dutch beam trawl fleet consists of two major segments, namely, large beam 
trawlers > 24m, see table 3.4, and beam trawlers <= 24 (eurocutters), se table 3.5. 
Most of the vessels in the eurocutter fleet do not target only flatfish. Many of the ves-
sels are multi-purpose vessels which can switch between flatfish and shrimp, depend-
ing on quota, season and catch opportunities. 
 
During the past six years, the eurocutter fleet increased in terms of number of vessels 
by approximately 20%. The number of vessels in the segment of large beam trawlers 
decreased significantly by 20%. This is because in the present situation with high fuel 
prices, it is in general more profitable to fish with less engine power.  
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Table 3.4. Beam trawlers > 24 m, capacity indicators, 1998-2004 
        
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
        
Volume of landings (1000t) 68.0 72.0 68.0 64.0 57.9 56.3 44.2 
Fleet - number of vessels 163 159 157 150 141 128 131.0 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 67 66 67 65 61.1 56.6 57.1 
Fleet - total kW (1000) 269 262 260 249 233 212.2 212.1 
 
Source: AER, 2005 
 
 
Table 3.5. Beam trawlers <= 24 m, capacity indicators, 1998-2004 
        
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
        
Volume of landings (1000t) 20 18.6 17 18 17 20.3 23.4 
Fleet - number of vessels 142 143 159 163 173 173 171 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 11 11 12 12 13.6 13.9 13.8 
Fleet - total kW (1000) 31 32 35 36 38 37.9 37.0 
 
Source: AER, 2005 
 
3.4.2. Catches 
The main target species of the North Sea beam trawl flatfish fishery are plaice and 
sole, with important by-catches of cod, whiting, dab, turbot and brill, together with a 
variety of benthic invertebrates and other non-commercial species as unwanted by-
catch. The general minimum allowed mesh size for this fishery is 100 mm. 
 
Sole is only caught in the southern North Sea below 55°N. In this area the beam trawl 
fishery is a mixed fishery for sole and plaice. As a derogation from the general rule, 
the minimum allowed mesh size below 55°N is 80 mm when fishing for sole because 
this mesh size corresponds to the minimum landing size of sole of 24 cm. (One is as-
sumed to be fishing for sole if the on board catch is composed of at least 5% of sole 
and less than 10% of cod, haddock and saithe.) With this mesh size, however, it is in-
evitable that significant amounts of undersized plaice have to be discarded. 
 
The beam trawl fishery above 55°N is essentially a plaice fishery, as not much sole is 
found in this area. There, the general minimum mesh size of 100 mm applies. This 
mesh size is still not in line with the minimum landing size for plaice of 27 cm and, 
consequently, the plaice fishery also has considerable amounts of undersized plaice 
discards. 
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In recent years, fishing effort of the major fleets targeting sole and plaice has de-
creased. Because of a decreasing TAC for plaice and a relatively stable TAC for sole, 
fishing effort has concentrated more in the southern part of the North Sea. In addition, 
because of days-at sea regulations and high fuel prices, fishing effort has shifted to 
more coastal areas. These changes have caused increasing discards of juvenile plaice 
during the last few years. 
 
Table 3.6 shows the landings of sole, plaice and cod by the Dutch flatfish fleet. Since 
1999, landings of these species have gradually decreased. 
 
Table 3.6. Total landings by species of Dutch flatfish beam trawl fleet (1000t) 
        
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
        
 --------------------------------------------- Beam trawlers > 24m ------------------------------------- 
Sole 13.3 14.5 13.3 11.9 10.4 10.5 10.5 
Plaice 26.6 34.9 32.2 30.2 24.7 24.6 19.7 
Cod 5.8 4.3 2.8 1.6 1.8 1.4 0.7 
Other 22.7 18.7 20.0 20.6 21.0 19.8 13.3 
Total 68.4 72.4 68.3 64.3 57.9 56.3 44.2 
 ----------------------------------------------- Beam trawlers <= 24m ---------------------------------- 
Sole 2.2 2.2 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.6 2.5 
Plaice 2.7 3.4 2.5 2.1 1.4 1.9 3.1 
Cod 4.1 1.3 1.3 0.8 1.6 0.6 0.7 
Shrimp 5.3 7.5 6.9 8.7 7.9 11.7 8.3 
Other 5.3 4.2 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.5 8.8 
Total 19.6 18.6 16.9 17.9 17.0 20.3 23.4 
 ---------------------------------------------- Total beam trawl fleet ------------------------------------ 
Sole 15.5 16.7 15.4 13.7 11.8 12.1 13.0 
Plaice 29.3 38.3 34.7 32.3 26.1 26.5 22.8 
Cod 9.9 5.6 4.1 2.4 3.4 2.0 1.4 
Shrimp 5.3 7.5 6.9 8.7 7.9 11.7 8.3 
Other 28.0 22.9 24.1 25.1 25.7 24.3 22.1 
Total 88.0 91.0 85.2 82.2 74.9 76.6 67.6 
 
Source: AER, 2005 
 
 
Table 3.7 shows partial fishing mortality rates for plaice and sole in the Dutch beam 
trawl fleet. The partial fishing mortality (Fpart) incurred by the Dutch beam trawl fleet 
has been calculated by multiplying total fishing mortality (Ftot) with the ratio of the 
fleet landings and total landings per species. Because Ftot for plaice also includes dis-
cards, this figure assumes that the discard rate of plaice in Dutch beam trawl fleet is 
the same as in other North Sea beam trawl flatfish fleets.  
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Table 3.7. Partial fishing mortality of plaice and sole in Dutch beam trawl fleet 
        
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
        
Fpart plaice 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.21 0.18 
Fpart sole 0.38 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.26 0.25 
3.5. Economic performance  
The economic results for large beam trawlers (>24m) have deteriorated during the last 
seven years, see table 3.8. Gross value added of the large beam trawlers has decreased 
by 36% since 1998, and net profit has been negative since 2002. Employment de-
creased by 21% between 1999 and 2004. Fuel costs of the large beam trawlers in-
creased by 47%, while the crew share decreased by 32%. 
 
Table 3.8. Beam trawlers > 24 m, economic and capacity indicators, 1998-2004 
        
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  
 ----------------------- Economic indicators (m €) ---------------------- 
Value of landings 201 217 213 211 182.4 179.6 165.1 
Fuel costs 34 37 66 62 50 49.7 49.9 
Other running costs 36 36 36 34 31.2 30.1 26.3 
Vessel costs 24 23 23 23 22.1 21.3 20.2 
Crew share 57 63 51 53 48 47.2 39.0 
Gross cash flow 49 58 37 39 31.1 31.2 29.7 
Depreciation 29 28 28 30 27.3 27.1 28.0 
Interest 8 7 7 6 5.9 5.8 3.5 
Net profit 12 23 2 3 -2.1 -1.7 -1.8 
Gross value added 107 121 87 92 79.1 78.4 68.7 
 ----------------------- Other economic indicators ----------------------- 
Employment on board (FTE) 1,138 1,127 1,127 1,049 991 900 900 
Invested capital (m €) 350 348 335 307 323 312 310 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 31 30 30 29 26 25 24 
 
Source: AER, 2005 
 
 
For the beam trawlers below 24m there is no clear trend. Gross revenue has increased 
by 23% from 1998 to 2004 with some variation over time. Net profit and gross value 
added have followed the same pattern. Investments, employment and effort have all 
increased from 1998 to 2004, see table 3.9. 
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Table 3.9. Beam trawlers <= 24 m, economic and capacity indicators, 1998-2003 
  
        
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
        
 --------------------------- Economic indicators (m e) ---------------------- 
Value of landings 52 63 59 70 57.8 56.7 64.0 
Fuel costs 4 5 10 9 7.8 7.9 9.5 
Other running costs 10 10 11 10 10.7 10.7 11.0 
Vessel costs 7 8 8 8 7.2 7.3 10.2 
Crew share 20 23 21 26 22.5 22 20.9 
Gross cash flow 11 17 9 17 9.6 8.8 12.5 
Depreciation 6 6 7 8 8.2 8.3 9.7 
Interest 2 2 3 2 1.8 1.8 1.3 
Net profit 3 9 -1 7 -0.4 -1.3 1.5 
Gross value added 31 40 30 43 31.6 30.8 33.3 
 -------------------------- Other economic indicators ---------------------- 
Employment on board (FTE) 476 481 508 519 575 575 570 
Invested capital (m €) 80 76 83 81 96.2 96.2 95.1 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 20 20 22 23 22.7 22.5 23.0 
 
Source: AER, 2005 
 
 
The main reasons for the decrease in profitability is the reduction of TAC's for sole 
and plaice and the increasing fuel costs. Particularly rising fuel prices have had a 
dramatic effect on the economic results of this fleet because beam trawling is a very 
energy-intensive fishing method.  
 
The development for the Dutch beam trawl fleet with respect to four important eco-
nomic indicators appears from figure 3.4 and 3.5. 
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Figure 3.4. Value of landings and gross value added (1998-2004) 
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Figure 3.5. Net profit and employment (1998 – 2004) 
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3.5.1. Prices of species 
Table 3.10 presents prices of main species during the last seven years. During this pe-
riod the price of sole has gradually increased, while the price of plaice remained more 
or less stable. 
 
Table 3.10. Prices of main species for Dutch beam trawl fleet (€/kg) 
        
Species 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
        
Plaice 1.90 1.53 1.70 1.77 1.98 1.78 1.90 
Sole 7.22 7.73 8.83 8.88 8.62 8.47 10.07 
Cod 1.95 2.06 2.22 2.23 2.18 2.02 2.05 
whiting 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.98 1.02 
Dab 1.19 1.32 1.30 0.99 0.83 0.88 0.80 
Turbot and brill 8.85 6.93 7.40 8.36 7.99 7.77 8.30 
3.6. Modelling the optimizing behaviour by fishermen under TAC and effort 
constraints 
3.6.1. Introduction 
This section investigates the consequences for economic efficiency of managing fish-
eries through either TAC or effort limitations. In order to address our main hypothe-
sis, a bio-economic simulation model for the North Sea flatfish fishery is used. The 
core of the economic module of this model consists of Cobb Douglas production 
functions for sole and plaice, where catches depend on fishing effort and spawning 
stock biomass. A direct implication of using this type of production function is that 
catchability varies with the amount of fishing effort. This means that the optimizing 
behaviour by fishermen is presumed to affect the productivity of fishing effort. 
 
Moreover, optimizing behaviour by fishermen is presumed to be influenced by the 
particular nature of the management constraint that is applied to the fishery. In short, 
fishers are presumed, and modelled, as to optimize their fishing activities in a differ-
ent way when the output (TAC) of the fishery is constrained than when the fishing 
input (effort) is constrained. This will cause the production function and the level of 
catchability to vary with the nature of the management constraints applied and 
thereby raising the question of how economic results of the fishery are influenced by 
a given management policy. The rest of this section compares the economic conse-
quences of effort and TAC management in the Dutch beam trawl fleet. 
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3.6.2. The management scenarios 
Two management scenarios will be investigated: TAC management and effort man-
agement. Both scenario‟s are based on the present management plan for North Sea 
plaice and sole
12
 which contains both effort and TAC constraints. In the effort man-
agement scenario, the TAC restriction of the management plan is disabled so that the 
fishery is only constrained by the effort restriction. In the TAC scenario, the effort 
constraint is disabled, so that the fishery is only restricted by the TAC's. The man-
agement plan aims at: “reducing the fishing mortality rate on plaice and sole by 10% 
each year, with a maximum TAC variation of 15% per year until safe biological limits 
are reached for both stocks”. In the second stage, fishing mortality for both species 
will be kept at a level corresponding to MSY, which is assumed to be 0.3 for plaice 
and 0.2 for sole. 
 
3.6.2.1. TAC management 
The procedure for setting TAC's for sole and plaice has been described in article 7 
and 8 of the multi-annual management plan for plaice and sole in the North Sea. Basi-
cally, the TAC is set at a level that corresponds to a 10% lower fishing mortality than 
in the year before, unless the resulting fishing mortality would be smaller than FMSY. 
In the latter case, the TAC is set at a level that corresponds to FMSY. 
 
Procedure for setting the TAC for plaice and sole 
1.  The Council shall adopt the TAC for plaice and sole at that level of catches 
which, according to a scientific evaluation carried out by STECF is the 
higher of: 
(a)  that TAC the application of which will result in a 10% reduction for 
plaice and sole in the fishing mortality rate in its year of application 
compared to the fishing mortality rate estimated for the preceding year;  
(b)  that TAC the application of which will result in the level of fishing 
mortality rate of 0.3 on ages two to six years for plaice and 0.2 on ages 
two to six years for sole in its year of application. 
2.  Where application of paragraph 1 would result in a TAC which exceeds the 
TAC of the preceding year by more than 15%, the Council shall adopt a 
TAC which is 15% greater than the TAC of that year. 
                                                 
12 Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007 of 11 June 2007 establishing a multi-annual plan for fish-
eries exploiting stocks of plaice and sole in the North Sea 
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3.  Where application of paragraph 1 would result in a TAC which is more 
than 15% less than the TAC of the preceding year, the Council shall adopt 
a TAC which is 15% less than the TAC of that year. 
 
 
3.6.2.2. Effort management 
The procedure for setting the effort limitation is less straightforward than that for 
TAC's. Article 9 of the multi-annual management plan requires that the effort limita-
tion of those fleets where either or both plaice and sole comprise(s) an important part 
of the landings will be annually adjusted to the maximum of the effort needed to de-
plete the TAC for sole and plaice as set according to article 7 and 8. As the Dutch 
beam trawl fleet clearly belongs to this class of fleets, this effort limitation will be one 
of two effort management scenarios that we will explore in the simulation model. In 
the simulation we will ignore the fact that the Commission may deviate from the ad-
vice given by STECF. In a second effort scenario we will explore the implications of 
annual effort limitations to the minimum of the effort needed to deplete the TAC for 
sole and plaice. 
 
Fishing effort limitation as described in the multi-annual management plan:  
 
1.  The TAC's referred to in Chapter II shall be complemented by a system of 
fishing effort limitation established in Community legislation. 
2.  Each year, the Council shall decide by a qualified majority, on the basis of 
a proposal from the Commission, on an adjustment to the maximum level 
of fishing effort available for fleets where either or both plaice and sole 
comprise an important part of the landings or where substantial discards 
are made and subject to the system of fishing effort limitation referred to in 
paragraph 1. 
3.  The Commission shall request from STECF a forecast of the maximum 
level of fishing effort necessary to take catches of plaice and sole equal to 
the European Community's share of the TAC‟s established according to 
Article 6. This request shall be formulated taking account of other relevant 
Community legislation governing the conditions under which quotas may 
be fished. 
4.  The annual adjustment of the maximum level of fishing effort referred to in 
paragraph 2 shall be made with regard to the opinion of STECF provided 
according to paragraph 3. 
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5.  The Commission shall each year request the STECF to report on the annual 
level of fishing effort deployed by vessels catching plaice and sole, and to 
report on the types of fishing gear used in such fisheries. 
6.  Notwithstanding paragraph 4, fishing effort shall not increase above the 
level allocated in 2006. 
7.  Member States whose quotas are less than 5% of the European Commu-
nity's share of the TAC‟s of both plaice and sole shall be exempted from 
the effort management regime. 
8.  A Member State concerned by the provisions of paragraph 7 and engaging 
in any quota exchange of sole or plaice on the basis of Article 20(5) of 
Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 that would result in the sum of the quota 
allocated to that Member State and the quantity of sole or plaice transferred 
being in excess of 5% of the European Community's share of the TAC 
shall be subject to the effort management regime. 
9.  The fishing effort deployed by vessels in which plaice or sole are an impor-
tant part of the catch and which fly the flag of a Member State concerned 
by the provisions of paragraph 7 shall not increase above the level author-
ized in 2006. 
3.6.3. Modelling the behaviour of the Dutch beam trawl fleet 
The simulation model is, with some adjustments, based on the model developed by 
IMARES and LEI in the EU project EFIMAS. The model has been extensively de-
scribed in Oostenbrugge (2008). Here the description will be restricted to the main 
features of the model.  
 
The IMARES-LEI model has been designed as a short-term, bio-economic, model 
which can be used to predict adjustments within the existing fleet to different man-
agement policies. Possible simulations which can be run include the effects of 
changes in the number of effective days at sea, adjustments of fishing gear or fishing 
areas. Effects on investment and disinvestment are beyond the scope of the model.  
 
The model consists of a biological sub-model in which spawning stock biomass 
(SSB) is calculated on the basis of recruitment, natural mortality and catches in the 
year before, a management sub-module in which the management decision is simu-
lated on the basis of stock size and a harvest control rule, and an economic sub-model 
that consists of Cobb-Douglas production functions for sole and plaice, the two target 
species of the fishery, and cost equations where costs are a function of effort. The 
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economic sub-model uses information on stock size from the biological sub-model 
and the TAC from the management module and returns information on fishing effort 
and catches of plaice and sole back into the biological sub-model. 
 
A basic assumption of the economic sub-model is that for every restriction of the 
fishery, the least efficient fishing trips will be cancelled first. These are the trips with 
lowest net revenues per unit of the restricted factor in the management scenario con-
cerned. This means that under effort management the trips with lowest net revenues 
per day at sea will be dropped first while under TAC management the trips with low-
est net revenue per unit used of the TAC will be dropped. This optimizing behaviour 
will cause the coefficients of the production function to differ according to the man-
agement regime applied. 
 
At the core of the economic sub-model are the Cobb-Douglas production functions 
for sole and plaice. An important feature is that the output elasticity of effort (β) is 
smaller than 1. Catches increase with fishing effort but the rate of increase in catches 
decreases with increasing effort. This reflects the assumption that if the fishery is re-
stricted, the least efficient trips will be dropped first.  
 
(3.1)  
β
i
i i i
H = α E B    
 
Where i denotes sole and plaice, H catches, E fishing effort, B spawning stock bio-
mass, and α and β coefficients of the production functions of sole (s) and plaice (p). 
 
As stated, under TAC and effort constraints fishermen will optimize their behaviour 
differently implying that the coefficients of these functions will differ under different 
management regimes resulting in different catches per unit of effort and consequently 
lead to different economic results. 
3.6.4. Optimizing behaviour under TAC management 
A central assumption in the TAC management scenario is that sole is the main target 
species that drives the effort of the beam trawl fleet; consequently, plaice catches are 
derived from the effort that is needed to deplete the fleet‟s share of the sole TAC (Q). 
After the TAC has been set according to article 7 and 8 of the management plan, the 
model calculates the effort needed to deplete the fleet‟s share of the sole TAC (equa-
tion 3.2). This effort is used in the production function for plaice to calculate the 
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plaice catches (equation 3.4). The plaice catches can be lower or higher than the 
plaice quota. In the latter case, landings L are assumed equal to Q and the over quota 
catches are assumed to be discarded so that discard D is the difference between 
catches and landings (equation 3.7). The sole catches and landings are always equal to 
the fleet‟s share Q of the TAC (equation 3.3).  
 
 
(3.2) 
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(3.5) L p=H p  if H p≤ Q p    
   
(3.6) L p=Qp  if H p≥ Q p    
   
(3.7) Dp=H p− L p    
  
3.6.5. Optimizing behaviour under effort management 
In the case of effort management, the effort restriction is set by the management au-
thorities. The procedure for determining the total allowed catch for sole and plaice is 
the same as in the TAC scenario. In this case, however, the TAC is not imposed on 
the fishery, but the authorities calculate the effort that would be needed to deplete the 
Dutch share of the plaice and sole TAC and, based on that calculation, impose an ef-
fort restriction. Here it is assumed that the management authorities know the coeffi-
cients of the production functions for sole and plaice. Catches of plaice and sole are 
subsequently calculated by inserting the effort restriction in the production functions 
under the implicit assumption that the fleet deploys the total allowed effort
13
. 
 
Two effort management scenarios are considered by applying (3.8-3.13). The “maxi-
mum effort” scenario follows the effort limitation procedure of the flatfish manage-
ment plan. In this scenario, the effort constraint is annually adjusted to the maximum 
                                                 
13  If this would not be the case, then the management restriction would not be binding and the man-
agement regime would have no influence on economic results. 
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of the effort needed to deplete the TAC for either sole or plaice (equation 8). In the 
maximum scenario one of the species will be overexploited each year. In the “mini-
mum effort” scenario, the effort constraint is set at the minimum of the effort needed 
to deplete the TAC for either sole or plaice (equation 3.9). Consequently, in the mini-
mum scenario one of the stocks will be underexploited each year. 
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Catches and landings of both plaice and sole may be higher or lower than the Dutch 
share of the TAC that would have been imposed in the TAC management scenario, 
depending on which of the TAC‟s requires the most effort to be depleted. Catches of 
both species are equal to landings as there is no reason to discard marketable fish.  
3.6.6. Calculation of prices, costs and revenues 
Prices costs and revenues are calculated similarly in both scenarios by equations 3.14-
3.21. 
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(3.16)   OiiT R+PL=R      
   
(3.17) CF =CF
0
    
   
(3.18) 
Ovv E
E
C=C 0     
   
 
(3.19) CT =CF +CV    
   
(3.20) RN =RT− CV    
   
(3.21) Π=RT− CT     
   
 
e : price flexibility; for sole es = -0.3; for plaice ep = 0 
P: price of species 
P
0
: price of species in base year 
L: Landings of species  
RT: Total revenue  
RO: Other revenue 
RN: Net revenues 
CT: Total costs 
C V: Variable costs 
C F: Fixed costs  
Π: Net profit 
3.7. Simulation Results  
3.7.1. Development in indicators over time 
Three management scenarios are tested, two scenarios in which allowed effort is re-
stricted and one in which the total allowable catch (TAC) is restricted. These scena-
rios are described in section 3.6. In section 3.7.2 the modeling results are discussed. 
The hypothesis is that effort management will result in better economic performance 
than TAC management. 
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Figure 3.6 shows the development of net profits in the three scenarios. In the first 
year, these are lower for the minimum effort scenario than for the TAC scenario due 
to lower landings. The maximum effort scenario shows higher profits in the first years 
due to higher effort and higher landings of plaice and sole. This scenario, in a sense, 
“pays” for the initially higher profits through a decrease in the spawning stock bio-
mass (SSB) which eventually leads to lower landings and thereby profits. The maxi-
mum effort scenario has the highest effort over the whole simulation period because 
SSB of sole and plaice doesn‟t rise as much as in the other two scenarios. 
 
In direct contrast, the minimum effort scenario shows higher profits because it “in-
vests” in SSB by initially reducing effort. The investment pays off with higher land-
ings and profits in the future.  
 
Results for TAC scenario follow a middle path between the maximum and minimum 
scenarios and, consequently, profits are between the two other scenarios.  
 
The development of gross cash flow and gross value added, for all three scenarios, 
follows the same pattern as net profits. In the long term, catchability of both sole and 
plaice is highest in the minimum effort scenario, followed by the maximum effort 
scenario and the TAC scenario. This is caused by the combined effect of development 
of SSB and the difference in the production functions in the TAC and effort scenarios. 
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Figure 3.6. Development in indicators 2007-2040 
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3.7.2. Results in terms of Net Present Value 
In this section the economic results in terms of net present value (NPV) are discussed. 
Using a discount rate of 4%, the NPV over the years 2007 – 2037 is € 484 millions 
for the TAC scenario, € 671 millions for the minimum effort scenario and € 328 mil-
lions for the maximum effort scenario. From this we may conclude that over the 
whole simulation period the minimum effort scenario performs better than the TAC 
scenario followed by the maximum effort scenario. However, the single value result 
of an NPV hides the variation that occurs between scenarios over the simulation 
years. Table 3.10 shows that all three scenarios have negative NPV in the first few 
years and positive NPV after twenty years or longer. This is not surprising because 
net profit in the base year (2006) is also negative. The effort minimum scenario is the 
first to move to a positive value while the TAC is the last. All scenarios remain posi-
tive over the remainder of the simulation.  
 
The colors in table 3.11 mark the relative ranking of the scenarios in terms of NPV 
over several periods, green, yellow and red for first, second and third rank respective-
ly. During the first three years the maximum effort scenario shows better results than 
the other two scenarios. After seven years the NPV of the minimum effort scenario 
has the highest relative rank, followed by the effort maximum and TAC scenarios. 
After thirty years, the effort maximum moves from second to third rank.  
 
 
Catch- 
ability  
of plaice 
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Table 3.11. Comparison of NPV (millions €) in the three scenarios 
       
Scenario One Year Three Years  Seven 
Years 
Ten Years Twenty Years Thirty Years 
       
Effort Minimum: -4.524 -16.376 1.101 63.779 368.443 670.730 
TAC: -5.795 -24.958 -41.610 -4.698 228.158 483.906 
Effort Maximum: -.064 -9.598 -4.316  40.157 196.297 329.204 
3.8. Conclusion 
Whether effort management results in better economic performance than TAC man-
agement, depends on how the effort restriction is set. While the effort maximum sce-
nario shows relative good results in the short run, it shows worse economic perfor-
mance than the TAC scenario in the long run. However, both in the short run and in 
the long run, the more cautious effort minimum scenario shows better economic re-
sults than the TAC scenario.  
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4. Economic consequences of marine protected areas in the 
Baltic Sea 
4.1. Description of the fishery 
This case study considers the cod fishery in the Baltic Sea. Two populations of cod 
inhabit the Baltic area, eastern and western cod, with different morphometric condi-
tions and population genetics (WWF, 2006). The stocks, of which the eastern is the 
biggest and constitute around 90% of the total resource, with the eastern stock found 
in the eastern and northern part of the Baltic Sea, and the western stock found west of 
Bornholm island and in the Danish Straits. The eastern stock is fished by Denmark, 
Sweden, Poland, Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia while the western stock is 
mainly taken by Denmark, Germany and Sweden. The eastern stock has by ICES 
been classified to be outside safe biological limits, and to be harvested unsustainably 
at present. The western stock is at present around the precautionary limit. The case 
study will consider closed areas and seasons for cod fisheries as an innovation aimed 
at improving the management of the cod stocks. The following hypothesis will thus 
be tested for this case study: 
 
Technical measures and Marine Protected Areas (MPA‟s) are likely to reduce eco-
nomic efficiency. 
4.1.1. State of the stocks 
 
4.1.1.1. Eastern cod (ICES area 25-32) 
The eastern cod is mainly fished by demersal and pelagic trawls, and gillnets (ICES, 
2007). Figure 4.1 shows the development in Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and 
landings since 1965. The figure shows how the stock was exploited heavily during the 
1970‟s and especially through the 1980‟s, followed by a steep decline in landings as 
well as SSB in the 1990‟s and later. The SSB has been below precautionary SSB (240 
000 tonnes) as well as the lowest limit SSB (160 000 tonnes) since 1997, and is as 
such at present at risk of reduced reproductive capacity.  
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Figure 4.1. Cod in the eastern Baltic (Area 25-32): Spawning stock biomass and 
landings 
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Source: ICES (2007) 
 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the development in fishing mortality for eastern Baltic cod. The fig-
ure shows that the fishing mortality has not experienced a significant decrease during 
the last 10 years even though the there have been large fluctuations. This in spite of 
that the size (measured in kW) of the Danish and the Swedish fleets fishing in the 
Baltic have decreased by about 25% since 1995 (WWF, 2006). It is seen that the fish-
ing mortality is well beyond the precautionary limit of Fpa=0.6, and since 1998 also 
have been above Flim=0.96 almost all the time. Based on these observations, ICES has 
pointed out that the present management plan for eastern Baltic cod has a number of 
weaknesses and is difficult to implement. ICES and STECF recommends that the 
stock fishing mortality should be reduced significantly to ensure high yields and low 
risk to the stock. Based on this advice the EU commission suggests a revised long 
term management plan for eastern cod including stepwise reduction of fishing effort 
over a number of years (EU, 2006). 
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Figure 4.2. Cod in the eastern Baltic (Area 25-32): Average fishing mortality 
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Source: ICES (2007) 
 
 
4.1.1.2. Western Cod (ICES area 22-24) 
The western Baltic cod is fished mainly by Denmark, Sweden and Germany using 
trawl and gillnet. In most of the Sound (area 23) there is a ban on trawl. Figure 4.3 
shows the development in SSB and landings for western Baltic cod since 1970
14
. The 
figure shows that the stock and landings approximately follow the same pattern with 
high values until around 1985 where a steep decline in stock is followed by a similar 
decline in catches, while some recovery of both is seen around the mid 90s. Towards 
2005 the stock however declines to below Bpa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Blim, Fpa and Flim have not yet been defined by ICES for western Baltic cod (EC, 2007). 
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Figure 4.3. Cod in the western Baltic (Area 22-24): Spawning stock biomass and 
landings 
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Source: ICES (2007) 
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the development in average fishing mortality for the western Baltic 
cod. The figure shows that the fishing mortality fluctuates around a mean value at 
around 1.2 during the entire period. ICES has not set any precautionary limits for fish-
ing mortality, as estimation of Fpa is problematic due to the large exchange of cod 
with adjacent stocks. Regarding the sustainability of the western Baltic cod stock, 
which at present is just below Bpa, the situation is at present difficult to assess. ICES 
states that the exploitation of the stock to a high degree depends on the strength of the 
incoming year-classes (ICES, 2007). There is at present no agreed management plan 
for the stock, but ICES has recommended a target fishing mortality rates at 0.3-0.6, 
which would result in low risk to reproduction and high long-term yields.  
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Figure 4.4. Cod in the western Baltic (Area 22-24), average fishing mortality 
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Source: ICES (2007) 
 
 
4.1.1.3. Eastern and Western Baltic Cod 
ICES recommends separate management areas for the western and the eastern cod, 
subdivision 22-24 and subdivision 25-32 respectively. The stocks overlap in subdivi-
sion 24 and 25, in which landings can not be assigned to the one or the other stock. 
Biological reference points differ significantly for the two stocks illustrating esti-
mated differences in the reproductivity. Seeing these differences and the differences 
outlined above, STECF recommends further studies on the interplay between the two 
stocks, as this may improve management considerations (EC, 2007).  
4.1.2. Stock – recruitment relationships 
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 shows the stock recruitment relationships for eastern and western 
Baltic cod. For the eastern stock figure 4.5 indicates that there is a significantly posi-
tive relationship between spawning stock biomass (SSB) and recruitment for SSB > 
Blim. For SSB < Blim the recruitment seems be rather uncertain, and generally below 
200 millions individuals a year. This uncertainty coupled with the fact that SSB for 
the eastern cod stock has been below Blim since around 1997 emphasises the fact that 
the eastern stock is outside safe biological limits. 
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Figure 4.5. Spawning stock (SSB) – recruitment relationship for eastern Baltic cod 
(area 25-32) 
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Source: ICES (2007) 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Spawning Stock (SSB) – Recruitment relationship for Western Baltic 
cod (area 22-24) 
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Source: ICES (2007) 
 
 
For the western stock in figure 4.6 indicates a positive stock-recruitment relationship 
for SSB > Bpa. Below Bpa there seems to be no clear relationship between stock and 
recruitment, which can vary from almost no recruitment to around 150 millions indi-
viduals a year.  
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4.1.3. Management regime 
 
4.1.3.1. General management for the Baltic Sea 
The Baltic Sea fishery has until 2006 been managed by the International Baltic Sea 
Fishery Commission (IBSFC), established in 1973 with contracting parties: Denmark, 
Sweden, Germany, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the Russian Fed-
eration. The contracting parties shared the responsibility for protecting and making 
rational use of the living marine resources in the Baltic Sea. It has been the responsi-
bility of IBSFC to co-ordinate the management in the Baltic Sea and Belts and to 
submit advice for management based on scientific research. The regulation measures 
put into force by IBSFC comprised: 
 
 Total allowable catches (TAC‟s) for the four main commercially explored 
species in the Baltic Sea: Cod, sprat, herring and salmon. 
 Technical regulation measures, including minimum landings sizes, restric-
tions on engine size and gear, panels in demersal trawl targeting cod, and 
closed areas and seasons.  
 Strengthen enforcement and control through increased exchange of informa-
tion between the contracting parties. 
 Adoption of long term management plans. 
 
The IBFSC ceased to exist on 1. January 2007, and the EU has not been a member 
since 1. January 2006. This happened after the inclusion in the EU of Poland, Lithua-
nia, Latvia, and Estonia May 1. 2004. This left only Kaliningrad (Russia) outside the 
countries fishing in the Baltic Sea. The Russian EEZ constitutes only 5.8% of the Bal-
tic Sea. 
 
Thus, until 2006 the Baltic cod stocks have been managed through a combination of 
TAC‟s and technical measures, including seasonally closed areas, aiming at protect-
ing the stocks when spawning and avoiding fishing when the quality and the prices 
were low. The extend of the closed areas and the seasons in which they have been 
closed have varied from year to year. In the mid 1990‟s two closures were introduced, 
(i) a summer ban on targeting cod from 15. April to 31. August (with some variation 
of dates during the years, and (ii) a closure of all fisheries in the Bornholm Basin (see 
figure 4.7) from 15. May to 31. August (Council reg. 3362/94). 
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Seeing that the cod stock did not recover in spite of the closed areas and seasons, 
more extended closures were introduced in 2005 by the EU (not binding for Russia). 
The main aim of the closures were to reduce the overall fishing mortality for cod in 
the Baltic, but also to some extend to protect the stock when spawning. The closures 
included (i) an extended summer ban on fishing cod in the eastern Baltic Sea from 1. 
May to 15. September, (ii) a spring ban on cod fishing in the western Baltic Sea from 
1. March to 30. April, and (iii) cod fishing prohibited for the EU fleet all year round 
in the Bornholm Deep, the Gotland Deep and the Gdansk Deep (see figure 4.7). In 
2006 however the three areas were only closed in the spawning season from 1.
 
May to 
31. October due to new EU regulations. 
 
Figure 4.7. The Bornholm Deep, The Gotland Deep and The Gdansk Deep in the 
Baltic Sea. 
 
 
Source: Aro 2000, redrawn after Bagge, et al. 1994 
 
 
The IBFSC managed the eastern and western cod stocks as one unit, covering subdi-
visions 22-35 (22-24 west; 25-35 east), while ICES considers the eastern and western 
cod as separate units and thus gives advice separately for the two stocks, stressing that 
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this division of management is important in order to adapt the exploitation to the very 
different developments of the two stocks. Up until 2006 the advice for Baltic cod set 
by ICES has by far been exceeded by the actual TAC‟s set by the IBSFC and later by 
the EU Commission (WWF, 2006), the reasons being to take into consideration the 
short-term economic and socioeconomic interests of the fishing sector. Attempts have 
been made to close down the cod fishery with the EU as the driving force. However, 
before the enlargement of the EU in the Baltic region these proposals were objected 
by Poland and Russia, and did not come into force. Game theoretical considerations 
advice such actions as the player(s) that do not seek an agreement will gain at the ex-
pense of the players who keep agreements (Kronbak, 2005; Kronbak and Lindros 
2007; Nielsen 2006), which may be seen as one of the explanations for the manage-
ment failures. 
 
It is thus clear from the continuously falling stocks of especially the eastern Baltic cod 
that the management measures used so far for Baltic cod have not been sufficient to 
ensure sustainability. It has thus been concluded that the IBFSC management plans 
cannot be implemented and enforced to a satisfactory level, and therefore the EU 
Commission forwarded a proposal in July 2006 for a multi-annual management plan 
(EC, 2006), aiming at reducing the exploitation of Baltic cod gradually towards long-
term sustainable levels, while at the same time ensuring that the reduced effort hereby 
introduced would be acceptable to the fishing industry. 
 
The means for achieving this target is two-fold. Firstly, an annual decrease of 10% in 
fishing mortality is proposed until the stocks have reached levels that with high prob-
ability ensure sustainability. Secondly, various technical measures are maintained es-
pecially the closed areas and seasons (EC, 2006). As such it is prohibited to target cod 
in the western Baltic Sea from 15. March to 14. May, and in the eastern Baltic Sea 
from 15 June to 14 September. Moreover it is prohibited to perform any fishing in the 
three areas shown in figure 4.7 from 1.May to 31.October. 
 
4.1.3.2. Management of the Danish fleet 
Until 2007 the Danish fishery for cod in the Baltic Sea was regulated through rations 
or yearly quotas (individual non transferable time limited quotas). The Danish man-
agement must be considered very restrictive, as all vessels could apply for a cod 
quota, but if a quota was granted it was prohibited to fish for cod in any other area, 
which entailed that the fishermen would have to take their opportunity costs into con-
sideration, see Frost and Jensen (2003). When choosing ration regulation, a vessel 
was given cod rations in the Baltic on a half- or full-monthly basis, the amount of 
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which depended on the length of the vessel. When a ration was fished up, the vessel 
was not allowed to fish more cod before the next ration period. Alternatively a vessel 
could choose to be allocated a yearly quota, based on its historical landings. The indi-
vidual vessel owners choice between rations or yearly quotas would depend on an as-
sessment of which would give the highest earnings during a year.  
 
In 2007 the Danish regulation (including the regulation for cod in the Baltic Sea) was 
changed to individual yearly vessel shares of the Danish quotas. The shares are dis-
tributed according to the vessels historical catches for three years with most weight 
put on the catch the previous year. The shares are tied up to the specific vessel and 
can only be traded with the vessel. Vessel shares can however be exchanged between 
vessels according to a set of specific rules, or can be put together to form pool fishery. 
The Danish fleet is, like the other nations fishing in the Baltic Sea, also subject to the 
long-term recovery plan for cod in the Baltic described above. The yearly vessel quo-
tas will be based on the actual TAC advice following the recovery rule. 
4.1.4. The Danish Fleet fishing in the Baltic Sea 
In the Danish fishing fleet, trawlers, Danish seine, and netters and liners land cod in 
the eastern and western Baltic. In 2006 the catch of cod in the Baltic Sea and the belts 
constituted around 72% of the total Danish catch of cod from all fishing grounds. 
Figure 4.8 shows the Danish landings of cod in the Baltic areas in the period 1999-
2006. It is seen that the cod catches in especially the eastern Baltic Sea drop during 
the period 1999-2002, corresponding to the decline in stock during the same period 
(figure 4.1). In the western Baltic Sea the catches also declined to some degree during 
the period 1999-2003.  
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Figure 4.8. Danish cod landings in the Baltic in the period 1999-2006. 
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Source: Danish Directorate of Fisheries, Year Book of Fisheries Statistics, 1999-2006. 
 
 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 show the landings in the Baltic areas distributed on vessel types 
during the period 1999-2006. In the western Baltic the cod landings for especially 
trawlers < 40 GT (< 18m)
 15
 and for netters and liners fall significantly during the pe-
riod and it is thus these two segments that represent the overall decline in cod land-
ings shown in figure 4.8. In the eastern Baltic the landings of cod have shown an 
overall decrease from 1999 to 2006 for trawlers < 40 GT, trawlers between 40 and 
100 GT (18m – 26m), and for netters and liners. It is as such these segments that carry 
the decline in total Danish cod catches in the eastern Baltic Sea during the period. It is 
however interesting to notice that even though the trawlers < 40 GT have an overall 
decrease in cod landings during the period, there has actually been a slight increase in 
cod catches from 2002 and forward, in accordance with that the total cod landings 
level out from 2003 (cf. figure 4.8).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Analysis of the Danish fishing fleet has shown that the relationship between Length Overall 
(LOA) and Gross Tonnage (GT) follows the relationship: ln(GT) = -3.31 + 2.41 * ln(LOA) 
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Figure 4.9. Cod landings distributed on vessel groups in the western Baltic Sea 
and the Belts during the period 1999-2006 
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Source: Danish Directorate of Fisheries, Year Book of Fisheries Statistics, 1999-2006. 
 
 
Figure 4.10. Cod in the eastern Baltic (Area 25-32): Average fishing mortality 
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Source: Danish Directorate of Fisheries, Year Book of Fisheries Statistics, 1999-2006. 
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4.1.5. Economic Performance 
The Danish vessels fishing for cod in the Baltic Sea comes from most of the Danish 
fishing ports, however, mainly from the ports in the Baltic Sea. A description of the 
economic performance of the full segments of trawlers, Danish seine, netters and lin-
ers, and purse seiners will thus be given, as this approximately reflect the economic 
performance of the specific vessels fishing cod in the Baltic. Data of economic per-
formance is taken from AER (2005). Due to the restructuring of the data collection in 
connection with the Data Collection Regulation (DCR) (Commission reg.1639/2001), 
economic data can at present only be shown until 2004. Figure 4.11 and 4.12 thus 
shows the development in selected economic indicators for the Danish fleet segments, 
as defined by AER, during the period 1999-2004. Figure 4.11 shows the development 
of a number of economic indicators (corresponding to the indicators used in AER, 
2005) for the Danish trawl fleet. 
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Figure 4.11. Economic indicators for the Danish trawl fleet 1999-2004 
 
Trawl < 24 m
-50
0
50
100
150
V
a
lu
e
 o
f
la
n
d
in
g
s
F
u
e
l c
o
s
ts
O
th
e
r
ru
n
n
in
g
V
e
s
s
e
l
c
o
s
ts
C
re
w
 s
h
a
re
G
ro
s
s
 c
a
s
h
flo
w
D
e
p
re
c
ia
tio
n
In
te
re
s
t
N
e
t 
p
ro
fit
G
ro
s
s
 v
a
lu
e
a
d
d
e
d
In
v
e
s
te
d
c
a
p
ita
l 
m
E
U
R
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Trawl 24-40 m
-50
0
50
100
150
200
V
a
lu
e
 o
f
la
n
d
in
g
s
F
u
e
l c
o
s
ts
O
th
e
r
ru
n
n
in
g
V
e
s
s
e
l
c
o
s
ts
C
re
w
 s
h
a
re
G
ro
s
s
 c
a
s
h
flo
w
D
e
p
re
c
ia
tio
n
In
te
re
s
t
N
e
t 
p
ro
fit
G
ro
s
s
 v
a
lu
e
a
d
d
e
d
In
v
e
s
te
d
c
a
p
ita
l 
m
E
U
R
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Source: AER, 2005. 
  
 
Figure 4.12 shows the indicators for Danish seine and gillnet. The figures firstly show 
that the gross value added decrease during the entire period for trawlers smaller than 
24m (around 100 GT), Danish seine and gillnet. In all three cases this seems to be 
caused by a steady decrease in landings value during the period, probably due to fal-
ling quotas given the increased pressure on the most important stocks for the Danish 
fleet. The net profit for these three segments however does not fall at the same speed 
as the gross value added, as the loss in landings value are compensated by a corre-
sponding decrease in crew share. The net profit for trawl smaller than 24m and for 
gillnet is negative during the entire period, indicating some overcapacity for these two 
segments. For Danish seine the net profit is around 0 during the period. 
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Figure 4.12. Economic indicators for the Danish seine and gillnet fleet 1999-2004 
 Danish seine
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
V
a
lu
e
 o
f
la
n
d
in
g
s
F
u
e
l 
c
o
s
ts
O
th
e
r
ru
n
n
in
g
c
o
s
ts
V
e
s
s
e
l
c
o
s
ts
C
re
w
 s
h
a
re
G
ro
s
s
 c
a
s
h
fl
o
w
D
e
p
re
c
ia
ti
o
n
In
te
re
s
t
N
e
t 
p
ro
fi
t
G
ro
s
s
 v
a
lu
e
a
d
d
e
d
In
v
e
s
te
d
c
a
p
it
a
l 
m
E
U
R
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Gillnet
-20
0
20
40
60
80
V
a
lu
e
 o
f
la
n
d
in
g
s
F
u
e
l 
c
o
s
ts
O
th
e
r
ru
n
n
in
g
c
o
s
ts
V
e
s
s
e
l
c
o
s
ts
C
re
w
 s
h
a
re
G
ro
s
s
 c
a
s
h
fl
o
w
D
e
p
re
c
ia
ti
o
n
In
te
re
s
t
N
e
t 
p
ro
fi
t
G
ro
s
s
 v
a
lu
e
a
d
d
e
d
In
v
e
s
te
d
c
a
p
it
a
l 
m
E
U
R
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 
 
Source: AER, 2005. 
 
 
For trawl 24-40m the gross value added increases from 1999-2002 and then decreases 
in 2003 and 2004, again following the trend in landings values. The net profit for 
these two segments follows the same trend, in spite of the crew share. The net profit is 
less than 0 in most of the period for trawlers 24-40m while it oscillates around 0 for 
the large trawlers and purse seiners. In all it can be concluded that none of the Danish 
fleets seems to have made a significant positive profit during the period 1999-2004, 
and there is thus room for improvement. The reason might be found in the overcapac-
ity still present in the Danish fleet in spite of a severe reduction of fleet capacity from 
1987 to 2002. Table 4.1 shows the development in a number of capacity indicators for 
the Danish fleet in the period 1999-2004 in a traffic light exposition.  
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Table 4.1. Capacity indicators for the Danish fleet during the period 1999-2004 
        
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
        
T
ra
w
l 
<
 2
4
m
 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 82.1 86 76.7 73.4 63.5 62.6 
Volume of landings (1000t) 144.3 152.7 202.6 171.9 133 135.6 
Fleet - number of vessels 467 499 461 439 376 370 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 13.7 15.2 15.8 15.3 15.9 16.7 
Fleet - total kW (1000)    97.7 85.5 82.4 
        
T
ra
w
l 
 
2
4
--
4
0
m
 Effort (1000 days at sea) 28.8 32.2 32.1 31.4 29.7 26.3 
Volume of landings (1000t) 553.6 691.2 667.3 609.7 382.2 368.2 
Fleet - number of vessels 129 140 138 134 124 118 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 27.9 32.1  33.3 32.4 31.2 29.2 
Fleet - total kW (1000)    81.3 75.4 70.3 
        
D
a
n
is
h
 s
e
in
e
 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 17.8 16.7 15.5 15 12.2 9.9 
Volume of landings (1000t) 18.9 15.2 14.6 13.7 9.1 9.2 
Fleet - number of vessels 105 103 96 95 69 69 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 5.2 3.9  3.4 3.4 3.2 3.4 
Fleet - total kW (1000)    16.2 12.2 11.8 
        
G
ill
n
e
t 
Effort (1000 days at sea) 65.1 64.8 74.4 59 48.2 45 
Volume of landings (1000t) 28.9 27.2 25.9 23 20 18.9 
Fleet - number of vessels 491 476 495 435 379 367 
Fleet - total GT (1000) 6.9 6.7 7.4 6.4 6 6 
Fleet - total kW (1000)    46.2 37.3 35.2 
 
Source: AER (2005) 
 
 
The colours specify whether the value of the indicator has increased or decreased 
compared to the year before. Green means increase while red means decrease. Total 
kW numbers for the fleets have first been available from 2002. It is clear from table 1 
that there has been an overall decrease in capacity for the Danish fishing fleet during 
the period, with few exceptions. The Danish seine fleet seems to be most severely af-
fected by capacity decreases during the period. The fleet only experiences a slight in-
crease in volume of landings from 2003 to 2004. The remaining fleet segments also 
mostly experience decreases in the capacity indicators, and in all it must be concluded 
that the capacity indicators shown in table 4.1 reflects the general reduction in fleet 
capacity during the period coupled with an increasingly strict management. 
4.1.6. Species prices 
The main species caught in the Baltic are cod, herring and sprat. Table 4.2 shows the 
price development for these species in the different areas of the Baltic Sea.  
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Table 4.2. Price (€/kg) development for the main target species in the Baltic sea, 
from 1999 to 2006. 
         
   1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Western 
Baltic 
and 
the 
Great 
Belt 
        
Sprat 0.0985 0.0923 0.1072 0.1247 0.1278 0.1183 0.1234 
Herring 0.1055 0.0896 0.1149 0.1384 0.1617 0.1387 0.1151 
Cod 1.6532 1.8509 2.1875 2.2099 1.9954 1.6926 2.1198 
         
The 
Sound 
Sprat - 0.0836 0.0141 0.0226 - 0.0898 0.0811 
Herring 0.2042 0.1009 0.1851 0.1996 0.2347 0.2084 0.1843 
Cod 1.6489 1.803 1.9847 2.0822 1.7742 1.614 1.9015 
         
Eastern 
Baltic 
Sprat 0.1005 0.0957 0.103 0.1278 0.1479 0.1122 0.1081 
Herring 0.1552 0.1397 0.1944 0.2346 0.2427 0.1968 0.2303 
Cod 1.5462 1.6444 1.8093 1.7973 1.5562 1.4111 1.6554 
 
Source: Danish Directorate of Fisheries, Year Book of Fisheries Statistics, 1999-2006. 
 
 
The colour specifies whether the price has increased or decreased compared to the 
previous year, where green indicates increase and red decrease. It is seen that the 
prices more or less follows the same trends with an increase in 2001 and 2002, a gen-
eral decrease in 2004, and some fluctuations in 2003 and 2005. Further descriptions 
of the forces ruling the fluctuations in the Danish prices can be found in FOI (2001-
2007). 
4.2. The bioeconomic model BEMCOM 
4.2.1. Introduction 
In order to assess the effect of Marine Protected Areas (MPA‟s) and other effort con-
trol schemes on economic performance of the fishing industry, a bioeconomic optimi-
sation model has been developed. Following Cunningham, Dunn and Whitmarsh 
(1985) a bioeconomic model can be defined as ”a special kind of model for fisheries 
analysis to take account both of biological and of economic forces”. The acronym of 
the model is BEMCOM (BioEconomic Model to evaluate the COnsequences of Ma-
rine protected areas). The model has also been applied in the EU 6FP PROTECT 
(Marine Protected Areas as a tool for Ecosystem Conservation and Fisheries Man-
agement), to evaluate the economic effects of MPA‟s in the North Sea and in the Bal-
tic Sea. 
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In the present context, BEMCOM is applied to assess the consequences for the eco-
nomic performance of the Danish fleet fishing in the Baltic, of extending the MPA‟s 
aiming at limiting fishing effort and protecting juvenile cod. The model simulates the 
fishery over a 10 year period, which is an adequate time-span for capturing possible 
effects of the different scenarios considered. 
 
The fishery in the Baltic Sea is mainly focused on three species, i.e. cod, herring and 
sprat. Many types of vessels fish in this area, but do not necessarily obtain all their 
income from their activities in the Baltic Sea. All nations around the Baltic Sea have a 
fishing fleet, but it has unfortunately not been possible to obtain detailed data from 
other countries besides Denmark in order to reach the level of detail required by 
BEMCOM. The assessments of economic performance presented here thus only in-
cludes vessels from Denmark, but will in connection with the biological stock estima-
tions include overall estimates of the catches of the remaining countries surrounding 
the Baltic Sea
16
.  
 
The Danish fleet fishing in the Baltic consists of 15 distinct fleet segments. Seeing 
that most of these also fish outside the Baltic, the economic performance of their total 
fishery has been assessed under different assumptions about MPA closures in the Bal-
tic. The economic performance has been assessed under the assumption that the total 
fleet seeks to maximise the net present value of its net profit, i.e. the value of landings 
minus all costs (variable, fixed and crew costs), which is a close approximation to the 
resource rent. 
4.2.2. Description of BEMCOM 
BEMCOM is set up as a flexible modelling framework, which is programmed in a 
generic way in order to be able to handle different case studies reflected through the 
utilised dataset and parameter values. Different management strategies can thus be 
investigated with respect to marine protected areas, as well as other technical restric-
tions (e.g. minimum mesh sixe, closed seasons and fishing day limitations).  
 
                                                 
16 As more data becomes available in the future through for instance the data collection initiated 
within the European Union, this can of course be included in order to increase coverage. Neverthe-
less, it is important to stress that BEMCOM will still require some data that only the individual 
countries have access to. 
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BEMCOM operates with several dimensions (years, quarters, fishing areas, fleets 
etc.), where some of these have an extensive number of alternatives. For instance, 
fishing area can be detailed down to ICES-square or an even finer grid size. In the 
Baltic Sea this means that instead of just having one fishing area the model includes 
in this case more than 100 fishing squares covering the total Baltic Sea. The high 
level of detail is necessary in order to address the questions related to the economic 
consequences of marine protected areas. However, this detailed structure increases the 
data requirements in order to obtain a well-functioning model and relevant answers to 
the proposed questions.  
4.2.3. Model overview 
An overview of the interactions within a bioeconomic model is given in Figure 4.13. 
BEMCOM follows along the lines given in Figure 4.13, and even though the model is 
more complex than shown, the figure gives the basic flows. 
 
Figure 4.13.  Basic interactions in a bioeconomic model 
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At present the model does not include any direct investment function, but the fleet ca-
pacity (number of vessels) is included as a variable, and will thus change during the 
optimisation period in order to find the maximum net present result. The variation in 
fleet capacity is at present limited by a 20% band around the initial value, together 
with limitations on overall fleet capacity (GT). 
 
The reason for the exclusion of a more refined investment structure is the lack of 
knowledge and empirical information, which can be utilised when modelling. De-
scribing the investment environment is a complex case, where many factors should be 
considered, including the fisherman‟s individual desires towards investing in the fish-
ery, the surrounding financial environment, and regulatory restrictions limiting the 
desired behaviour. The seminal paper within investment theory of fisheries is consid-
ered to be Clark, Clarke and Munro (1979). Despite that this paper was published 
more than 25 years ago, there has not been performed much empirical analysis within 
this area although it is very important.  
 
Currently one the EU-project CAFÉ (EU Contract no. 022644) is investigating which 
factors influence the investment decisions of fishermen. Moreover investment behav-
iour has been discussed and implemented in the EU-project EFIMAS (EU Contract 
no. 502516), and reported in Hoff and Frost (2006, 2008). Future developments of 
BEMCOM thus aim to include investment behaviour.  
4.2.4. Dimensions, variables and parameters 
BEMCOM has in its current form seven dimensions in order to reflect different rele-
vant aspects of the fishery. The dimensions are as follows: 
 
- year y = 1,…,Y 
- month/quarter m = 1,…,M 
- vessel/fleet segment f = 1,…,F 
- primary fishing ground (area) g = 1,…,G 
- sub-fishing areas (squares) a = 1,..., A 
- species s = 1,…,S 
- cohort c = 1,…,C 
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It is of course possible to include additional dimensions in BEMCOM, such as home 
port. However, this will increase complexity of the model, solving time plus increase 
data demand, when quantifying the model. 
 
Observe that the model differentiates between primary fishing ground and sub-fishing 
areas. Primary fishing grounds are e.g. North Sea, eastern Baltic, Western Baltic etc, 
while sub-fishing areas are sub-divisions of the primary fishing areas, i.e. ICES sub-
areas. This differentiation has been necessary in order to include a detailed descrip-
tion of the fishery down to the level of sub-fishing areas, while at the same time per-
forming stock estimations on the level of primary fishing ground. 
 
The variables estimated in BEMCOM, can be divided between economic, biological 
and production variables  
 
The economic variables in BEMCOM are: 
- profit  P 
- revenue R 
- total costs TOTC 
- variable costs VC 
- fuel and lubricants costs OC 
- provision costs PC 
- ice costs IC 
- sales costs SC  
- crew costs CC 
- fixed costs FC 
- maintenance costs MAIN 
- insurance costs INSUR 
- other fixed costs OTH 
   
 
The biological variables are: 
- fish stocks Nc>1 
- recruitment Nc=1 
 
while the production variables are: 
- catches C 
- effort E 
- fleet size (number of vessels) NV 
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- landings L 
- landings weight WL 
- discards D 
All variables are determined within the model framework, when the net present result 
function is optimised. 
 
The input parameters to the model are also divided between economic, biological and 
production parameters, respectively. 
 
The economic parameters in BEMCOM are: 
- fish prices P 
- fuel price Fp 
- provisions price Pp 
- ice price Ip 
- sales share Sp 
- crew share Cp 
- Price flexibility rate  
 
while the biological parameters are: 
- natural mortality coefficient M 
- discard coefficient Df 
-  fish weight per cohort Wt 
-  Stock Biomass SB 
- Spawning Stock Biomass SSB 
 
Finally, the production parameters are: 
- landings per unit effort  LPUE 
- Landings fraction per cohort cf 
- Total catch of other nations Coth 
- Quota Q 
 
The values of the parameters are determined outside the model based on the utilised 
dataset or by using knowledge about these. The level of detail for the variables and 
parameters can be reduced or expanded, if this is desired. The choice is dependent on 
several things including the available information and the wish to obtain a functional 
model. 
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4.2.5. Equations 
The model equations are differentiated between biological stock development equa-
tions and equations for the short term economic development of the fishing vessels. 
Starting with the biological equations, it is firstly assumed that fish stock dynamics 
are evaluated on the primary fishing ground level e.g. the cod stock in the eastern Bal-
tic Sea. The number of fish recruited to cohort 1 of species s in fishing ground g at 
year y depends on the size of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) at year y-1 and the 
recruitment coefficients Rc, through a chosen stock-recruitment function f (e.g. 
Ricker, Beverton-Holt, or constant recruitment): 
 
(4.1) )SSB(fN g,s,yc,s,g,y 11      
   
The Beverton-Holt stock recruitment function has the form: 
 
(4.2) 
g,s,y
g,s,y
c,s,g,y
SSBs
SSBr
N
1
1
1





   
 
while the Ricker relationship has the form: 
 
(4.3)  )exp( ,,1,,11,,, gsygsycsgy SSBsSSBrN     
 
The fish stocks are reduced through natural mortality and through fishery. Thus when 
total catches C in the previous year and natural mortality MORT are known
17
, the 
stock size N (measured in number of fish) of cohort c>1 of species s in fishing ground 
g can be estimated using the Pope approximation (Sparre, 1998): 
 
(4.4)
, , , , , , 1 , , 1 1, , , 1 , , , 1
exp( ) ( / ) exp( / 2) ; 1
y g s c y e g s c g s c y g s c s c g s c
N N M C wt M c
     
        
 
Where cswt , is the weight per individual of species s in cohort c. 
 
Unwanted catches are an almost unavoidable part of fisheries, and it is therefore nec-
essary to divide the total catches between a discarded and a landed part. The dis-
carded part can for instance be of no value to the fishermen or be illegal to land, and 
therefore thrown back into the sea. Unfortunately the survival rate of the discarded 
fish is very low. The number of fish discarded D in year y from the average vessel in 
fleet f in area a of cohort c of species s is: 
 
                                                 
17 Possible predation is in the present context assumed to be included in the natural mortality. 
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(4.5)  csafy
obs
csafcsafy CdfD ,,,,,,,,,,,   
 
where 
obs
csafdf ,,,  is an observed discard fraction in are a for species s of cohort c for 
fleet f.  
 
The remaining part of the total catch is landed. The landings are dependent on the 
type of vessels (selectivity, primary gear type etc.) and an array of other things such 
as age of fishermen, experience etc. The average landings L (measured in kg) of spe-
cies s in cohort c taken in sub-fishing area a of fishing ground g in month m of year y 
by a vessel in fleet f is determined by the (observed) landings per unit effort (LPUE), 
the effort (E) of the vessel, the stock size SB, and the catch distribution fraction (cf) 
on cohort c: 
 
(4.6)  csgfagftsagfmycsagfmy cfELPUEL ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,   
 
where agftE ,,,  is effort and csgfcf ,,,  the landings fraction per cohort (i.e. the percent-
age of the landings constituted by cohort c). Catches, and thus landings, are also as-
sumed dependent on the stock abundance, which is included in the LPUE that varies 
over time with stock according to: 
 
(4.7)  0; ,,
,,0
,,
,,,,,0,,,,,
,,











 gsf
gsy
gsy
sagfmysagfmy
gsf
SB
SB
LPUELPUE 

 
 
Where gsySB ,, is the stock biomass of species s in fishing ground g in year y, and 
gsf ,,  is scaling parameter reflecting that landings may not vary proportionally with 
stock changes (more likely decreasing returns to scale should be expected). 
 
The economic equations can be divided between revenue (or landings value) and cost, 
where the latter can further be separated into variable and fixed costs. The economic 
variables are characterised by not having species and cohorts as their dimensions, but 
on the contrary including fleet and fishing characteristics.  
 
The revenue obtained from the landed catch is obtained by multiplying with fish price 
p. The average revenue R in year y for a vessel in fleet f is: 
 
(4.8)  csgfy
csgagm
csagfmyfy pLR ,,,,
,),(,,
,,,,,,,    
 
Landing prices csgfyp ,,,,  for each species and cohort are not dependent on the total 
amount of fish landed. Prices on fish are on the contrary generally considered to be 
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determined on the global market. A correct modelling approach would therefore be to 
consider total global landings, but this is a time consuming and cumbersome process, 
which has therefore been excluded from the model. A more straightforward approach, 
used in the model at present, is to assume that the prices vary with the quota levels Q: 
 
 
(4.9)  0; ,,
,,0
,,
,,,,0,,,,
,,











 sfg
sgy
sgy
csafycsgfy
cfg
Q
Q
pp 

 
 
 
Where sgyQ ,,  is the quota in year y of species s in fishing ground g and sfg ,, is the 
price flexibility rate. 
 
As mentioned above, the average total costs at year y for a vessel in fleet f is the sum 
of variable costs (VC), which varies with the short term activity of the vessel, or fixed 
costs (FC) that varies with the long term activity of the vessel
18
: 
 
(4.10)  fyfyfy FCVCTOTC ,,,   
 
Looking first at the variables costs, these consist of costs related to the use of oil 
(fuel) and lubricants (OC), provisions costs (PC) and ice costs (IC), auction related 
sales costs (SC) and finally payment to the crew onboard (CC):  
 
(4.11)  f,yf,yf,yf,yf,yf,y CCSCICPCOCVC   
 
The fuel costs (OC) at year y for an average vessel in fleet f is determined by the fuel 
price fp per effort unit, and the effort used by the vessel: 
 
(4.12)   
)g(a,g
a,g,f,yg,ff,y EfpOC  
 
Fuel costs per effort unit is used, rather than fuel price per unit fuel used, as the total 
fuel costs will then vary with the choice of area to fish in. If the area is close to the 
                                                 
18
 Despite that BEMCOM is a dynamic model; there is no inclusion of inflation in the cost equa-
tions. This is straightforward to include such considerations by applying a parameter in each rele-
vant equation, but obtaining qualified information about future cost developments, for instance in 
fuel price, is very complex 
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vessels home port, fuel consumption is low and vice versa. No division is made be-
tween steaming time and fishing time
19
. 
 
It is necessary to bring supplies on every trip in order to feed the crew. The amount of 
supplies is related to the number of days at sea. The provision costs at year y for an 
average vessel in fleet f are therefore determined as: 
 
(4.13)   
)(,
,,,,,
gag
agfygffy EppPC   
 
Observe that the provisions price gfpp ,  vary between fleets, because crew size dif-
fer. 
When catching fish, it is necessary to store the landings cold in order to preserve the 
fish. This requires ice, and the costs of ice at year y for an average vessel in fleet f are 
thus determined as: 
 
(4.14)   
csgag
cscsagfygffy wtLipIC
,),(,
,,,,,,,,   
 
Where gfip , is the price of ice needed per kg landed fish.  
 
When selling the landing, auctions usually require a fee in order to cover costs for the 
auctioneer, packing and transporting. The fee is often a share of the revenue, and the 
sales cost at year y for an average vessel in fleet f is therefore: 
 
(4.15)  ftfft RspSC ,,    
 
The final variable cost is payment of the crew. Normally, this is considered to be a 
share of the revenue deducted some specific types of variable costs. However, for 
easiness the crew payment at year y for an average vessel in fleet f with home port h is 
calculated as: 
 
(4.16)  fyffy RcpCC ,,    
 
With the basic equations for the variable costs in place, it is time to consider the fixed 
costs. The fixed costs are considered to be composed of three elements: 1) mainte-
nance costs, 2) insurance costs, and 3) other costs (rent of buildings on share, accoun-
                                                 
19 It has not been possible in the case studies to model fuel costs in this detailed way due to lack of 
data. 
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tancy assistance etc.). Thus, the fixed costs at year y for an average vessel in fleet f 
are: 
 
(4.17)  
, , , ,y f y f y f y f
FC MAIN INSUR OTH     
 
None of these costs varies with the daily activity of the individual vessel, nor the ar-
eas and types of species caught, and are therefore determined through the values from 
the utilised data.  
 
Having defined how revenue and cost is determined, the profit P (or net result) in year 
y for an average vessel in fleet f is defined as: 
 
(4.18)  fyfyfy TOTCRP ,,,    
4.2.6. Objectives and restrictions 
The model is run by optimising certain objectives given certain restrictions. Within 
the economic literature, it is generally assumed that fishermen will seek to maximise 
their profit and society will seek to obtain the highest resource rent which means that 
the fish stock abundance is taken into account. As discussed in chapter 2 in this re-
port, it is difficult to evaluate the resource rent exactly as stock estimates are required. 
A good approximation to the resource rent is, however, the net profit (or net result), 
i.e. value of landings minus all costs, the deviation from the exact resource rent being 
how well the crew payment reflects the actual opportunity costs. 
 
Thus in the present application the objective function will be a summarization net 
profit, measured in present values, for all the individual vessels over all time periods: 
 
(4.19)  


fy
tfyE
PTOTP
agft
,
,
)1(
1
max
,,, 
 
 
where  is the discount rate.  
 
Society may also have other objectives such as the highest possible employment, and 
this could justify the use of a multi-objective approach. This will however not be pur-
sued further here. 
 
Obtaining the highest profit for the society does however not necessarily need to be 
done without including other considerations. This can be done through imposing re-
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strictions on the endogenous variables in the model. These of course include the fun-
damental restrictions, securing that catches and effort are not negative.  
 
Furthermore specific restrictions are included in the present application regarding 
landings, effort and capacity. Firstly the landings in year y in fishing ground g of spe-
cies s are restricted by the quotas, i.e.: 
 
(4.20)  












sgy
sgy
sgysgysgy
gacfm
csafmy
SB
SB
QQQL
,,0
,,1
,,0,,,,
)(,,,
,,,,, ;  
 
where it is assumed that the quota in year y is set through assessment of the stock in 
the previous year.  
 
Secondly the total number of sea days used by an average vessel of fleet f in month m 
of year y is limited from below and above by a minimum respectively maximum 
value: 
 
(4.21)  
(max)min
,,,, )( afmfmy EE   
 
Thirdly the number of vessels (capacity) in fleet segment f in year y is limited within a 
20% band around the number of vessels in the start year: 
 
(4.22)  fyfyfy NVNVNV ,0,,0 2.18.0    
 
While the total number of vessels in the fleet is bounded from above by the original 
capacity measured in GT: 
 
(4.23)    f ff,yf ff,y GTNVGTNV 0  
 
Where fGT is the average gross tonnage per vessel in fleet segment f. 
 
With regard to biology, it is assumed that the spawning stock biomass of cod in year y 
does not fall below the biomass of cod in the start year in any area: 
 
(4.24)  g,yg,y SSBSSB 0  
 
And finally it is assumed that the catch in any sub-area of a fishing ground does not 
exceed the biomass divided by the total number of sub-areas gn  in the fishing ground 
(thus assuming equal distribution of the stock over the total fishing ground): 
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(4.25)  gg,sc,m,f c,s),g(a,f,m,y
nSSBL   
 
Other types of restrictions can be included in BEMCOM. These may for instance con-
sider the quota and effort distribution between fleets. 
4.3. Application to the Baltic Sea fishery 
This case study includes evaluation of catches of the three target species in the Baltic 
mentioned above (cod, herring and sprat), together with an alternative covering „other 
species‟. The focus will be on assessing economic fleet performance of 15 Danish 
vessel segments fishing in the Baltic Sea under different scenarios, given the assump-
tion that the total net present profit of the Danish fleet is maximised over the model-
ling period, i.e. over a 10 year period (cf. equation 4.19 above). Moreover some focus 
will be given on stock development of Baltic cod (eastern and western stock), seeing 
that the recovery of this species has primarily been in focus, when discussing use of 
closed areas in the Baltic Sea. Catches of the remaining species are included in order 
to evaluate total profit of the fleets in question. 
 
Three scenarios are considered. The first correspond to the status-quo situation in the 
Baltic Sea at present, i.e. finds the economically optimal allocation of effort for the 
Danish fleet under the current management regime in the Baltic sea. Scenario 1 then 
considers extended closures of the Bornholm and Gotland Deep, which are both con-
sidered spawning areas for eastern Baltic cod. And finally scenario 2 considers a fur-
ther extension of the closure around the Bornholm Deep, recognizing that this is the 
most important spawning area for eastern Baltic cod. 
 
Generally, data is obtained from three main sources: 1) International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea (ICES), 2) Danish Directorate for Fisheries (FD) and 3) Insti-
tute of Food and Resource Economics (FOI) in Denmark. Data from the two latter 
sources only cover 2005, which is the latest year available. 
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4.3.1. Dimensions and alternatives 
The dimensions and alternatives within each dimension in case study 1 are as follows: 
 
- year y = 2006,...,2015 
    
- quarter m = 1Q,2Q,3Q,4Q  
    
- vessel/fleet 
segment 
f = GKu12m, JOLRUSu12m, SGTu12m, TRAu12m, GK1215m, 
SGT1215m, TRA1215m, GK1518m, SGT1518m, SNV1518m, 
TRA1518m, SNV1824m, TRA1824m, TRA2440mINDU, 
TRA2440mAND 
    
- fishing ground g= 3B, 3C, 3D, 4ABC, 3AN, 3AS, 2,5,6,7,9 
    
- fishing sub-area a = 36G4,37G3,37G4,37G5,37G6,38G3,38G4,38G5,38G6,38G7, 
38G8,38G9,39G3,39G4,39G5,39G6,39G7,39G8,39G9,39H0, 
40G4,40G5,40G6,40G7,40G8,40G9,40H0,41G4,41G5,41G6, 
41G7,41G8,41G9,41H0,42G6,42G7,42G8,42G9,42H0,43G6, 
43G7,43G8,43G9,43H0,43H1,43H3,44G6,44G7,44G8,44G9, 
44H0,44H1,44H2,44H3,45G6,45G7,45G8,45G9,45H0,45H1, 
45H2,45H3,46G6,46G7,46G8,46G9,46H0,46H1,46H2,46H3, 
47G8,47G9,47H0,47H1,47H2,47H3,48G8,48G9,48H0,48H1, 
48H2,48H3,48H4,48H5,48H6,48H7,48H8,49G8,49G9,49H0, 
49H1,49H2,49H5,49H6,49H7,49H8,50G7,50G8,50G9,50H0, 
50H1,51G7,51G8,51G9,51H0,51H1,52G7,52G8,52G9,52H0, 
52H1,53G7,53G8,53G9,53H0,53H1,54G7,54G8,54G9,54H0, 
54H1,55G8,55G9,55H0,55H1,56H0,56H1,56H2,57H1,57H2, 
57H3,58H1,58H2,58H3,58H4,59H1,59H2,59H3,59H4,60H2, 
60H3,60H4, 
2,3AN,3AS,4ABC,5,6,7,9 
    
- Species s = COD,HER,SPR,OTH 
    
- Cohort c = 1,…,7 
 
With respect to year, ten years are included in order to sufficiently illustrate the ef-
fects of technical measures enforced in the different scenarios. The gains expected 
from effort control management systems must likely be obtained in the long run, and 
therefore it is not sufficient only to include a few years in the model. 
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In order to allow for seasonal closures, every year is divided into four quarters. Initial 
model runs were made with a monthly division, but unfortunately the model complex-
ity increased to a level requiring more computer memory than the used GAMS solver 
was able to accommodate
20
. 
 
The economic unit in the model is the fishing vessel. However, it is not possible to 
model each vessel individually. Therefore, vessels have been distributed into groups 
reflecting their size and the vessel type. Thus besides the length categories, a deduc-
tion is made between 5 vessel types: 1) trawlers (TRA), netters/liners (GK), din-
ghies/potters (JOLRUS), multi-purpose (SGT) and Danish seiners (SNV). Further-
more, the large trawlers above 24 meters are divided into industrial vessels (INDU) 
for who industrial species comprise more than 80% of their catch value, and vessels 
where this is not the case (AND). 
 
With respect to fishing areas, the Baltic Sea covering the Sound, Belts, Western Baltic 
and eastern Baltic is divided into ICES-squares. A total of 142 ICES-squares are thus 
included in the model, but there are not registered fishing activities in all of them. 
Furthermore eight other areas outside the Baltic Sea are included in the model in or-
der to be able to evaluate the total landings value for each vessel group. 
 
A deduction is made between three primary species, cod, herring and sprat, while an 
„other‟ group includes all other species caught by the fishermen. 
 
Within the biological part of BEMCOM, the age structure of cod is assumed to be 
split between seven age classes (cohorts), where the latter covers fish at and above 
age 7. 
4.3.2. Biological data and assumptions 
As discussed above, evaluation of stock development (equation 4.2) has only been 
performed for the eastern and western cod stocks in the Baltic, as these are the focus 
species when discussion MPA‟s and other technical measures. For the remaining spe-
cies only evaluation of catches are included in the model. It has thus only been neces-
sary to obtain biological information for the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea. 
 
                                                 
20 The used solver is CONOPT3 for GAMS, which at present works with a maximum memory of 
2GB.  
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Biological data for Baltic cod has primarily been obtained from ICES „Baltic Fisher-
ies Assessment Working Group‟ (WGBFAS). Biological data for 2005 has been used 
to initialise the model, i.e. the initial data for stock etc. are all taken from the data col-
lected for 2005 by WGBFAS.  
 
Biological data is only given on the level of total ICES fishing area, i.e. not at the 
ICES square level. The biological data has been divided between western Baltic 
(3BC) and eastern Baltic (3D) seeing that the cod stocks east and west of the island of 
Bornholm have different biological characteristics and do almost not overlap (WWF, 
2006). 
 
Stock numbers at age, individual weight at age, maturity index at age, and natural 
mortality at age have been extracted for the two cod stocks from the WGBFAS 2007 
report (ICES (2007). Table 4.3 shows these initial values used in the model. 
 
Table 4.3. Initialisation data (year=2005) for the eastern and western cod stocks 
         
 ------------------------ 3BC (western) ---------------------- ----------------------- 3D (eastern) --------------------- 
 Stock  
number  
(thousands) 
Natural 
mortality 
rate 
 
Maturity  
rate 
Weight  
per  
fish (kg) 
Stock  
number  
(thousands) 
Natural 
mortality 
rate 
 
Maturity  
rate 
Weight  
per  
fish (kg) 
         
1 30,495 0.242 0.01 0.08 0 - 0 0 
2 56,823 0.2 0.1 0.36 172,258 0.2 0.13 0.344 
3 6,467 0.2 0.64 0.83 65,175 0.2 0.36 0.626 
4 5,752 0.2 0.87 1.69 36,353 0.2 0.83 0.916 
5 1,183 0.2 0.93 1.93 11,789 0.2 0.94 1.201 
6 298 0.2 0.91 3.37 2,510 0.2 0.96 1.924 
7 129 0.2 0.91 8.84 699 0.2 0.97 2.719 
 
Source: ICES (2006). 
 
 
Furthermore, a Ricker stock-recruitment relationship (equation 4.3) is used to esti-
mate recruitment at age 2in area 3D. The Ricker parameters for this relationship have 
been estimated from spawning stock biomass and recruitment in the period 1966-
2005 for eastern cod, and are given by 
3
1.6458 10r   (recruits per tonnes SSB) and 
4
0.0126 10s

  (tonnes
-1
). In are 3BC a stepwise recruitment (at age 1) is assumed, 
based on spawning stock biomass and recruitment data in the period 1970-2005 for 
western cod. It is thus assumed that 
3
57815 10R   (recruits per tonnes SSB) for 
SSB<30.000 tonnes, while 
3
108807 10R    (recruits per tonnes SSB) for SSB>30.000 
tonnes. Data for both stocks are also found in the WGBFAS 2006 report.  
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Finally international catch data for the period 2000-2005 for all countries surrounding 
the Baltic Sea have been used to estimate how much Danish cod catches in 3B, 3C 
and 3D constitute of total cod catches in the respective areas These fractions are 
shown in table 4.4. It is seen that Denmark dominates the cod catches in area the 
sound and the western Baltic Sea (are 3B+3C) and for these areas the Danish catches 
are scaled up, using the catch fractions, to reflect the expected total cod catches used 
to perform stock estimates (equation 4.4). In area 3D, however, Denmark only takes 
around 11% of the total cod catches, and the total catches must thus be assumed to be 
more or less independent of the Danish catches. Constant measures of the cod catch in 
3D taken by all other nations than DK are thus included to perform stock estimates. In 
the „status quo‟ scenario corresponding to the present state of the fishery this is set to 
47 752 tonnes corresponding to the minimum observed catch by other nations in the 
period 1996-2006
21
. 
 
Table 4.4. Fraction Danish cod catches constitute of total cod catches in the Bal-
tic Sea with catches measured in weight 
    
 The Sound Western Baltic Sea Eastern Baltic Sea 
    
Fraction of cod catches 0.78 0.56 0.11 
4.3.3. Technological assumptions and restrictions 
The initial catch per unit effort for a vessel in the included fleets is calculated from 
the available dataset for 2005. However, as the cod stock increases, it is assumed that 
the catch per day at sea of cod will also increase. Because cod and „other-species‟ (i.e. 
all other species than cod, herring and sprat) are most often caught together, it is as-
sumed that the catch of other-species decrease with increasing cod stocks. Several 
reasons can justify this, first the eggs of other-species will be eaten by cod, and sec-
ond a vessel has limited holdings, and given that the price of cod generally is higher 
than the price of other-species, the latter will be discarded.  
 
It must be noticed that if a fleet did not have observed catches in a fishing area/ICES-
square in 2005, it will neither have this in the future, because catches in the model are 
a linear function of the initial CPUE distribution. This is most likely a questionable 
assumption. It can to some extend be reduced by combining the ICES-squares into 
                                                 
21 The minimum has been chosen for technical reasons, as the model will for higher value reveal 
infeasible results. 
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larger areas, but this will on the other hand reduce the level of detail possible, when 
closing some areas. 
 
In order to obtain realistic results, several technical restrictions have to be included. If 
not, the model would most certainly give results, which are not consistent with reality. 
For instance the number of days at sea used by a vessel must be kept below the num-
ber of days in a year.  
 
As shown in equation (4.22) the number of vessels in the model is allowed to vary 
with 20% compared to the number of vessels in the initial year (2005), which are 
given in table 4.5. The Danish fishing fleet has already been reduced by more than 
20% (measured in number of vessels) in the period 1994-2006 in connection with ca-
pacity reduction programmes. As this reduction has brought the Danish fleet below 
the GT and kW ceilings set by EU for Denmark, it cannot be expected that the Danish 
fleet will be reduced significantly in the future, and a maximum 20% reduction thus 
seems realistic. The 20% upper limit is more problematic, seeing that it is not allowed 
to bring new capacity into the Danish fishing fleet. This restriction is however cov-
ered by equation (4.23), which in combination with the 20% upper limit on variation 
in vessels allows some exchange of capacity between vessel groups. 
 
Table 4.5. Number of vessels in 2005 
  
 Number of vessels 
  
Netter/liner <12m 130 
Dinghy <12m 30 
Multi-purpose <12m 35 
Trawlers <12m 14 
Netter/liner 12-15m 25 
Multi-purpose 12-15m 34 
Trawler 12-15m 77 
Netter/liner 15-18m 5 
Multi-purpose 15-18m 8 
Danish seine 15-18m 9 
Trawler 15-18m 52 
Danish seine 18-24m 21 
Trawler 18-24m 42 
Trawler 24-40m industrial 24 
Trawler 24-40 mixed 9 
 
 
Another restriction relates to the maximum number of days that each vessel is al-
lowed to have in a quarter (equation 4.21). Instead of basing this restriction on the ac-
tual number of days in each quarter, it is based on what is observed in the dataset. 
Thus for every fleet and quarter, the vessel with most days at sea is identified, and this 
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is used as the maximum number of days a vessel within this fleet can have in a quar-
ter. This will be less than the total number of days in a quarter, because time is also 
used for repairs, weekends and vacation. 
 
Furthermore, a restriction is included about the minimum number of days at sea for 
each vessel (equation 4.21). Given that it is assumed that the number of vessels can-
not go below 80% of the initial number, it is considered relevant to include this. If 
not, the fishermen would just be laying in the ports bearing their fixed costs. By giv-
ing them a minimum activity, these fixed costs could possibly be covered. The num-
ber of minimum days is calculated in the same way as maximum number of days with 
the opposite sign. 
 
A restriction is also needed on the maximum allowable catch (equation 4.20). If such 
a restriction is not imposed the model could in principle fish the species to extinction. 
Initially, it is assumed that the maximum allowable catches (the „quotas‟) are set 
equal to the observed catches taken by the included vessels in 2005. Over the years, 
the maximum allowable catch of cod is scaled with the development in the cod stock 
in the Sound, western and eastern Baltic Sea, i.e. an increased stock gives higher quo-
tas of cod. The cod quota in other fishing areas are not changed, but kept at the initial 
level. None of the quotas for herring, sprat and other-species are changed, neither in 
the Baltic Sea or other areas.  
 
Besides the above quota restriction, it is also necessary to include a restriction regard-
ing the stock (equation 4.24). In order to secure that the model does not end up with a 
solution, where the cod stock is fished to extinction in the last period (because there is 
no tomorrow), a restriction must be included. Therefore it is assumed that the cod 
stock must at no time be below the initial stock level. 
 
Finally it is assumed that the catch in each fishing area (ICES square) cannot exceed 
the stock biomass divided by the number of total areas in the fishing ground (equation 
4.24). This is done to make sure that not all fishing activity is concentrated in one or 
two sub-areas, which would be unrealistic. 
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4.3.4. Economic data and assumptions 
 
4.3.4.1. Catches, prices and revenue 
As previously mentioned, vessel catches are calculated in BEMCOM through the dis-
tribution of days at sea. Based on these catch levels for each fleet, the revenue is cal-
culated by multiplying with the assumed price on fish.  
 
Initial prices are calculated from the same data set used to calculate the CPUE matrix. 
Prices are not assumed to be different between each ICES-square in the Baltic. In-
stead, prices for each of the four species are assumed to vary between the fleet seg-
ments and three aggregated areas in the Baltic Sea 1) the Sound, 2) western Baltic and 
3) eastern Baltic plus the areas outside the Baltic Sea.  
 
Prices are not assumed to vary within a year, but instead between years. The yearly 
variation is assumed to depend on the development in the quotas. Thus if quotas in-
crease, this will generally be expected to have a negative influence on the obtained 
price, because more fish is becoming available on the fish markets, and the other way 
around with reduced quotas. Changes in quotas are however not completely reflected 
in the prices, and price flexibility is therefore included. Price flexibilities reflect the 
responsiveness of price to changes in own or other quantities. For the Baltic Sea cod 
fishery, a price flexibility of 0.2 is assumed as also done SEC (2004, 2005). Table 4.6 
shows the average prices observed in 2005 for the primary fishing areas. 
 
Table 4.6. Fish prices in 2005 (DKK) 
       
 The Sound Western Baltic Sea Eastern Baltic Sea Skagerrak Kattegat North Sea 
       
Cod 12.64 13.41 11.19 17.65 4.39 20.20 
Herring 1.43 1.05 1.70 1.99 1.63 2.04 
Sprat 0.60 0.92 0.79 0.87 0.82 0.82 
Other 25.76 12.30 7.03 15.34 29.57 1.92 
 
Note: 1 € = 7.45 DKK 
 
 
4.3.4.2. Costs 
Cost information for the included vessels is obtained from the Danish fisheries ac-
count statistics published by the Institute of Food and Resource Economics. The in-
formation is collected for a stratified sample of approximately 330 vessels, corre-
sponding to one-third of the commercial Danish fishing fleet. Information from the 
2005 Account Statistics are utilised in the following. 
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Generally, costs can be divided into variable and fixed costs, where the former varies 
with the activity of the vessels, while the latter have to be paid irrespective of vessel 
activity. All costs are calculated as average costs for a vessel within each of the in-
cluded fleet segments. 
 
The variable costs have for different reasons been modified. The utilised economic 
data is not collected on a trip level, but on a yearly level. Because BEMCOM operates 
on a daily level, approximations have to be made for the costs that vary with the 
number of days at sea in order to obtain reasonable figures for the daily cost structure. 
This is thus done by dividing the variable costs, except sales and crew costs (i.e. fuel, 
ice, provisions and maintenance costs), with the observed average number of days. 
These daily variable costs do not vary during a year, and are not dependent on trip 
length and fishing area. Other variable costs (sale costs and crew payments) are de-
pendent on fishing revenue, and the percentage that have to be used for this is deter-
mined by dividing the observed costs in the data set with the observed revenue in the 
dataset.  
 
Afterwards, these modified figures have to be further changed. The reason for this is 
that the figures in the Danish account statistics cover all vessels in Denmark. It is thus 
not possible to extract economic figures solely on vessels fishing in the Baltic Sea, 
because these vessels only constitute a small fraction of the 330 vessels in the total 
Danish fleet. To accommodate this problem the economic figures for the total Danish 
fleet have been scaled in order to approximate costs of the vessels fishing in the Baltic 
Sea. This is done by using a scaling factor, which is set as the proportion between the 
average catch revenue observed for vessels fishing in the Baltic Sea and the average 
catch revenue generally observed for a Danish vessel. 
 
Sales and crew costs are in BEMCOM calculated as a percentage of catch revenue. 
The percentage is calculated from the initial economic dataset without making any 
modifications. 
 
Fixed costs are not changed, because these are not dependent on vessel activity. It is 
not reasonable to adjust these in the same way as done with the variable costs de-
pendent on vessel activity. Thus, it is assumed that the vessels operating in the Baltic 
Sea have the same fixed costs as an average vessel in the Danish fleet. The cost fig-
ures used in the Baltic Sea case study for the included vessels are shown in Table 4.7.  
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Tabel 4.7. Cost figures 
         
 Variable costs  Variable costs  Fixed costs  
 
Fuel 
Ice/provi
-sions 
Mainte-
nance Sales Crew 
Rent of 
plant 
and 
equip. 
Insuran-
ce 
Miscel-
laneous 
 
---- DKK/day at sea ---- 
% of 
-- catch revenue -- ----------- DKK/year --------- 
         
Netter/liner <12m 307 120 657 0.11 0.10 3,466 22,228 34,647 
Dinghy <12m 388 153 1,363 0.04 0.11 16,586 24,762 34,419 
Multi-purpose <12m 365 16 565 0.08 0.04 19,459 35,063 34,433 
Trawlers <12m 363 16 561 0.08 0.04 19,459 35,063 34,433 
Netter/liner 12-15m 572 64 727 0.09 0.21 7,975 48,338 57,327 
Multi-purpose 12-15m 476 164 753 0.13 0.01 574 32,103 47,019 
Trawler 12-15m 1,118 111 809 0.11 0.19 6,101 53,524 55,854 
Netter/liner 15-18m 908 212 1,516 0.10 0.38 5,719 96,725 100,493 
Multi-purpose 15-18m 2,362 123 1,213 0.11 0.22 1,911 39,478 87,486 
Danish seine 15-18m 741 160 1,355 0.10 0.29 7,931 65,273 81,561 
Trawler 15-18m 1,767 131 1,116 0.08 0.22 7,584 78,636 82,853 
Danish seine 18-24m 1,102 351 1,534 0.10 0.36 240 104,365 102,191 
Trawler 18-24m 2,749 232 1,458 0.10 0.28 5,688 135,077 113,656 
Trawler 24-40m industrial 5,480 1,157 2,106 0.11 0.26 8,989 250,193 172,282 
Trawler 24-40 mixed 6,683 458 3,410 0.10 0.29 9,248 224,524 173,664 
 
 
As mentioned, costs do not vary during the year. Neither is costs assumed to vary 
within the analysed period. It is highly problematic to foresee future development in 
costs, for instance fuel prices, and therefore no assumptions are made in relation to 
this. This is of course a questionable assumption, which can be discussed. 
4.4. Scenarios and results 
Given the flexibility of BEMCOM it is possible to analyse many different scenarios. 
Here 3 scenarios have been considered in order to investigate the influence of techni-
cal measures on economic efficiency of the Danish fishing fleet. 
 
The first scenario is the base case, which is basically illustrating the „status quo‟ situa-
tion, where the management situation in 2005 is assumed to continue for the analysed 
period. This management includes (i) an all year ban for the EU fleet on fishing cod 
in the Bornholm Deep, the Gotland Deep, and the Gdansk Deep, (ii) an extended 
summer ban on fishing cod in the eastern Baltic from 1. May to 15. September, and 
(iii) a spring ban on fishing cod in the western Baltic from 1. March to 30. April. In 
this scenario, the model optimises the economically optimal distribution of catches, 
and thus allocation of days at sea, disaggregated down to ICES-square for the Sound, 
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western and eastern Baltic Sea and for the main areas for the areas included outside 
the Baltic. This is done for the analysed period, i.e. 2006-2015.  
 
It has been observed in the available data that extensive fishing activity is taking place 
on the boundaries of the currently closed areas in the eastern Baltic Sea. This of 
course has a significant influence on the possibilities for the cod to go in and out of 
the spawning areas without getting caught. Therefore, a scenario is analysed where 
the currently closed areas are expanded. Thus, cod fishing in the following ICES-
squares 39G5, 39G6, 40G5, 40G6 (areas around Bornholm Deep), 40G8, 40G9, 41G8 
and 41G9 (areas around Gotland Deep) is completely prohibited all year.  
 
Finally the area in and around the Bornholm Deep is the most important spawning 
area for eastern Baltic cod. As such it can be argued that an even larger area around 
the Bornholm Deep should be permanently closed to cod fishery. Therefore the last 
scenario closes most of the ICES area 25 around the Bornholm Deep, together with 
the extended closure around the Gotland Deep used in scenario 1. 
 
The extra ICES squares closed in scenario 1 and 2 described above are characterised 
by having high catch- and CPUE-levels. Therefore a closure will have an economic 
impact on the vessels fishing there. However, they have the opportunity to reallocate 
their activity to other areas in and outside the Baltic Sea, and in this way reduce the 
economic repercussions. Furthermore, it is expected that the cod stock in especially 
the area 3D, in which the deeps are located, will increase and in this way give rise to 
an improvement in catches.  
 
It must be noticed for all three scenarios that if a fleet did not have observed catches 
in a certain ICES-square in 2005 (i.e. in the initial CPUE matrix), it will neither have 
this in the optimal solution, seeing that the catches in the model are linear in the initial 
CPUE distribution. As such the model implicitly assumes compliance with the man-
agement schemes implied by the CPUE matrix, throughout the total optimisation pe-
riod. 
 
A large amount of output becomes available when running BEMCOM. This extensive 
output will not be described in the following. Instead the focus will be on the devel-
opment in the following indicators: 
 
 cod stock (SSB) 
 number of days at sea 
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 profit 
4.4.1. Base scenario 
Figure 4.14 shows the initial number of vessels in 2005 (table 4.5) together with the 
average number of vessels over the modelling period for each vessel group. For all 
small vessel groups less than 15 m, except the trawlers 12-15 m (TRA1215m)), the 
average number of vessels is higher than the initial number of vessels, i.e. it is optimal 
for these groups to invest in more capacity in the present management situation. For 
the larger vessels there is not clear pattern in whether it is optimal to invest or disin-
vest in capacity, even though it seems that most large trawlers have more vessels on 
the average in the optimal situation than the initial number. 
 
Figure 4.14. Average number of vessels over the simulation period in the base 
scenario, together with the initial (2005) number of vessels. 
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The total optimal profit (measured in present values), defined as catch revenue minus 
variable and fixed costs, summarised over the optimisation period of the included 
vessels is in the base status-quo scenario DKK 6,331 million (€ 850 millions) for the 
total fleet. Figure 4.15 shows the average profit per vessel in the different fleet seg-
ments summarised over the optimisation period, measured in present values. It is seen 
that especially the small vessels <15m will be profitable over the optimisation period, 
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while Danish Seine (SNV) will on the other hand have a small or negative profits. 
Generally most trawl segments (TRA) seem profitable as well as the multipurpose 
vessels (SGT). 
 
Figure 4.15.  Average present value profit per vessel summed over the optimiza-
tion period (million DKK) in the Base scenario 
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Table 4.8 shows the total catch value summed over the ten years optimisation period 
per vessel disaggregated between species and areas in the Baltic. It is seen that cod is 
the most important species in 3C and 3D, while herring is as important as cod in 3B. 
Sprat is relatively important in 3C, while the catch value of other species is approxi-
mately zero in the Baltic areas. 
 
Table 4.8. Total catch value per vessel (millions DKK, present values), distrib-
uted over species groups and summed over the optimisation period, 
base case 
     
 COD HER SPR OTH 
     
3B 6.87 6.21 0.00 0.00 
3C 29.97 9.47 7.80 0.01 
3D 34.15 7.11 0.32 0.06 
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Figure 4.16 shows the distribution of the total catch value of cod, summed over the 
optimisation period (million DKK, present values), per vessel in the Baltic areas for 
the different vessel groups. It is seen that it is mainly the small vessels below 15 m 
that catch cod in the Baltic, with the exception of the Danish seiners 15-18m 
(SNV1518m) that catch some cod in the eastern Baltic (3D). Together with these it is 
mainly the multipurpose vessels (SGT) that catch cod in the eastern Baltic. 
 
Figure 4.16. Total Cod catch value (million DKK, present values) per vessel in the 
Baltic areas summed over the optimisation period, base case 
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The development in the eastern (3D) and western (3B+3C) Baltic cod spawning stock 
biomasses (SSB) during the optimisation period is shown in figure 4.17 for the status-
quo base case. The figure shows that the cod SSB in the eastern as well as western 
Baltic can be expected to increase to above the precautionary limit (Bpa) during the 
optimisation period, given the assumptions that the fishing fleets operate in an eco-
nomically optimal way (maximising the total net profit of the fishery) and that the 
fishery comply with the management scheme, i.e. do not fish in the closed areas etc.  
 
The spawning stock biomass in the eastern Baltic generally increases throughout the 
optimisation period, but not unrealistically so, as the eastern cod SSB has been ob-
served to be up to a max of 700 thousand tonnes during the period 1966-2006. The 
stock in the western Baltic generally increases with the exception of the last simula-
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tion year, but still stays above the precautionary limit. The observed increase of both 
stocks to above Bpa implies that the present management scheme may in the long run 
lead to the desired stock recovery in the Baltic Sea, if vessels are allowed to behave in 
an economically optimal way. 
 
Figure 4.17. Development in cod spawning stock biomass (SSB), base scenario 
(1000 tonnes) 
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Figure 4.18 shows the development in the number of days at sea used on the average 
per vessel in the Danish fishing fleet in the Baltic areas 3B, 3C, and 3D together with 
the number of days at sea used per vessel in the remaining fishing grounds, during the 
optimisation period in the base scenario. The total number of days at sea used by a 
vessel in the fleet increases by around 20% during the period, which is caused by an 
increase by the number of days used in 3C (western Baltic). The number of days used 
in 3D (eastern Baltic) decreases a bit during the period, while the number of days 
used in 3B and in other areas stays approximately constant. 
 
It is not surprising to see that the included fleets use relatively little time in 3B, i.e. in 
the Sound, which is a small area with a lower CPUE compared with the remaining 
areas
22
. Contrary to this, the included vessels allocate a relatively large part of their 
effort in 3C and in „other areas‟ compared to 3D. Thus, the vessels allocate the largest 
                                                 
22 The average CPUE in the Sound was in 2005 687 kilos of cod per day at sea, where the average 
CPUE in 3CD was 750 kilos of cod per day at sea. 
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part of their effort in areas close to the majority of the Danish ports (except Born-
holm). 
 
Figure 4.18. Figure 4.18 Development in number of days at sea per vessel in the 
Danish fishing fleet, base scenario 
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Figure 4.19 shows the average distribution of days at sea per vessel per year over the 
simulation period for each vessel group. It is seen that especially multipurpose vessels 
(SGT) 12-15m and below 12m (u12m) together with Danish seine (SNV) spend a 
large amount of their time in the eastern Baltic (3D), while multipurpose vessels 15-
18m and large industrial trawlers spend all their time in other areas. Generally the 
trawlers spend most of their time in other areas, with the exception of the small trawl-
ers (<12m) that spend some time in the eastern Baltic (3C). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEVIS    FOI    119 
Figure 4.19. Average days at sea per vessel per year over the simulation period, 
base case 
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4.4.2. Extended closure of Bornholm and Gotland Deep (Scenario 1) 
This scenario has extended closures around the current marine protected areas in the 
Bornholm and the Gotland Deep, corresponding to closing 8 of the 58 ICES squares 
in the eastern Baltic (3D) throughout the year. Especially the area around the Born-
holm Deep is characterised by large catches and CPUE for the included Danish fleets.  
It is in this scenario assumed that the total cod catches taken by the other nations in 
3D are scaled down with a factor 50/58, i.e. that these catches are distributed homo-
geneously over the eastern Baltic and are therefore proportionally reduced by the clo-
sure of 8 ICES squares. Closure of these areas is thus expected to have a positive im-
pact on the spawning stock biomass, but a negative impact on the economic perform-
ance of the included fleets. 
 
Figure 4.20 shows the average number of vessels per year during the simulation pe-
riod in fleet segment in scenario 1 and in the base scenario together with the initial 
number of vessels in each group. It is seen that the average number of vessels in sce-
nario 1 either stays equal to or decreases relative to the number of vessels in the base 
scenario for all vessel groups. No increase in number of vessels relative to the base 
case is observed. Thus the extended closures seem to lead to reduced overall capacity 
in the Danish fleet, compared to the optimal status quo situation. It should also be no-
ticed that the optimal number of vessels in scenario 1 is lower than the initial number 
of vessels for most vessel groups, except some of the smaller vessels. Thus extended 
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closures in the Baltic may lead to a general decrease of the Danish fleet when com-
pared to the present situation.  
 
Figure 4.20. Average number of vessels per year in Scenario 1 and in the base 
scenario, together with the initial number of vessels (2005) 
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The total maximum profit (measured in present values) in scenario 1, defined as catch 
revenue minus variable and fixed costs, summarised over the optimisation period of 
the included vessels is DKK 3,640 millions (€ 489 millions) for the total fleet, i.e. a 
reduction of 43% compared to the base scenario. Figure 4.21 shows the average profit 
per vessel in the Danish fleet in scenario 1 and in the base scenario measured in pre-
sent values and summarised over the optimisation period. It is seen that with few ex-
ceptions all vessel groups experience decreasing profitability under the extended clo-
sures when compared with the status quo situation. Three vessel groups even go from 
positive to negative profitability. The exceptions are the small dinghys (JOL-
RUSu12m) and small multi-purpose vessels (SGTu12m) that experience increases in 
profitability during the period. 
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Figure 4.21. Average present value profit per vessel summed over the optimization 
period (millions DKK) in the scenario 1 and in the base scenario. 
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Table 4.9 shows the total catch value per vessel summed over the ten years optimisa-
tion period in Scenario 1. Cod is still the most important species, followed by herring. 
Comparison with table 4.8 shows that the catch value of cod has increased in all three 
areas. The largest relative increase compared with the base case is in area 3B where 
the cod catch value has increased with 116%. In area 3C and 3D the cod catch value 
has increased with around 52%. Contrary to this the catch value of the other species 
has all decreased significantly compared with the base case. It is interesting to notice 
that the Danish fleet stops fishing Sprat in area 3C in this scenario. 
 
Table 4.9. Total catch value per vessel (millions DKK, present values), distrib-
uted over species groups and summed over the optimisation period, 
scenario 1 
     
 COD HER SPR OTH 
     
3B 14.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3C 45.54 7.04 0.10 0.00 
3D 52.50 0.39 0.96 0.00 
 
 
Figure 4.22 shows the distribution of the catch value of cod per vessel in the Baltic 
areas for the different vessel groups, summed over the optimisation period. This is 
shown both for Scenario 1 and for the Base case, with the left hand columns for each 
vessel group representing scenario 1. It is seen that the two vessel groups that primar-
 
122    FOI    CEVIS 
ily catch cod in 3D in the base case, namely SGTu12m and SGT1215m (multipurpose 
vessels below 12m and 12-15m) still catch a significant amount of cod in 3D but also 
starts catching cod in 3C. It is interesting to notice that vessel groups that caught none 
or little cod in 3D in the base status-quo scenario increase their catches of cod in this 
area. This is probably connected to the increased stock of cod in 3D (cf. below) re-
sulting from the extended closure. 
 
Figure 4.22. Total Cod catch value (million DKK, present values) per vessel in the 
Baltic areas summed over the optimisation period, Scenario 1 (left 
hand columns) and base case. 
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Figure 4.23 shows the development in cod spawning stock biomass (SSB) in the east-
ern (3D) and western (3B+3C) Baltic during the modelling period in scenario 1. Fig-
ure 4.23 shows SSB in scenario 1 relative to the SSB in the base case. The cod stock 
in the eastern Baltic reaches the precautionary level within 4 years with the extended 
closure assumption. This is an improvement compared to the base case where it takes 
7 years for the 3D stock to reach the precautionary limit. Generally the stock in 3D is 
higher in the case of extended closures than in the status quo case, cf. figure 4.17. The 
stock in the western Baltic also rises above the base case stock after 6 years, which is 
probably a consequence of changed fishing patterns due to the closure in 3D. 
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Figure 4.23. Development in cod spawning stock biomass (SSB), scenario 1 (1000 
tonnes) 
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Figure 4.24. Cod spawning stock biomass (SSB) in scenario 1 relative to SSB in 
base scenario 
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Figure 4.25 shows the average number of days per sea per vessel in the total Danish 
fleet in each of the simulation years in scenario 1 and in the base scenario. The aver-
age number of days at sea used by a vessel in the fleet is lower relative to the base 
case throughout the simulation period when additional closures are introduced in the 
eastern Baltic (3D). The cause of this is especially a decrease in effort in other areas, 
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while the effort in both the eastern and western Baltic increases some in scenario 1 
compared to the base case. The latter effect is expected as the stock in both areas in-
creases during the simulation period (cf. figure 4.23). The effort in 3B is unchanged 
compared to the base case. 
 
Figure 4.25. Development in number of days at sea, scenario 1 and base scenario 
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Figure 4.26 shows the average number of days at sea per vessel per year in each of the 
vessel groups in scenario 1 and in the base scenario. The base case results are the col-
umns on the right for each vessel group. It is seen that most vessel segments reduce 
their average yearly fishing time in other areas in scenario 1 compared to the base 
scenario, which may be caused by the increasing fishing possibilities for cod in 3D 
when the stock increases. Especially the large industrial trawlers (TRA2440mINDU) 
and the liners and gillnetters between 15 and 18 (GK1518m) m increase their effort in 
3D in scenario 1, while the remaining segments keep approximately the same effort in 
3D in the two scenarios. The effort increase in 3C is caused mostly by liners and gill-
netters 0-15m (GKu12m and GK1215m). 
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Figure 4.26. Average days at sea per vessel per year over the simulation period, 
scenario 1 (left hand columns) and Base case (right hand columns) 
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4.4.3. Extended closure of the Bornholm Deep (Scenario 2) 
As mentioned above this scenario has kept the extended closures of scenario 1, but 
extend the closure around the Bornholm Deep even further, such that most of ICES 
area 25 is now closed to cod fishery. In all 13 out of the 58 squares in the eastern Bal-
tic (3D) is now closed throughout the year. As in scenario 1 it is assumed that the total 
cod catches taken by the other nations in 3D are scaled down with a factor 45/58, i.e. 
that these catches are distributed homogeneously over the eastern Baltic and are there-
fore proportionally reduced by the closure of 13 ICES squares.  
 
Figure 4.27 shows the average number of vessels per year over the simulation period 
for each vessel group in scenario 2, together with the initial number of vessels in 2005 
(table 2.3) and the number of vessels in the base scenario. As in scenario 1, the aver-
age number of vessels in scenario 2 is either equal to or lower than the average num-
ber of vessels in the base scenario. Thus again the optimal capacity of the Danish fleet 
decreases with the increased closures in the eastern Baltic. 
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Figure 4.27. Average number of vessels over the simulation period in Scenario 2 
and in the base scenario, together with the Initial (2005) number of 
vessels. 
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The total maximum profit in scenario 2 summarised over the optimisation period of 
the included vessels is DKK 3,689 millions (€ 495 millions) for the total fleet, i.e. ap-
proximately the same as in scenario 1. Figure 4.28 shows the average profits per ves-
sel in scenario 1 and 2, and in the base scenario, measured in present values and 
summarised over the optimisation period. It is seen that the aggregated profitability of 
most of the larger vessel segments (>12m) is lower in both scenarios when compared 
with the base case. The exception is the multipurpose vessels 12-15m (SGT1215m) 
that have a higher total profitability with the extended closure of the Bornholm Deep 
compared to both the base case and to scenario 1. For the small vessels the picture is 
more mixed. All of these, except the multipurpose vessels below 12 m (SGTu12m) 
have a small increase in profitability in scenario 2 compared to scenario 1. The small 
dinghys (JOLRUSu12m) and the small trawlers (TRAu12m) moreover also have a 
small increase in profitability when compared to the base case. 
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Figure 4.28. Average present value profit per vessel summed over the optimization 
period (Million DKK) in the scenario 2, scenario 1, and in the base sce-
nario. 
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Table 4.10 shows the catch value per vessel distributed over the species groups and 
areas in the Baltic, summed over the optimisation period. It is interesting to notice 
that the catch value distribution in scenario 2 is closer to the base case than to sce-
nario 1 i.e. that while the extended closures in scenario 1 resulted in a significant in-
crease in cod catch value in 3D, extending these closures even further around the 
Bornholm Deep leads to decrease of this catch value again. Cod is still the most im-
portant species in 3C and 3D while herring and cod are equally important in 3B. The 
catch value of cod has increased in 3D compared to the base case, but not as much as 
in scenario 1. And contrary to scenario 1, the catch value of cod in 3C is the same in 
scenario 2 as in the base case. 
 
Table 4.10. Total catch value per vessel (millions DKK present values), distributed 
over species groups and summed over the optimisation period, Sce-
nario 2 
     
 COD HER SPR OTH 
     
3B 6.90 7.19 0.00 0.00 
3C 29.81 12.71 6.37 0.09 
3D 42.59 11.33 0.43 0.39 
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Figure 4.29 shows the distribution of the catch value of cod per vessel in the Baltic 
areas for the different vessel groups, summed over the optimisation period. This is 
shown both for Scenario 2, Scenario 1 and for the Base case. The total catch value of 
cod decreases for most vessel groups in scenario 2 when compared to scenario 1, with 
the exception of multi-purpose vessels 12-15m (SGT1215m) and small trawlers 
(TRAu12m). Both these groups have increasing catch value of cod in the eastern Bal-
tic when compared to scenario 1 and the base case, which is also true for the dinghys 
(JOLRUSu12m). But generally it can be concluded that the catch value of cod in the 
Baltic areas will, with few exceptions, decrease for a vessel in the Danish fleet with 
the extended closure of the Bornholm Deep. 
 
Figure 4.29. Total cod catch value (million DKK, present values) per vessel in the 
Baltic areas summed over the optimisation period, scenario 2 (left 
hand columns), Scenario 1 (middle columns) and base case (right 
hand columns). 
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Figure 4.30 shows the development in cod spawning stock biomass (SSB) in the east-
ern (3D) and western (3B+3C) Baltic during the modelling period in scenario 2. Fig-
ure 4.30 shows SSB in scenario 2 relative to the SSB in the base case. As in scenario 
1 the cod stock in the eastern Baltic reaches the precautionary level within 4 years, 
but the stock generally increases faster and to a higher final level in scenario 2 when 
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compared to scenario 1. This is seen by comparing figure 4.30 and 4.23. The devel-
opment of the cod stock in 3C in scenario 2 resembles the pattern seen in scenario 1. 
 
Figure 4.30. Development in cod spawning stock biomass (SSB), scenario 2 (1000 
tonnes) 
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Figure 4.31. Cod spawning stock biomass (SSB) in scenario 2 relative to SSB in 
base scenario 
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Figure 4.32 shows the average number of days per sea per vessel in the total Danish 
fleet in each of the simulation years in scenario 2 and in the base scenario. As in sce-
nario 1, the average number of days at sea used by a vessel in the fleet is lower rela-
tive to the base case throughout the simulation period. Again, this is mostly caused by 
a decrease in effort in Other Areas, while the effort in both the eastern and western 
Baltic increases some in scenario 2 compared to the base case. Comparison with fig-
ure 4.25 shows that the effort used in the eastern Baltic increases compared with sce-
nario 1 while the effort in 3C stays more or less unchanged. This additional increase 
of effort in 3D is again believed to be caused by the increased stock and thus catches 
in 3D in the later years of the simulation period. 
 
Figure 4.32. Development in number of days at sea, scenario 2 and base scenario 
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Figure 4.33 shows the average number of days at sea per vessel per year in each of the 
vessel groups in scenario 2, scenario 1 and in the base scenario. The scenario 2 and 
scenario 1 distribution of sea days does not differ much but for most fleet segments 
significantly from the base scenario. 
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Figure 4.33. Average days at sea per vessel per year over the simulation period, 
scenario 2 (left hand columns), Scenario 1 (middle columns) and base 
case (right hand columns) 
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4.5. Summary and conclusion 
The fishery in the Baltic Sea is characterised by several things: 1) it is mainly focused 
on three species cod, herring and sprat; 2) many different types of gear is used: trawl, 
Danish seine, nets; and 3) fishermen comes from all nations around the Baltic Sea. 
These complexities of course influence how to analyse the economic consequences of 
marine protected areas in the Baltic Sea. Therefore, a bioeconomic model is required 
for the analysis. In bioeconomic models, functional relationships are thus established 
between the specific biological characteristics of the fish resource and the economic 
behaviour of the fishermen using the resource. 
 
A bioeconomic model has been setup in order to analyse the consequences of marine 
protected areas in the Baltic Sea. The acronym of the model is BEMCOM (Bio-
Economic Model to evaluate the COnsequences of Marine protected areas). BEM-
COM is a flexible modelling framework, which is programmed in a generic way and 
can handle different case studies through the utilised dataset and parameter values. It 
is an optimisation model and it is programmed in GAMS (General Algebraic Model-
ling System). 
 
In order to quantify BEMCOM to the Baltic Sea case study, data has been collected 
from ICES, The Danish Directorate of Fisheries and the Institute of Food and Re-
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source Economics. It has unfortunately not been possible to obtain detailed data from 
other countries besides Denmark in order to reach the necessary level of detail re-
quired in BEMCOM. Only Danish vessels are therefore currently included, but as 
more data becomes available in the future, vessels from other nations can be included 
as well. At present total cod catches in the Baltic Sea is approximated by adding a 
constant catch amount for the other countries surrounding the Baltic Sea. 
 
Because the recovery of cod has primarily been in focus, when discussing use of 
closed areas in the Baltic Sea, stock development of Baltic cod (eastern and western 
stock) has been evaluated in the present context. Catches of the remaining species 
both in- and outside the Baltic Sea have however been included in order to evaluate 
total profit of the fleets in question. 
 
Three scenarios have been investigated, both run over a ten year time period. The first 
scenario is considered to be a status quo situation, where it is assumed that the current 
regulation in the Baltic Sea continues, thus the current closed areas in the Baltic Sea 
continues to be in place. Secondly, because fishing continues around the borders of 
the status-quo closures, thus taking any spill over of cod, the second scenario consid-
ers extended closures around the Bornholm and the Gotland Deep. Finally, seeing that 
the Bornholm Deep is the most important spawning ground for eastern Baltic cod, a 
third scenario has been considered, that assumes an even more extended closure 
around the Bornholm Deep. 
 
To assess the economic efficiency of the Danish fishing fleet in the three scenarios, 
the net present value of total profits, defined as discounted catch revenue minus vari-
able and fixed costs summed over the 10 year period, has been maximised for the 
Danish fleet in each scenario. The maximisation is done under a range of restrictions 
including maximum and minimum number of days at sea per vessel and expected 
quotas.  
 
In the base status-quo scenario the total net present profit for the Danish fleet is DKK 
6,331 millions (€ 850 millions). In scenario 1 (extended closures around the Born-
holm and the Gotland Deep) and scenario 2 (further extension of the closed area 
around the Bornholm Deep) the values are DKK 3,640 and 3,689 millions (€ 489 mil-
lions and € 495 millions) respectively. As such the scenario evaluations indicate that 
extending the marine protected areas in the Baltic Sea will decrease the economic ef-
ficiency of the Danish fishing fleet. This is not a surprising result, because vessels are 
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excluded from fishing areas with high catch and CPUE levels around the deeps, and 
are thus forced to fish in areas that are less attractive.  
 
On the other hand the model evaluations also show the desired recovery of the eastern 
Baltic cod stock, and it can therefore be concluded that extending the marine 
protected areas will be good for the fish, but economically bad for the fishermen. 
However, it must be noted that this conclusion depends on the assumptions and 
restrictions made. 
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5. Participatory governance in the western shelf northern 
hake fishery 
5.1. Introduction  
Underreporting and discards are two of the main problems in the assessment of 
Northern stock of hake. The catch of younger ages is completely discarded and there 
is no reliable data to obtain reliable estimates of discard time series. So discards are 
not taken into account in the assessment and management of this stock. There is no 
data to quantify the underreporting but it is believed that it would be around 30% of 
the total catch. These two facts introduce bias in the assessment of the stock and 
would lead to the failure of the management. Participatory governance and effort 
management regimes would contribute to obtain reliable discards estimates and to re-
duce the underreporting. Improvement in data quality and reduction of underreporting 
would improve the management of the stock, obtaining in the long term a healthy 
stock. In turn a healthy stock would lead to a more economically efficient fleet. In this 
work we analyze, by means of simulation, the economic efficiency of Basque fleets 
targeting hake under TAC and effort based management regimes combined with par-
ticipatory governance.  
5.2. The stock 
European hake (Merluccius merluccius) see figure5.1, is a commercially exploited top 
predator gadoid species. It is widely distributed from Norway to Mauritania and from 
the Mediterranean to the Black Sea (Svetovidov, 1986). ICES assumes two different 
stock units: the so-called Northern stock, in division IIIa, Subareas II, IV, VI and VII 
and divisions VIIIa,b,d, and the Southern stock in divisions VIIIc and IXa, along the 
Spanish and Portuguese coasts. The main argument for this choice was that the Cap 
Breton canyon (close to the border between the Southern part of division VIIIb and 
the more eastern part of division VIIIc, i.e. approximately between the French and 
Spanish borders) could be considered as a geographical border limiting exchanges be-
tween the two populations. See map about the ICES fishing areas (figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.1. European hake (Merlucius merlucius) 
 
 
 
Northern hake has been commercially exploited since the 18th century (Casey & 
Pereiro, 1995), with annual catches ranging from 40 000 to 96 000 tones during the 
period 1961-2007. Hake fishery is, economically, a very important fishery to Spain 
and France which account for the 60% and 27% of the total landings respectively. 
Hake is caught together with other species such as monkfish, megrim, Nephrops and 
sole. The fleet is mainly composed by trawlers, gillnetters and longliners. Hake dis-
carding in youngest ages is high for some fleets, but due to lack of data, reliable esti-
mates of discard time series are not available. (ICES, 2008). 
 
According to the ICES assessment of this stock, the population size of Northern 
European hake showed a steep decline during the beginning of the 1990s and the pre-
sent level is considered to be only 60% of the maximum historical estimate. The stock 
is managed by a TAC and quotas system with some technical measures associated. A 
minimum landing size at 27 cm was set in 1998 for all areas, except for the Skager-
rak/Kattegat area in which it was set at 30 cm (Council reg. 850/98). Due to the criti-
cal state of the population an Emergency Plan was introduced in June 2001 (Council 
reg. 1162/2001). The aim of the plan was to protect juveniles, limitations of minimum 
mesh sizes for some gears were imposed; these limitations were dependent on the 
geographical area, the amount of hake landed and the technical characteristics of the 
vessel. Since 2004, a recovery plan is in force which objective is to obtain, in two 
consecutive years, levels of mature fish above Bpa at 140 000 tonnes, (Council reg. 
811/2004). According to last ICES assessment (ICES, 2008) the objective of the plan 
has already been achieved, so it is foreseen to be replaced by a long term management 
plan by 2009 (STECF 2007a, STECF 2007b). The long term management plan pro-
posed are focused in achieving a fishing mortality level in accordance with maximum 
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sustainable yield by 2015, in agreement with Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
(2002).  
 
Figure 5.2. Map of the ICES statistical fishing areas of the Northeast Atlantic. 
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5.3. The Basque fleet  
Two different fleets exploit northern hake in the Basque Country, “Baka” trawlers 
and pair trawlers. “Baka” trawlers can be defined as a single vessel which trawls a 
bottom net operating in contact with the seabed. In this case trips last on average 6 
days depending on the area being fished, and the haul duration is between 4 and 5 
hours. Catches are generally landed in Basque ports (Ondarroa and Pasaia) and in 
French, Scottish and Irish ports from where the catch is transported by trucks to be 
sold on local Basque markets. 
 
On the other hand, bottom pair trawlers are composed by two vessels trawling a sin-
gle VHVO net between 25-35 meters high and 75 to 90 meters wide. The average 
number of days for a trip is 5 or 6. The duration of the haul is longer than that of the 
otter trawls taking 7-8 hours on average for each haul.  
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The main differences between the two fleets, in terms of the fishing, are given by the 
catch profile and the cost structure. 
 
The main characteristic of the Basque fisheries together with the biological status of 
the stock have conditioned their historical economic performance. Beginning with the 
technical characteristics the Baka otter trawlers are vessels with a mean length at 32 
m, mean power at 812 HP, mean GT at 224 and a mean age at 17 years employing 10 
to 12 crewmembers. The VHVO pair trawlers are vessels with a mean length at 32 m, 
mean power at 907 HP, mean GT at 247 and mean age at 22.4 years.  
 
The annual catches for Basque fisheries related to the international catches are around 
a 20% of the TAC (Figure 5.3), being higher for Pair than for Baka trawler which de-
termines the different economic performance between both fleets. However, for both 
of them the assigned quota and so the total catches put in evidence the great impor-
tance of both fleets given the small number of fleets composing the fishery table 5.1. 
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Figure 5.3. Basque landings of northern hake. 
 
 
 
Economic performance also depends on the landing composition, and in this sense 
Baka trawlers could be considered to be executing a mixed fishery given that only 8-
9% of their catches are due to the hake stock. This percentage goes up to more than 
the half of the catches for the pair trawlers, which is then considered as a single fish-
ery. 
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Table 5.1. Economic indicators per vessel for the Basque fleets targeting north-
ern hake 
       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Baka       
Value of hake landings (1000 €) 130 97 144 97 123 89 
Revenue (1000 €) 725 532 565 615 580 635 
Crew share (1000€) 392 323 323 335 375 425 
Gross Cash flow (1000 €) 7 -126 -92 -39 -184 ---- 
Net Profit (1000 €) -123 -245 -211 -404 -594 ---- 
Volume of hake landings (tonnes) 37 24 31 22 32 38 
Number of vessels 28 27 24 21 21 17 
Pair trawlers       
Value of hake landings (1000 €) 664 697 961 893 772 924 
Revenue (1000 €) 809 818 1094 1027 838 949 
Crew share (1000€) 311 332 332 361 361 ---- 
Gross Cash flow (1000 €) 184 193 468 329 127 ---- 
Net Profit (1000 €) -15 23 298 70 -243 ---- 
Volume of hake landings (tonnes) 214 219 317 276 253 304 
Number of vessels 25 19 21 20 20 18 
5.4. Actual management regime 
It must be stressed that several management tools are combined under the northern 
hake management. These tools are: 
 
 Northern hake stock is managed by a TAC and quotas. 
 Technical measures associated such as minimum mesh size in some areas for 
some gears and minimum length in landings (Council reg. 850/98). The 
minimum legal sizes for fish caught in Sub areas IV-VI-VII and VIII is set at 
27 cm total length (30 cm in division IIIa). First, a 100 mm minimum mesh 
size has been implemented for otter-trawlers when hake comprises more than 
20% of the total amount of marine organisms retained onboard. This measure 
did not apply to vessels less than 12 m in length and which return to port 
within 24 hours of their most recent departure. Second, two areas have been 
defined, one in subarea VII and the other in subarea VIII, where a 100 mm 
minimum mesh size is required for all otter-trawlers, whatever the amount of 
hake caught.  
 Furthermore, in November 2000, ICES announced that the northern hake 
stock was in serious danger of collapse and from 14th of June 2001 an emer-
gency plan was implemented by the Commission for the recovery of the 
northern hake stock (Council reg. 1162/2001, 2602/2001 and 494/2002). The 
objective of the northern hake stock recovery plan is to increase the level of 
spawning biomass of this stock. Once the target level has been achieved the 
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Commission will introduce follow-up management measures replacing the 
recovery plan.  
 A TAE (total allowable effort) system, which is introduced previous to the 
TAC regulation, is being used. It works as follows: In 1981 it was decided to 
list all the Spanish vessels operating in divisions VIIIabd and sub-areas VI 
and VII in order to create access rights to these fisheries (a single fishing 
right per vessel). The idea was to maintain the level and fix these rights even 
if the number of vessels decreased. When Spain joined the EU in 1986 the 
number of vessels in that list was close to 300 and the so-called “300 list” or 
the “300 fleet” was created. These fishing rights became transferable by area, 
and the system continued nowadays. Currently, there are several negotiations 
going on to decide whether this system will continue or not.  
5.5. The simulation model 
The main reason to focus on the particular fishery of the northern hake fishery ex-
ploited by Basque trawlers from Spain, among several fleets from other countries i.e. 
France, Ireland, and United Kingdom, is due to the fact that the process for managing 
the northern hake stock by the measures in section 5.4 has been modified recently by 
adapting to a new innovative participatory regime, through the two Regional Advi-
sory Councils (RACs). With the creation of the North Western Waters Regional Ad-
visory Council (NWW RAC), established in September 2005 and the South Western 
Waters Regional Advisory Council (SWW RAC), created in April 2007, this innova-
tive participatory system was introduced and began to develop for the management of 
the northern hake.  
 
Taking into account the specific characteristics of the northern hake, the effect of the 
management strategy of introducing a participatory regime on the economic effi-
ciency of the Baka and pair trawler fleets is tested. With this aim, a management pro-
cedure is considered together with an operational bio-economic model that has been 
implemented to allow for simulating the real world, that is, real stock population and 
other key variables in the past and in the future. This framework has been developed 
by the work package five of the CEVIS project. The management procedure evalua-
tion framework has been represented by figure 5.4 based on Aranda et al. 2006. 
 
 Following Kell et. al, (2006): Management Strategy: refers to the combination of 
specific management objectives and associate implementation measures. Management 
Strategy Evaluation (MSE): refers to the simulation of some or all elements of a man-
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agement strategy. Management Procedure (MP): assess status of stock and set man-
agement options depending upon perceived status of the stocks. Operational Man-
agement Procedure (OMP): developed through an Operating Model which represents 
the “real/true” dynamics of the stocks and fisheries. Management Procedure Evalua-
tion Framework (MPEF): simulation framework. 
 
Figure 5.4. The Evaluation Framework for TAC setting. 
 
 
 
The operational model consists of two sub-models: 1) a biological sub-model based 
on an age structured population and three different fleets harvesting the resource: 
Baka, pair trawler and a third category that covers other fleets, and 2) an economic 
sub-model. The economic sub-model considers the fishing mortality function speci-
fied within the biological sub-model which is linearly dependent on effort (fisher be-
haviour is not considered within the model).  
 
The management procedure allows for simulating data sample for the assessment 
which permits estimating the population (using XSA). Finally, management advice is 
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produced: a harvest control rule based on a fishing mortality target setting the objec-
tive. 
 
The economic sub-model includes price functions for the target species: hake, megrim 
and anglerfish according to the EIAA model (STECF 2007b). For the rest of the spe-
cies the price is taken as a constant. The multi-species nature of the fishery is not cov-
ered by the objective of this study, and so the economic effect of the innovative re-
gime is only analysed for the northern hake stock within the context of the mix-
fishery. 
 
Additionally, cost indicators (variable and fixed) are used to evaluate historical eco-
nomic performance of the fishery from 1992 to 2006 and to develop future economic 
performance projections from 2007 to 2040. In particular, economic performance has 
been measured for the fleets in the short term and in the long term by means of the 
following indicators: hake revenue, total catch revenue, gross cash flow, gross sur-
plus, net surplus, financial profitability, full equity profit, net present value, and the 
break even revenue. 
 
Finally, it should be mentioned that fleet behaviour is included in the sense that the 
collapse of some iteration can cause a tactical reaction of the fleet. 
5.6. The management scenarios tested 
Hypothesis: 
 The management through participatory governance is just starting recently 
with the establishment of the South Western Regional Advisory Council 
(RAC) in which the fishing industry groups are being organised to participate 
from the beginning in the assessment and decision process. We assume that 
the participatory governance will improve the quality of the input data to the 
assessment both in terms of reduced bias and reduced uncertainty. This im-
provement will, principally, be reflected in the reduction of the unreported 
landings and inclusion of discard data. 
 Controls on fishing effort, as an innovative management measure, appear to 
be more likely to succeed than the TAC and quota system when managing 
mixed fisheries as northern hake. All vessels involved in hake fishery are cur-
rently monitored by satellite vessel monitoring system (VMS) and it would 
be relatively easy to use this system for control purposes. They have the ad-
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vantage that they address an input to the fishery, i.e. fishing effort. They also 
address fisheries rather than individual stocks.  
 Four different management scenarios have been analysed depending on the 
different hypothesis related to the introduction of the participatory TAC 
and/or effort regime.  
 A base case (bc) is evaluated under which the fishery is managed by tradi-
tional tools; that is by means of TAC without considering a participatory 
governance. The historic levels of underreporting are maintained and dis-
cards estimates are not available. 
 A second scenario (tac.pgov1) is evaluated by assuming the introduction of 
participatory innovation which will permit 100% observation of the discard 
data at ages 0, 1 and 2 which is not included in the traditional assessment 
base for fixing the TAC.  
 A third scenario (tac.pgov2) is evaluated by assuming that the introduction of 
the participatory regime implies not only that the discards are observed, but 
also that the fishermen‟s engagement in the management process for setting 
TAC (see figure 5.1) implies a reduction in the underreporting level.  
 A fourth scenario (eff.bc) is analysed to evaluate the effect of effort manage-
ment without participatory governance. The underreporting is reduced due to 
the effort management but discards estimates are not available.  
 A fifth scenario (eff.pgov2) is analysed to evaluate the effect of the participa-
tory regime by means of discard observations based on effort management, 
which will allow for comparison with respect to the introduction of the inno-
vative regime based on the more traditional TAC system.  
 
In general, reduction in discards and underreporting will contribute to decrease the 
differences between the real world and the observed one in terms of the economic 
performance of the involved fleets in the medium and long run. Notice that, under the 
observed world the catches are equal to the TAC while within the real one the catches 
could be above the TAC given the underreporting. 
5.7. Results 
Economic performance is analysed both in the short-run by means of the revenues, 
gross cash flow, gross surplus and gross added value and in the long-run by means of 
the financial profitability and the full equity profit. The following results are obtained:  
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I. pgov1 (discard observation) and pgov2 (discard and unreported landings obser-
vation) produce better economic performance than the base case (bc) TAC sce-
nario, both in the short-run and in the long-run. 
II. However, the pgov2 system produces better economic performance than the 
pgov1 but only in the long-run. 
III. Introducing co-management regime based on an effort system the eff.pgov2 is 
similar or little higher than eff.bc in the short run, while eff.pgov2 is lower than 
eff.bc in the long run. 
IV. eff.bc is the regime that assures the best economic performance in the long run 
for Baka, while eff.bc and pgov2 provide the best result for pair trawlers, al-
though pgov2 is a little higher than eff.bc for several years. 
 
Economic performance is also analysed through reference points as the net present 
value (NPV) among others:  
I. For pair trawlers, the NPV is positive under the five scenarios, but higher 
within the pgov2 than within the pgov1 and the bc; and higher in the eff.bc than 
the eff.pgov. 
II. For Baka trawlers the NPV related to the bc is negative while being positive for 
other scenarios, being higher for pgov2 than pgov1, and higher for eff.bc than 
eff.pgov2.  
III. NPV under eff.bc produces better result than NPV under any TAC based sce-
nario for Baka, and better result than NPV under TAC bc for pair trawlers. 
 
In general, for both fleets effort management produces better economic performance 
than TAC management in the base case. Participatory governance (observed discards) 
improves economic performance in the TAC scenario; being even stronger when the 
underreporting level is reduced. Moreover, in the long run this improvement is higher 
the more profitable the fleet is (pair trawlers). Finally, participatory governance has a 
slightly negative effect on economic result in an effort scenario, see table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2. Traffic light system for the NPV (millions €) 
         
Regime\ Year 
2008-
2028 
2008-
2032 
2008-
2034 
2008-
2040 
2008-
2010 
2008-
2014 
2008-
2028 
2008-
2040 
         
TAC bc (base case) -32 -34 -37 -39 128 54 196 359 
TAC pgov1 -1.3 -0.8 -0.4   0.1 247 104 384 717 
TAC pgov2 15 18 20 23 236 98 391 822 
Effort bc 15 18 21 25 224 91 374 796 
Effort pgov2 10 12 14 16 221 86 367 748 
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6. Economic consequences of effort management in the 
Faroese fisheries 
6.1. Introduction 
In order to assess the effect of effort control on the economic performance of fisher-
ies, the case of the Faroe Islands fisheries has been considered. This case study inves-
tigates how the economic performance of Faroese long liners and pair trawlers is af-
fected by the varying degrees of the innovative effort control systems introduced in 
the Faroese fisheries management in 1996. This is compared with the situation in 
which the Faroese fishery is assumed to be managed by a more traditional quota con-
trol. Two kinds of effort scenarios are considered. The first is a feed-forward simula-
tion system, where the effort in a year is based on the situation for the stocks in previ-
ous years plus policy decisions regarding the proposed effort measure. The second 
effort scenario is an economic optimum scenario, where the effort each year is set to 
maximise the total net present value of the Faroese fishing fleets over the considered 
period.  
 
In the simulation framework, the analysis of economic performance is carried out in 
two steps. In the first step, a simulation model developed by Baudron (Baudron, 
2007) for evaluation of the biological effects of effort-based management in the Faroe 
Plateau cod fishery is run to obtain catch and effort distribution for the two fleet seg-
ments. These outputs are then used as inputs in the second step to evaluate economic 
performance given the evaluated effort or TAC-based management system. In the op-
timisation framework the Baudron-model, combined with the economic model, are 
run together over the modelling period, and optimised with respect to total net present 
value, by varying the yearly efforts of the two fishing fleets. 
 
Within the 200 nautical miles economic zone (EEZ) for which the effort management 
applies the Faroese fishery is mainly focused on cod, haddock and saithe. Faroese pair 
trawlers, longliners and small trawlers/netters/jiggers dominate this fishery. The latter 
group is not covered by the cost and earnings statistics and is therefore the vessel 
segments considered in the present study are the pair trawlers and the longliners. 
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6.2. Management of the Faroese Fishery 
Until 1959, all nationalities were allowed to fish in the Faroese waters outside a limit 
of 3 nautical miles. Throughout the 1960s, this zone was gradually expanded, ending 
at a 200 nautical miles EEZ in 1977 (ICES NWWG, 2007). In 1987, fisheries licenses 
were introduced. From 1994 to 1996, the fishery was regulated through individual 
transferable quotas with the aim to increase the stocks of Faroe Plateau cod and had-
dock to safe biological limits. The quota system was, however, met with considerable 
criticism and resulted in substantial discarding and in misreporting. Thus the Faroese 
Parliament abandoned the system in May 1996 and a new system was developed 
based on individual transferable effort (days) quotas within fleet categories. The new 
system was introduced in June 1996. It may be expected that such a system of effort 
control may increase economic performance compared to a quota system. The effect 
of the new system is, however, mixed, as the Faroe Plateau cod was still under safe 
biological limits in 2005 while the haddock stock had risen to a sustainable level. 
 
The individual transferable effort quotas apply to (i) longliners < 110 GRT, jiggers, 
and single trawlers < 400 HP, (ii) pair trawlers, and (iii) longliners > 110 GRT. Of 
these pair trawlers > 400 HP and longliners dominate the fishery, and are therefore 
the fleet segments considered in the present work. Table 6.1 shows average (per ves-
sel) economic performance and capacity indicators for the pair trawlers and longliners 
during the period 1999-2004.  
 
Table 6.1. Economic and capacity indicators for the important Faroese pair 
trawlers and longliners. Per vessel 
         
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Pair trawlers         
Value of landings ( 1000 €) 1168 1159 1359 1427 1483 1190 1140 1343 
Crew share ( 1000 €) 512 530 578 632 641 468 464 501 
Gross cash flow ( 1000 €) 273 260 262 251 302 129 146 146 
Net profit ( 1000 €) 172 171 176 169 211 -32 -58 20 
Effort ( days at sea) 249 264 264 246 257 242 281 266 
Volume of landings (tonnes) 1113 1192 1338 1497 1699 1683 1761 2057 
Fleet - number of vessels 28 28 30 30 28 28 26 26 
Long liners         
Value of landings ( 1000 €) 1731 1604 1410 1674 1949 1953 1642 1566 
Crew share ( 1000 €) 996 935 818 937 1077 1060 821 764 
Gross cash flow ( 1000 €) 217 197 146 220 223 268 127 126 
Net profit ( 1000 €) 136 112 56 108 118 124 -28 -23 
Effort ( days at sea) 234 233 219 241 227 216 248 239 
Volume of landings (tonnes) 1151 895 696 823 1061 1112 1084 892 
Fleet - number of vessels 15 16 18 21 21 22 21 23 
 
Source: Rasmussen and Weihe, auditing company 
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Table 6.1 shows that the capacity (number of vessels) is approximately constant for 
the pair trawlers while it has increased a bit for the longliners from 1999 to 2006. The 
net profit of the pair trawlers has decreased steadily during the period while it has 
stayed approximately constant for longliners until 2003, and then drops suddenly in 
2004. The gross cash flow is positive for both segments throughout the period but de-
creases for the pair trawlers. 
6.3. Model framework 
The basis of the effort-based management scenarios considered in the present case 
study is the model developed by Baudron (Baudron, 2007) for evaluating biological 
effects of various effort-based management scenarios for the Faroese Pair Trawlers 
and Long liners. On top of this an economic module has been build to be able to 
evaluate the economic consequences as well. The biological model is described in de-
tail in Baudron (2007), therefore only a short description of this will be given below, 
followed by an outline of the economic equations used to evaluate the economic per-
formance. 
6.3.1. Biological framework 
The biological model consists of an operating model (OM) and a Management Proce-
dure (MP). The OM simulates stock dynamics, including natural and fishing mortal-
ity. The MP simulates the observed, or perceived, world, i.e. what scientists can con-
clude about the true stock via catches, sampling and stock assessments based on 
these. The MP further includes the management decisions based on these perceptions. 
It should be clear that the management decisions taken in year y in the MP will influ-
ence the stock status in year y+1 in the OM, i.e. that there is feedback between the 
two modules. The advantage of including both the OM and MP in the final simulation 
model is that this „allows testing of alternative management strategies before imple-
menting with respect to both the intrinsic properties of natural systems and our ability 
to understand and monitor them‟ (Kell et al., 2006). 
 
In the present context, the OM model covers eight years of observed data (the histori-
cal period running from 1998 to 2005) and a ten years simulation period (2006-2015). 
In the historical period, the effort applied by the fleets (and the corresponding fishing 
mortality) is set equal to the historical reported measures, i.e. stock development and 
catches are evaluated based on the historical effort (and fishing mortalities), which 
gives the possibility to assess how well the model predicts the historical catches and 
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assessed stocks. In the simulation period the effort is set based on the effort manage-
ment-rules. The fishing mortality used in the historic period is based on data reported 
by ICES North-Western Working Group (NWWG) during this period. Likewise the 
stocks in the start year are set equal the stocks reported by NWWG in 1998. Finally 
natural mortality, maturity, and catch and stock-weights are equal to values reported 
by the NWWG. The OM assumes that discards are equal to zero as there are no his-
torical discard data available. 
 
The OM model runs in the following steps:  
 Recruitment in year y is evaluated based on historical relationships between 
spawning stock biomass and recruitment, using a Ricker recruitment func-
tion. 
 The stocks in year y are evaluated using the well-known biological projection 
equation based on stock, natural mortality and fishing mortality in the previ-
ous year. 
 Fleet fishing mortalities in year y is set equal to stock selectivity times fleet 
catchability times fleet effort. The effort has been deduced by the MP based 
on previous years stocks, as will be outlined below. 
 Total species fishing mortality is set equal to the sum of the fleet fishing mor-
talities. 
 Fleet catch of each species in year y is evaluated using the well-known bio-
logical projection formula also used to determine the stock, together with the 
fleet fishing mortality. 
 Total species catch in year y is set equal to the sum of the fleet catches. 
 
The MP model is a simulation of the real management system based on observed 
catches and samplings. When management decisions are performed by working 
groups in the real world, there will always be a two year lag between data used for the 
decision and the TAC/effort decided upon. This time lag occurs because when the 
working groups meet in year y they have observed catch and sampling data available 
for year y-1 only, and they use this to set the TAC/effort for year y+1. Thus the MP 
model runs in the following steps: 
 
Based on the catches in year y-1 XSA (virtual population) analysis is used to assess 
the stocks up until year y-1. This opposed to the „true‟ stock set by the OM as de-
scribed above. The decision makers can only get a „best guess‟ of the OM stock based 
on the observed catches. 
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Given the perceived stocks in year y-1, the MP sets the effort (fishing mortality) for 
each species in year y+1 based the harvest control rule (HCR) for this species. For all 
three species the HCR aims at keeping the stocks above safe biological limits using a 
target fishing mortality of 0.45 for all three species. On top of this an upper limit is set 
on how much the effort must vary from one year to the next. Thus the model ends up 
with three possible efforts for year y+1, one each for cod, haddock and saithe respec-
tively. 
 
Based on the efforts determined for each species in year y+1 the MP model sets a fi-
nal effort aim for the Faroese fleet in year y+1 depending on the final management 
objective. This effort can be the minimum of the three efforts, thus protecting the 
most endangered stock (the one with the lowest fishing mortality). Or it can be the 
maximum effort, thus overfishing two stocks. Or some third measure, e.g. the effort 
giving the highest net present value for the total fishery in the period considered. The 
latter is the approach used in the optimisation scenario considered in the present con-
text. 
 
The final effort decided upon for year y+1 is then divided between the fishing fleets 
according to an effort distribution key based on historical effort data for the Faroese 
fleet. 
 
The biological model thus provides the catches of cod, haddock and saithe taken by 
pair trawlers and longliners during the simulation period, together with the effort used 
by each fleet in each year, and „true‟ and perceived stock estimates. These are used in 
the economic module described below to evaluate economic performance of the fleets 
given the simulated management system. 
6.3.2. Economic framework 
In the economic framework landing value (revenue), crew share, other variable costs 
and cash flow is evaluated for each fleet each year of the simulation period. This is 
used to evaluate the total net present value (NPV) for each fleet in the simulation pe-
riod including 2005, i.e. for the period 2005-2015. 
 
The revenue for each fleet Fl in year y is given by: 
 
(6.1)  
sp
yspFlspyFl CpR ,,,                      
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I.e. the sum over the species (sp) of the price of that species times the fleet catch of 
the species in year y. 
 
The crew share is assumed to be given by a constant share of the revenue, i.e. by: 
 
(6.2) yFlFlyFl RcsCS ,,                                                                                                                             
 
where Flcs  is the fraction that the crew on fleet Fl get of the total fleet revenue.  
 
The other variable costs are given by: 
 
(6.3) yFlFlyFl EvcVC ,,                                                                                                                                
 
where yFlE ,  
is the effort applied by fleet Fl in year y and Flvc  is the variable cost per 
effort unit used by fleet Fl.  
 
The cash flow (profit) taken by fleet Fl in year y is then given by: 
 
(6.4) y,Fly,Fly,Fly,Fl VCCSR                                                                                                                 
 
Finally the net present value for each fleet over the simulation period plus 2005 is 
given by: 
 
(6.5) 




2015
2005
20051y
y
y,Fl
Fl
)r(
NPV                                                                                                                   
 
i.e. the total discounted rent over the period. In the optimisation framework, it is the 
sum of the NPV‟s for each fleet segment that is the optimisation objective, deter-
mined by varying the fleet efforts from 2006 to 2015. 
6.3.3. Biological data 
The biological input to the model is based on observed data provided by the ICES 
North-western Working Group (NWWG). The initialisation data used for the three 
species are given in table 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
CEVIS    FOI    153 
Tabel 6.2. Initialisation data (year=1998) for Faroe plateau cod 
     
Age Stock number (thousands) Natural mortality rate Maturity rate Weight per fish (kg) 
     
1   17669 0.2 0 0 
2  5949 0.2 0 1.004 
3  4988 0.2 0.62 1.417 
4  7019 0.2 0.90 1.802 
5  12021 0.2 0.99 2.280 
6  2587 0.2 0.99 3.478 
7  355 0.2 1 5.433 
8  209 0.2 1 5.851 
9  49 0.2 1 7.970 
 
 
Table 6.3. Initialisation data (year=1998) for Faroe plateau haddock  
     
Age Stock number (thousands) Natural mortality rate Maturity rate Weight per fish (kg) 
     
1 18359 0.2  0.00  0.000 
2 3638 0.2  0.01  0.622 
3 7656 0.2  0.36  0.846 
4 28565 0.2  0.87  1.016 
5 44557 0.2  0.99  1.283 
6 1163 0.2  1.00  2.080 
7 161 0.2  1.00  2.556 
8 211 0.2  1.00  2.572 
9 233 0.2  1.00  2.452 
10 1216 0.2  1.00  2.753 
 
 
Table 6.4. Initialisation data (year=1998) for Faroe plateau saithe 
     
Age Stock number (thousands) Natural mortality rate Maturity rate Weight per fish (kg) 
     
3  12391 0.2  0.01  1.39 
4  26844 0.2  0.16  1.71 
5  15161 0.2  0.37  1.95 
6  17927 0.2  0.54  2.40 
7  4118 0.2  0.79  3.30 
8  1824 0.2  0.97  4.22 
9  790 0.2  0.97  5.00 
10  148 0.2  1.00  6.39 
11  67 0.2  1.00  6.66 
12  150 0.2  1.00  8.48 
 
Note: ‘N’=Stock numbers at age (Thousand individuals), ‘M’=Natural Mortality, ‘Mat’=Maturity fraction, 
‘W’=Stock weight at age (kg) 
 
 
The Ricker model ( )exp( SSBsSSBrR  ) is used to estimate recruitment R 
each year based on spawning stock biomass (SSB) in the previous year. The parame-
ters used in the equation are given in table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5. Ricker stock-recruitment parameters used in the biological simula-
tions 
   
 r s 
   
Cod 0.7756 1.529·10-5 
Haddock 2.558 2.708·10-5 
Saithe 2.393 2.119·10-5 
6.3.4. Economic data 
In the years 1999-2005 historical fleet-specific species prices are used to calculate the 
yearly catch values (equation 1). From 2006 and onwards the 2005 prices are used. 
The prices are shown in table 6.6. 
 
Table 6.6. Fleet-specific species prices (€/kg) used in the economic evaluations 
         
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Pair trawl 
Cod 2.20 2.61 2.72 2.09 2.24 2.22 2.51 
Haddock 1.61 1.90 1.91 1.56 0.92 0.94 0.93 
Saithe 0.70 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.50 0.44 0.54 
Long Line 
Cod 2.01 2.32 2.41 1.90 2.04 2.00 2.41 
Haddock 1.75 2.11 1.93 1.47 1.07 1.08 1.38 
Saithe 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.29 0.40 0.53 
 
Source: Hagstova (the Statistical Bureau of the Faroe Islands) 
 
 
Likewise historical data has been used for crew share and other variable costs in the 
period 1999-2005, while the 2005 data has been used for the period 2006-2015. The 
crew share (% of revenue) and variable cost per sea day is shown in table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7. Crew share (% of revenue) and variable cost (€) per days at sea used 
in the economic evaluations. 
         
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
         
Pair trawl Crew share 46% 43% 44% 43% 39% 41% 38% 
Variable cost 1399 1962 2213 2095 2445 2053 2577 
         
Long line Crew share 58% 58% 56% 55% 54% 50% 49% 
Variable cost 2023 2039 2147 2859 2892 2790 2825 
 
Source: Rasmussen and Weihe, auditing company 
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6.4. Scenarios examined 
To evaluate the economic performance of the two fleet segments in an effort control 
management system, 6 scenarios have been considered: 
1. Effort control management where the minimum of the efforts needed to take 
each of the three species is chosen. Moreover the fleet efforts are allowed to 
vary by up to 10% per year. 
2. Effort control management where the maximum of the efforts needed to take 
each of the three species is chosen. Moreover the fleet efforts are allowed to 
vary by up to 10% per year. 
3. Effort control management where the minimum of the efforts needed to take 
each of the three species is chosen. Moreover the fleet efforts are allowed to 
vary by up to 20% per year. 
4. Effort control management where the maximum of the efforts needed to take 
each of the three species is chosen. Moreover the fleet efforts are allowed to 
vary by up to 20% per year. 
5. Effort control management where the fleet efforts are chosen to optimise to 
total Net Present Value of the fishery over the simulation period. 
6. TAC management, where the TAC is set according to the same HCR as the 
effort (i.e. with at target fishing mortality of 0.45). An effort corresponding to 
each TAC is then evaluated for each species. Again the minimum or the 
maximum of these efforts can be chosen but the evaluations have shown that 
the maximum effort scenario leads to quick extinction of especially the cod 
stock, so this case is left out. Thus the minimum of the three efforts is used to 
calculate the final TAC/landings for each species. The species TACs are al-
lowed to vary with ±15% each year. 
6.5. Results  
Table 6.8 shows the NPV‟s over the simulation period for each fleet in each scenario. 
It is firstly seen that the total fleet NPV is highest in scenario 5 as expected. It is how-
ever interesting to observe that the individual NPV for the long liners is approxi-
mately equal in scenario 5 and in scenario 1, i.e. it seems that it is only the pair trawl-
ers that profit when the total fleet NPV is optimised. Secondly it is seen that both 
fleets have highest NPV in scenario 1 and 3, i.e. when the minimum of the three spe-
cies efforts are chosen, corresponding to complying with all species quotas. In the 
maximum scenarios on the other hand the NPV of both fleets are low, and negative 
for the pair trawlers, meaning that it does not pay off in the long run to take the least 
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binding quota while overfishing the two other stocks. This will also be illustrated be-
low via the stock developments in the period. Finally it is seen that the TAC scenario 
shows approximately the same result as the 10% effort min scenario. This is not sur-
prising as both scenarios build on the same HCR, and as the TAC scenario complies 
with all three quotas. Moreover the TAC scenario allows a 15% change in TACs from 
year to year. 
 
Table 6.8. Total NPV (mill €) over the simulation period for each segment in the 
Faroese Fleet, together with the sum of the segment NPVs. 
    
Scenario Pair trawl Long line Total fleet 
    
1 (effort min, 10%) 33.2 25.7 58.9 
2 (effort max, 10%) -9.2 9.6 0.4 
3 (effort min, 20%) 47.2 30.3 77.5 
4 (effort max, 20%) -5.6 10.6 5.0 
5 (max NPV) 49.6 32.0 81.6 
6 (TAC) 46.8 31.7 78.6 
 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the development in spawning stock biomass (SSB) for each of the 
three species over the simulation period. It is firstly seen that the development in the 
two minimum effort scenarios (1 and 3) is approximately equal and that the same is 
true for the development in the two maximum effort scenarios (2 and 4). The differ-
ence between the minimum and maximum effort scenarios is that the stocks of cod 
and saithe recover more quickly in the minimum scenarios than in the maximum sce-
narios, while the development of the haddock stock is the same in the minimum and 
maximum scenarios. This indicates that the haddock TAC is the least binding of the 
three TACs. The quicker recovery of the cod and saithe stocks explain why the fleets 
have higher NPV in the minimum effort scenarios than in the maximum scenario, as 
their landings will increase with the stocks. Figure 6.1 secondly shows that the cod 
and saithe stocks seem to increase at greater speed in the optimisation scenario (5) 
compared to the two minimum scenarios, but also that these stocks also start decreas-
ing again towards the end of the simulation period. The haddock stock on the contrary 
decreases steadily in the beginning of the simulation period but start to increase 
slowly towards the end.  
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Figure 6.1. Figure 6.1. Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) development of Faroe pla-
teau cod, haddock and saithe in each of the six scenarios. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Thus when the effort is chosen to maximise the fleet profits the stock development 
will be different from both the maximum and minimum effort scenarios, but not sig-
nificantly worse off. Finally it is seen that the stock oscillations in the TAC scenario 
is less pronounced and that the stocks develop slower in this scenario. 
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Figure 6.2 shows the development in fleet effort in each of the scenarios. It is not sur-
prising to observe that the fleet efforts are generally higher in the maximum effort 
scenarios (2 and 4) than in the minimum effort scenarios (1 and 3).  
 
Figure 6.2. Fleet efforts in each of the six scenarios. 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
It is more surprising that the effort decreases steadily in the minimum effort scenarios 
in most of the simulation period also when the stocks start to recover. This is ob-
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served in scenario 1 while the effort slowly starts increasing in scenario 3 at the end 
of the scenario. When this is compared with the NPV values shown in table 6.8 it is 
noticed that the fleets still manage to have high NPVs in the minimum effort scenar-
ios even though the effort is low in these scenarios. This is caused by the increasing 
stocks that lead to increasing catch values. In the maximum effort scenarios it is on 
the contrary observed that the effort increases in the beginning of the simulation pe-
riod but then starts decreasing following the decrease in SSB of all three stocks. In the 
NPV scenario (5) the effort is quite low for both fleet segments in most of the simula-
tion period, reflecting that the effort in this scenario is chosen to maximise the total 
NPV for both fleets over the period, which is done by minimising variable costs while 
maximising catch values. Finally it is seen that the efforts are also quite low in the 
TAC scenario, reflecting the assumption that the fishermen comply with all three 
TACs thus utilising the lowest effort. 
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Appendices to chapter 2 
Regulation 1639/2001 Appendix XVII (section J) 
 
Economic information per fleet segment as defined in Appendix III (Minimum 
Programme) 
  
General description Minimum1 programme First priority (annual) 
Income (turnover) Total and per species 
Production costs: 
- crew (include social cost) 
- fuel 
- repair and maintenance 
- other operational costs 
Total and per production cost category 
Fixed costs  Average cost, calculated from investment 
Financial position  Share of own/foreign capital 
Investment (asset)  
Prices/species (*)  Value, tonne 
Employment  Full time/part time/FTE 
Fleet  
 
- No 
- gt 
- kW 
- age 
- gear used 
Effort  Relevant unit accounting for technology and time 
 
1. There is a misprint in the regulation (says extended)  
(*) Quarterly basis everywhere. 
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Regulation 1639/2001 Appendix XVIII (section J) cont… 
 
Data needs for basic economic evaluation per fleet segment (Extended Pro-
gramme) 
  
General description Extended programme (Second priority) 
Landings per species Seasonal (monthly) 
Stock (by ICES areas) 
Market category 
Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Income (turnover) Subsides (annually) 
Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Production costs: 
- crew 
- fuel 
- repair and maintenance 
- other operational costs 
Further subdivision of operational costs 
Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Differentiation of remuneration to crew according to 
Position 
Fixed costs  Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Financial position  Rents to external institutions  
Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Investment (asset) By type of investment: 
hull of vessel, various engines and refrigeration/freezing, 
storage and lifting equipment 
Prices/species  
 
Monthly  
By market category 
Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Employment Skill/education 
Distinction per vessel size, regional differentiation 
Fleet Size categories of fleet segments 
regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
Effort  Regional differentiation (level 3, Appendix I) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEVIS    FOI    171 
Indicators used in Concerted Action EAEF (Economic Assessment of European 
Fisheries) 
  
AER (Annual economic report) EIAA 
Report text Appendix (time series) Summary (over time) Extended (one year) 
Economic indicators 
Value of landings  Value of landings Value of landings Value of landings 
Gross value added  Fuel costs Crew share Fuel costs 
Gross cash flow  Other running costs Gross cash flow Other running costs 
Net profit  Vessel costs Net profit Vessel costs 
 Crew share Gross value added Crew share 
 Gross cash flow  Gross cash flow 
 Depreciation  Depreciation 
 Interest  Interest 
 Net profit  Net profit 
 Gross value added  Gross value added 
 
 Operating profit margin 
(%) 
Operating profit margin 
(%) 
  Classification (words) Classification (words) 
Other economic indicators 
Employment on board (FTE)  
Employment on board 
(FTE)  
 As to the left 
Invested capital   Invested capital    
Fleet - number of vessels  Effort (days at sea)   
Fleet - total GT (1000)  Volume of landings    
Fleet - total kW (1000)  
Fleet - number of ves-
sels  
  
 Fleet - total GRT    
 Fleet - total GT     
 Fleet - total kW     
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Regulation 1639/2001 Appendix IV (section C) 
 
Detailed disaggregation of vessels for capacities (Extended Programme) 
         
Vessel length (level 1) < 10 m 10-<12 m 12-<18 m 18-<24 m 24-<40 m  40 m 
Type of fishing technique       
       
Level 2 Level 3 Level 4       
Mobile gears Beam trawl North Sea < 
221 kW 
      
  North Sea  
221 kW 
      
  Outside North 
Sea 
      
 Demersal 
trawl and 
demersal 
seine 
Bottom trawl       
  Danish and 
Scottish sei-
ners 
      
  Polyvalent       
 Pelagic 
trawl and 
seiners 
Pelagic trawl       
  Pelagic seiner 
and purse 
      
  Polyvalent       
 Dredges        
 Polyvalent 
mobile 
gears 
       
Passive gears Gears using 
hooks 
Longlines       
  Other gears 
using hooks 
      
 Drift nets 
and fixed 
nets 
       
 Pots and 
traps 
       
 Polyvalent 
passive 
gears 
       
Polyvalent 
gears 
        
 
Source: Commission Regulation (EC) no 1639/2001 Appendix IV (section C) 
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Regulation 1639/2001 Appendix III (section C) cont… 
 
Basic segmentation of vessels for capacities (Minimum Programme) 
Vessel length (level 1)  <12 m 12-<24 m 24- 40 m 40 m 
 Type of gear 
(level 2) 
Fishing technique (level 3)     
 Mobile gears Beam trawl     
  Demersal trawl and demer-
sal seiner 
    
  Pelagic trawl and seiners     
  Dredges     
  Polyvalent     
 Passive gears Gears using hooks ( 1 ) 
 
   
  Drift and fixed nets    
  Pots and traps    
  Polyvalent    
 Polyvalent 
gears 
Combining mobile and pas-
sive gears 
    
 
(1) This segment is aggregated for all passive gears. 
Note 1: If a gear category contains fewer than 10 vessels, then the cell can be merged with a neighbouring 
length category to be specified in the national programme. 
Note 2: If a vessel spends more than 50% of its time using a specific type of fishing technique, it should be 
included in the corresponding segment. 
Note 3: Length is defined as length overall (LOA). 
 
